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Abstract 
The aim of the current research is to examine the association between the quality of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure (QCSRD) and both real earnings management (REM) and 
accruals earnings management (AEM) in Indian listed companies from 2007 to 2015. Prior 
research in this area has substantiated that corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is 
related to earnings management (EM) (Yip et al., 2011; Muttakin et al., 2015). However, the 
empirical findings remain inconclusive with regard to whether commitment to CSR reporting 
has a positive or a negative impact on EM and vice versa. These puzzling results may be due 
to differences in their measurement of CSR disclosure and EM. The methods of measuring 
CSR disclosure that have been employed when examining the relationship with EM do not 
consider the QCSRD, which is important for distinguishing the information provided to users. 
Therefore, this study examined the relationship between QCSRD and EM in India. QCSRD is 
measured through a framework, which has been developed by this study, to capture three 
dimensions: the quantity of CSR information disclosed; the spread of CSR information 
disclosed and the usefulness of CSR information (characteristics of CSR information). It is also 
the first research to provide a broad examination of the influence of CSR reporting on both real 
and accrual earnings management. AEM is measured through the modified Jones model 
(1995), REM is estimated by employing Dechow et al.’s (1998) model. The study results 
indicate that the QCSRD is negatively and significantly associated with both AEM and REM. 
This is consistent with the moral perspective and assumes that companies with low levels of 
QCSRD engage more in real or accruals-based earnings management compared to those 
companies with a higher level of QCSRD. The study findings are also in line with signalling 
and agency theory suggesting that, by providing QCSRD, companies may mitigate information 
asymmetry and the problem of conflicting interests.  . 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The current chapter provides a rationale for the present thesis, which begins by clarifying its 
overview and justifications in section 1.1. Section 1.2 discusses the research motivations. 
Section 1.3 discusses the research question and objectives of this study. The importance of 
the research is discussed in section 1.4 and the methodology of study is explained in section 
1.5.  The contribution of study is presented in Section 1.6, and Section 1.7 shows the structure 
of this thesis. 
1.1 Research Overview  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting is an issue of growing interest for academics, 
businesses and stakeholders. CSR is commonly viewed as the type and scope of social 
obligations which should be considered by companies in the course of their routine business 
activities (Shamir, 2005). In practice, those companies who implement and report CSR 
activities are bound to provide reliable and transparent financial information (Kim et al., 2012; 
Bozzolan et al., 2015) and demonstrate a commitment to ethical and accountable behaviour to 
stakeholders (Jones & Wood, 1995; Yip et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2016). Nevertheless, there 
is an argument that CSR reporting can be used as an entrenchment mechanism to achieve 
managers’ self-interest aims through distorting earnings information (McWilliams et al., 
2006; Choi et al., 2013). Managers, when they want to disguise the true state of a company’s 
financial performance, may adopt earnings management (EM) to report and estimate the 
information by means of flexible accounting. EM is broadly interpreted as a way to “mislead 
some information users about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
impact contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999).  In this context, due to managers look after their own interests through providing 
ﬁnancial statements that do not reflect an accurate economic picture of the firm, EM is 
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considered a type of agency cost (Sun et al., 2010). Although CSR reporting and earnings 
management (EM) have established themselves separately as well-researched areas, relatively 
less attention has been paid to setting up a link between two. Since EM is influenced by the 
choices and incentives of those who are involved in formulating and making decisions in the 
organisations, consideration of CSR reporting could be important determinants (Choi et al., 
2013; Wang et al., 2016).  
 In order to explain the link between CSR reporting and EM, previous studies have suggested 
two perspectives, which are the legitimacy perspective and the moral perspective (Patten & 
Trompeter, 2003; Kim et al., 2012; Grougiou et al., 2014). According to the legitimacy 
approach, firms voluntarily issue CSR reporting to promote an impression of CSR values, 
which may or may not  be substantiated (Prior et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010; Mahoney at el, 
2013). Following this argument, the relationship between EM and CSR reporting could be 
substitutive in the sense that companies with low quality financial reporting might disclose 
CSR information as a mechanism of legitimacy to substitute for the low quality financial 
information (Martínez-Ferrero, et al, 2015). CSR reporting, in this sense, is used as window-
dressing to divert attention from questionable financial reporting processes. Consistent with 
the political cost hypothesis, firms are more likely to use disclosures to reduce political costs. 
These companies may disclose CSR information, for example, in order to reduce the likelihood 
that they will be targeted by adverse political actions. 
On the other hand, the moral perspective assumes that companies, which are socially 
responsible and disclose quality information of their CSR, are less likely to manipulate earnings 
(e.g. Chih et al., 2008; Yip et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2013). According to this perspective, a 
company with a strong commitment to CSR is more prone to act in a responsible way when 
reporting its financial statements (Choi et al., 2013). In the same vein, Kim et al. (2012) argue 
that firms  which  expend  their efforts  and  resources  on  designing  CSR programmes  and  
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implementing  these  programmes  to  address  the  ethical  interests  of stakeholders follow 
more transparent and reliable financial reporting and, thus, are less likely to manage earnings. 
Given that managers are more likely to manipulate earnings when there is high information 
asymmetry, CSR reporting is assumed by signalling theory to be a means for mitigating the 
information asymmetry between management personnel and stakeholders.  
Prior research in this area has substantiated that CSR reporting is associated with EM.  
Empirical findings, however, remain inconclusive with regard to whether commitment to CSR 
reporting has a positive or negative impact on EM and vice versa (for example, Sun et al, 2010; 
Yip et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2015; Muttakin & Azim, 2015; Belgacem & Omri 2015; Rezaee 
et al., 2017). These empirical studies have produced contradictory results as to the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and EM. For instance, while Wang et al. (2015) and Rezaee et al. 
(2017) found a negative relationship between CSR disclosure and EM, Muttakin & Azim 
(2015) and Belgacem & Omri (2015) report a positive relationship between them. Furthermore, 
Yip et al. (2011) investigate whether CSR reporting is associated with EM in a sample of US 
publicly listed oil and gas and food companies. They found a positive relationship in the food 
industry and a negative relationship in the oil and gas industry between CSR disclosures and 
EM. Conversely, Sun et al (2010), examined the relationship between environmental disclosure 
and discretionary accruals (DAs) in the UK. Their result suggests no significant statistical 
association between various measures of DA and environmental disclosure.   
One important gap in the previous studies is related to the measurement of CSR reporting. So 
far, two methods of measuring CSR disclosure have been employed when examining the 
relationship with EM. The first method uses subjective analyst disclosure quality rankings. 
Such indices rankings are not available in many countries and, therefore, cannot be applied 
widely. The second method measures CSR reporting based on the theme and amount of 
information disclosed. However, this method does not consider other important dimensions 
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that distinguish the information provided to users (e.g. Muttakin & Azim, 2015; Belgacem & 
Omri 2015; Rezaee et al., 2017). 
Prior studies also provide inconsistent results. One possible reason for this could be due to the 
biased measurement of CSR disclosure. Given the contradiction of prior studies’ findings, and 
the importance of this association for market participants and academics, more research is 
needed. It is not possible to conclude the possible effects of CSR reporting on EM without 
knowing whether CSR disclosure conveys true (as in the ethical perspective) or false 
information (as in the managerial opportunism or legitimacy perspective).  
The above discussion poses an important research question. However, the current study argues 
that it is more likely to reconcile these contradictions through evaluating the quality of CSR 
disclosure (QCSRD). Therefore, this study developed a multidimensional framework to 
measure the QCSRD. Then, the study empirically examines whether firms which exhibit 
QCSRD behave appropriately to constrain EM, thereby delivering more transparent and 
reliable financial information. Chih et al., (2008) argue that managers are less likely to engage 
in EM in companies that provide high quality disclosure of their social activities, which targets 
all stakeholders. This is because, when the transparency of information is increased, the 
expectation of the information asymmetry among the management and stakeholders will be 
reduced. Since the reduction in information asymmetry tends to constrain EM (Wang et al, 
2015), this study expects a negative association between QCSRD and EM. 
1.2 Research Motivations 
The motivation for the current research arises from several considerations. Firstly, due to the 
existence of agency conflict with the problem of information asymmetry, managers are more 
likely to engage in EM opportunistically in their own interests rather than optimising the 
company’s value. Consequently, this misleads stakeholders about the company’s financial 
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position and its market value. Therefore, due to the existence of agency costs, accountable and 
transparent systems should be introduced to mitigate this problem (Leftwich, 1980; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990). Agency theory proposes that companies might use different strategies to 
minimise the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders, such as CSR disclosure. 
In addition, the opportunistic perspective and the moral perspective (Kim et al., 2012) also pose 
an important research question. However, a closer look at the arguments behind these two 
perspectives reveals that they can be reconciled if one can evaluate the informational content 
(i.e. quality) of CSR. Therefore, the current study has a strong incentive to examine the 
relationship between QCSRD and EM. 
Secondly, previous empirical studies have produced contradictory results on the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and EM. These puzzling results may be due to differences in their 
measurement of CSR disclosure and EM. Previous studies (e.g. Kansal et al., 2014; Oikonomou 
et al., 2015) have measured CSR disclosure by using quantity as a proxy for quality. However, 
Botosan (2004) argued that although quantity and quality are inseparable and difficult to 
measure, information quantity disclosed does not necessarily imply quality. Furthermore, since 
it is difficult to measure disclosure quality due to issues of objectivity, the measurement of 
CSR disclosure quantity needs to be paralleled by quality measurement in order to clearly 
understand the level of CSR disclosure. 
Thirdly, another important gap observed from previous literature is on the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and EM. While many previous studies (e.g. Yip et al., 2011; Muttakin 
& Azim 2015) have used accruals bases in their measurement, no research has used real 
earnings management to examine the relationship between QCSRD and EM. This limitation in 
measurement, caused by the absence of a broader framework and omission of certain important 
variables, make the findings of these empirical studies inappropriate in establishing the 
relationship between CSR disclosure and EM.  
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Fourthly, since the majority of research is conducted in developed countries (e.g. Sun et al., 
2010; Yip et al., 2011), not much is known about the relationship between CSR disclosure and 
EM in developing countries. Only a few empirical studies in developing countries, Belgacem 
& Omri (2015) in Tunisia and Khan and Azim (2015) in Bangladesh, have investigated their 
relationship. Based on the above evidence, this study is motivated to examine the relationship 
between QCSRD and EM in India using a broader measurement framework of EM and a 
multidimensional proxy of QCSRD. 
Studying the link between QCSRD and EM in the Indian context is important for several 
reasons. Firstly, this study suggests that there are additional factors to be analysed, which are 
not included in developed countries’ paradigms. Prior research has argued that several factors 
such as culture, religion and other societal norms may influence CSR disclosure and EM (e.g. 
Hastings, 2000; Gautam and Singh, 2010). The focus on the quality of CSR disclosure and EM 
in the Indian context, and the practices of its leading companies, could provide practitioners 
and scholars with a new model (Cappelli et al., 2010). Secondly, the focus on one of the fastest 
growing economies can inform general managers and CSR managers about the characteristics 
of the Indian approach to QCSRD and EM. Thirdly, the Indian context makes an interesting 
example, being an environment that has one of the highest levels of CSR practices among other 
developing countries (Reserve Bank of India, 2009; Unido, 2002). India passed Section 135 of 
the Companies Act, in 2013, recommending a mandatory “CSR spend of 2% of average net 
income during the ending financial year” for all companies meeting specified financial 
thresholds by this Act. Thus, it has gone further than any other country. Finally, Indian listed 
companies exhibit a strong presence of family and promoter groups’ ownership (Chauhan et 
al. 2016). It is also a fact that Indian institutional laws, mechanisms and governance are weak 
compared to western countries (Reddy, 2016). Therefore, research findings for western 
countries may not be applicable in the Indian context. 
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1.3 Research Question and Objectives 
Recently, investors have increased their attention on CSR disclosures (Diouf and  Boiral, 
2017). The report of the Investors Responsibility Research Centre Institute in 2016 indicates 
that investors are integrating environmental social information into their investment decisions. 
Furthermore, several recent empirical studies investigate the importance of CSR reporting to 
business organisations, its relevance as it pertains to corporate culture, and raised concerns 
about the CSR reporting as a determinant of EM. Rezaee (2017) suggests that organisations 
should take their CSR reporting to the top of the agenda for their directors and executives to 
integrate into their corporate culture and business models, due to their potential role in 
mitigating information asymmetry and the problem of agency conflict. This thesis responds to 
these calls and the limitations within prior studies, which is explained in section 1.1, related to 
the measurement of CSR reporting and EM plus the contradictory results of prior studies. Thus, 
the main focus of this study is to answer its main question: 
 "Is there a positive or negative relationship between the QCSRD and the level of AEM and 
REM among Indian listed companies?”.  
This will be addressed through three empirical stages. The first stage is to measure both AEM 
and REM among Indian listed companies, while the second stage is to investigate the firms’ 
QCSRD among Indian listed companies. The final stage is to examine the relationship between 
QCSRD and both AEM and REM. To address the research’s primary question, the main aim 
of this study and key objectives are explained as follows: 
The aim of this study is to understand the relationship between the QCSRD and EM among 
the top 500 Indian listed companies. The key objectives are: 
1. To measure the level of EM among Indian listed companies; 
1.1 To measure the level of AEM among Indian listed companies. 
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1.2 To measure the level of REM among Indian listed companies. 
2. To measure QCSRD among Indian listed companies. 
3. To examine the relationship between QCSRD and EM among Indian listed 
companies. 
1.4 The importance of the Research  
This study is important from both academic and practical aspects. There is a gap in the previous 
studies on the impact of the CSR disclosure of the companies on the practices of EM, especially 
in the developing countries’ context. Furthermore, this is the first study to examine the effect 
of QCSRD on both AEM and REM. Companies now need to take care of moral aspects and 
social responsibility, which may help to improve the welfare of society and reduce economic 
problems such as unemployment, poverty and environmental pollution.  Furthermore, 
clarifying the impact of QCSRD provides information on environmental and social activities 
alongside financial information. This helps to meet the requirements of all stakeholders and 
reduces conflict of interest through providing quality information and thus the transparency of 
financial reports. Therefore, such research can provide good guidance for activating the role of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure in reducing EM practices in the Indian context. This 
study also helps standard setters and regulators to continue improving the guidance and 
frameworks to assist firms to provide high quality financial reporting and CSR disclosure. 
 
1.5 The Research Methodology  
A summary of the methodology used in the current research is presented in this section. The 
methodology in detail, comprising justification of the research measurements and methods, is 
presented in Chapter 4 (methodology chapter). In order to achieve objective one of this 
research, EM practices are addressed in chapter five.  AEM is measured through the modified 
Jones model (1995), as the main proxy, and Kothari et al.’s (2005) model, as a robustness 
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check, using different years and different industries. REM is estimated employing Dechow et 
al.’s (1998) model which is adopted by Roychowdhury (2006) using different years and 
different industries. The second objective of the present study is to measure QCSRD among 
Indian listed companies. This objective is achieved by measuring QCSRD through developing 
a multidimensional framework in chapter six. In order to address the main purpose of the 
current study, the relationship between EM and QCSRD is examined in chapter seven. 
Quantitative data for measuring EM is collected from the OSIRIS database, which contains 
reliable information on listed companies. Qualitative data, which was used to measure QCSRD, 
is collected from the annual reports of these companies, which make up the final sample of this 
study.  
Overall, three main steps are used by this study in data analysis. These consist of the 
preliminary analysis, the multivariate analysis and finally the robustness checks. In the initial 
analysis, the current study discusses the descriptive statistics and checks for a multicollinearity 
problem using a correlation matrix. The description of data with regards to the central tendency 
test on a single variable is achieved through descriptive statistics. The correlation between 
independent variables of the study sample is tested through a pairwise correlation matrix. 
In the present study, regression analysis is employed to test the study hypotheses. In order to 
test whether the panel or pooled model is more suitable, the Chow test and Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) are conducted for the study regression models, which are used in 
examining the study hypotheses. In order to determine the suitability of the fixed effect or 
random effect for the current study, the Hausman test is conducted.  
Furthermore, the current study conducted several (alternative) additional analyses to ensure the 
robustness of the main study results. To increase the power of the primary test and ensure the 
accuracy of the main results, the following analysis was used. Firstly, the current study uses 
suspect firms that may manipulate earnings based on four sub-samples of companies with 
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strong EM incentives. Secondly, the present study also examines whether EM differs between 
the high QCSRD and low QCSRD companies. Finally, using an alternative measurement of 
the explanatory variables AEM and REM, the current study tests whether the primary findings 
are robust to various measures or not. Two-stage least square regression (2SLS) is also included 
in order to check whether the results related to the relationship between EM and QCSRD and 
the finding related to the relationship between AEM and REM are impacted by an endogeneity 
problem or not.  
 
1.6 The Research Contribution  
Several contributions are made to the knowledge through this study, which are theoretical 
contributions and methodological contributions. 
1.6.1 Theoretical contribution 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it contributes to the literature 
in term of determinants of EM. It sheds light on the impact of the QCSRD on earnings 
management. The previous studies on the relationship between CSR disclosure and earnings 
management evaluate CSR reporting using the incidence and the amount of CSR disclosure 
without paying significant attention to the quality of the information disclosed, therefore, their 
findings are inconsistent. This study provides evidence that Indian firms disclosing QCSRD 
are, in fact, delivering more transparent and reliable financial information, which is consistent 
with the ethical perspective. Secondly, this is the first research to provide a broad examination 
of the influence of CSR reporting on both real and accrual earnings management. Prior studies 
(e.g. Belgacem & Omri, 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Yip et al., 2011) examine the impacts of CSR 
reporting on EM but do not specifically examine for REM. Therefore, they can provide only a 
partial picture of the relationship. The present study, thus, allows for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the effect of CSR reporting on EM. Finally, this study provides evidence that 
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Indian firms with QCSRD are, in fact, delivering more transparent and reliable financial 
information. Thus, the current study also extends the EM literature by providing empirical 
evidence of determinants of EM in an emerging economy context. 
1.6.2 Methodological contribution 
CSR reports have been criticised for their lack of relevance and credibility (Husillos et al., 
2011). This study seeks to contribute to this critique by offering new insights concerning the 
complexity of QCSRD and its relationship with EM, and develop a new multidimensional 
model to measure QCSRD. This framework provides evidence on the nature of a company’s 
CSR disclosures based on three dimensions, which allows capturing the quantitative and 
qualitative features concerning a specific kind of CSR information. The first dimension is the 
actual amount of disclosure, relative to the amount adjusted by two factors, size and 
complexity; prior studies show these two variables to have a strong impact on disclosure (e.g. 
Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). This is more likely to help in evaluating CSR 
disclosure, taking into account the differences in the companies’ size and industry. The second 
dimension measures the spread of CSR information. Using spread dimension in this framework 
helps to evaluate whether the CSR information disclosed meets the need of different 
stakeholders or focuses on specific groups. The usefulness dimension helps information users 
to evaluate CSR disclosure by capturing the four type characteristics: the relevance, faithful 
representation, understandability and comparability (based upon the qualitative characteristics 
of information suggested in the conceptual frameworks of IFRS (2010A). These procedures 
used allow a rich description of the nature and patterns of disclosure to emerge, and permit 
these dimensions to be analysed both in combination and individually.  
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1.7 Structure of the research 
The current study comprises eight chapters, including this chapter, which presents the overview 
of the current research and its objectives. This chapter summarises the motivation of the study 
and its methodology. Finally, this chapter presents the results, contribution of study and the 
structure of the present research. 
 Chapter two discusses two main points. Firstly the literature related to CSR disclosure is 
discussed, followed by the link between QCSRD and EM. It explains the argument about the 
definitions and concept of CSR disclosure and discusses its importance. It then presents the 
relationship between CSR disclosure and EM through prior literature and different theories to 
clarify why companies engage in CSR disclosure, and also to explain how QCSRD can be 
linked to AEM and REM. 
Chapter three presents an overview of EM, its activities and the models, which are used to 
estimate these activities. Starting with EM definitions, the previous literature is discussed to 
explain the common definitions of EM. Moreover, chapter three also clarifies the differences 
between AEM and REM, the techniques of EM and their measurements. It also discusses the 
most commonly-used models to measure accrual and real EM. Finally, the empirical studies 
which relate to the AEM and REM are discussed in chapter three. 
Chapter four explains in detail the methodology of this thesis. It explains the study hypotheses, 
clarifies the study sample and data collection, discusses and justifies the methods used for 
measuring EM (AEM and REM) as dependent variables and QCSRD as an independent 
variable, as well as the control variables.  It also explains the empirical models used to examine 
the relationship between QCSRD and EM. The analytical processes are also explained in this 
chapter.  
Chapter five addresses and analyses the empirical results related to earnings management 
across the sample studied. The key purpose of chapter five is to achieve objective one. The 
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results of AEM and REM practice and their trade-off are presented in this chapter, which begins 
with descriptive statistics then addresses the correlation matrix and the regression analysis. The 
robustness of the results was also reported in this chapter. 
Chapter six presents the empirical results of the QCSRD based on a multidimensional 
framework in order to achieve the second objective. It discusses the descriptive statistics and 
provides empirical findings based on the relationship between QCSRD and the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts.     
Chapter seven aims to achieve the main purpose of this study, which is related to the 
relationship between QCSRD and EM. This chapter provides the results from several analyses 
involving descriptive statistics, correlation matrixs using pairwise correlation and then 
regression analysis tests. This is done in order to examine the hypotheses related to the main 
question of this study.  Additional analysis of the robustness was also conducted in this chapter 
to check whether the main findings changed using different measurements or not. 
Finally, the conclusions of this thesis and an overall summery is provided in Chapter eight,  
this final chapter  discusses the summary of the key study results, limitations and the 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE LITERATURE REVIEW ON CSR 
DISCLOSURE AND ITS IMPACT ON EM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the second objective of this study is to measure the QCSRD practices, and the main aim 
is to examine the relationship between QCSRD and EM, chapter two is organised as follows: 
The concept of CSR and CSR disclosure is presented in section 2.2 and section 2.3 respectively. 
The importance and motivations of CSR disclosure are discussed in section 2.4 and 2.5. Section 
2.6 shows the determinants of CSRD and section 2.7 present the quality of CSR disclosure. 
Then the relationship between QCSRD and EM and theories related to EM and CSR disclosure 
are clarified in sections 2.8 and 2.9. Finally, the summary of this chapter is provided in section 
2.10. 
2.2 The Concept of CSR  
CSR is commonly viewed as the type and scope of social obligations, which should be 
considered by companies in the course of their routine business activities (Shamir, 2005). The 
importance of the CSR issue has been increased for several stakeholders. (Shamir, 2005; 
Morsing, M., & Schultz, 2006). Daub (2007) suggested that managers are currently forced to 
justify their activities to wider stakeholders. To this end, management no longer limit their 
focus on the economic activities, therefore managers should pay more attention to other issues 
that may affect their activities. Govekar & Hoffman (2007) argue that the concept of social 
responsibility appeared for the first time in 1923, when Sheldon pointed out that companies are 
expected to be socially responsible. They explained that the existence of companies and their 
continuity requires them to commit to, and fulfil, their social responsibility when performing 
their different activities. They identified two key areas of social responsibility: their 
responsibility to their employees and also to the community. Epstein & Buhovac (2014) 
indicate that social responsibility is closely linked with the concept of sustainable development. 
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This term describes companies' activities to meet their current needs without impacting future 
generations’ ability to meet their own needs. This concept is based on three main elements, 
which are environmental protection, economic growth and social development. Thus, social 
responsibility is the key tool that can help to achieve the concept of sustainable development 
(Moon, 2007; Hassan et al., 2010; Pirnea et al., 2011). Although social responsibility has 
become an issue of growing interest for academics, businesses and stakeholders, there is no 
comprehensive concept of a commonly-agreed definition of social responsibility yet (Dahlsrud, 
2008; Mihalache, 2013). This section, therefore, will offer a set of concepts that have been 
introduced by academic studies and a number of international organisations, which are assumed 
to contribute to the identification of social responsibility and its various dimensions.  
A number of academic studies have provided various social responsibility definitions. Thus, 
CSR can appear under different terms, such as business ethics, corporate citizenship, corporate 
accountability and corporate social performance (e.g. Carroll, 1999; Valor, 2005; Dahlsrud, 
2008). For example, social responsibility has been defined as dealing with stakeholders 
ethically or in a responsible manner that is consistent with the principles of civil societies and 
contributes to the enhancement of a high quality of stakeholder interest (Hopkins, 2004). 
Branco et al. (2006) also indicated that social responsibility is a set of standards which controls 
the decision-making process within the company, which include controlling the negative 
impact on the community and stakeholders. Galbreath, (2010) has also indicated that CSR is 
the activities and processes that aim to improve managers’ relationships with stakeholders and 
society at large. Others indicated that CSR is mostly a voluntary activity that directs the 
company's resources towards improving social welfare, which would protect the interest of 
stakeholders (Falck & Heblich, 2007; Arevalo & Aravind, 2011).  
Similarly, international organisations made a series of attempts to provide a comprehensive 
concept of social responsibility. For instance, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
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Development (2000) pointed out that social responsibility is a commitment by companies to 
contribute to sustainable development through cooperating with workers and their families, the 
local community, and society at large. High quality companies engage in these activities in 
order to improve the standard of living in a manner that serves the trade and leads to 
development at the same time (Cetindamar, 2007; Mijatovic et al., 2015). The International 
Business Leaders Forum (2005) also indicated that social responsibility is a commitment to the 
practices of commercial firms in light of a set of ethical principles that help to respect workers, 
community and environment, thus contributing to the creation of sustainable values for 
shareholders and society in general (Nelson, 2006). The European Commission (2001) also 
stated that firms should consider social and environmental concerns when conducting their 
business operations and their interaction with stakeholders. 
It is noted that, in the previous concepts, whether provided by academic studies or international 
institutions, four key dimensions of social responsibility are included. Carroll, (1991) and 
Matten and Moon (2008) indicated that these four dimensions of responsibility can be 
explained as a pyramid, presented in Figure 2.1, Firstly, economic dimension is the base upon 
which all the other dimensions are enhanced. The economic dimension perceives companies 
as economic units which provide sustainable earnings for shareholders, producing high quality 
goods demanded by the public at fair prices and providing new jobs with fair payment for the 
workforce. Secondly, the legal dimension requires companies within society to comply with 
social regulations and carry out the responsibility for their activities in accordance with local 
and international legal requirements. Thirdly, the ethical dimension requires companies to 
behave morally. Thus, it should meet the expectations of society, such as paying attention to 
environmental and sustainable development, human rights and avoiding misleading 
advertising. Fourthly, the voluntary dimension focuses on donations to the community and 
goes further than the shareholders’ perspectives, including the activities that are considered 
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desirable by the community. Examples of this might be supporting social and cultural projects, 
training and human resource development and creating employment opportunities for the 
public.  
Figure 2.1 (Carroll Model): 
Source: Carroll (1991, p.42) 
2.3 The Concept of CSR Disclosure 
There are two main categories of disclosure: voluntary and mandatory disclosure (Owusu-nsah, 
1998). Verrecchia (2001) argues that Mandatory disclosure forces managers to provide 
information on both bad and good news of their operations. Voluntary disclosure is defined as 
information in excess of requirements, which represents the willingness by managers to provide 
information that is deemed essential to users of their annual reports (Chau and Gray, 2002). 
Voluntary disclosure is a decision made by companies to disclose information for achieving 
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their different targets. Beyer et al. (2010) suggest that a substantial part of information used by 
decision makers in the markets is provided through voluntary disclosures. One of the most 
significant pieces of voluntary disclosure obtained from annual reports is CSR disclosure 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991; Epstein and Palepu, 1999; Hope, 2003). Since voluntary CSR 
disclosure is the flexible part of disclosure that can be affected by managers’ decisions, the 
current study focuses on this aspect of disclosure (voluntary CSR disclosure). CSR disclosure 
is a primary tool for managers to communicate with stakeholders about the social activities of 
the company. Therefore, it is a key tool in building strong relationships with stakeholders and 
creating mutual understanding to manage the potential conflicts (Balmer et al., 2006; Hess, 
2008). Moreover, CSR disclosure is used by managers as the main mechanism to inform wider 
stakeholders about the company’s CSR practices (Bella and Cooper, 2011). CSR disclosure, 
which is the focus of this chapter, includes financial and non-financial information relating to 
the company's interaction with the social environment. This is presented in their annual reports, 
or other reports prepared for this purpose. 
One of the earliest CSR disclosure definitions, which is provided by Elias and Epstein (1975), 
focuses on some aspects related to a company’s social practices or its influence. Since then, 
various definitions of CSR disclosure have been proposed by prior studies (Glautier et al., 2001; 
Hess, 2008; Bella and Cooper, 2011; Rezaee and Tuo, 2017). For many years the growing 
concern in CSR disclosure has focused on issues related to society and the environment (Yusri 
& Amran, 2012). Gray et al. (1987) defined CSR disclosure as the procedures of 
communicating the impacts of social and environmental practices of the companies’ economic 
activities to interested stakeholders within the community. Mathews and Perera (1995) 
suggested that CSR disclosure is an extension of disclosure about community service, 
employees, products, and reduction or prevention of pollution. In their CSR disclosure, firms 
provide financial and non-financial information relating to the company's interaction with 
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social and environmental issues, in annual reports or other reports prepared for this purpose. 
Glautier et al. (2001) stated that CSR disclosure is a concept of reporting information relating 
to the new dimensions for business, such as fair business practices, environment, energy, 
community, human resources, safety, involvement, trust, products and innovation. Moreover, 
CSR disclosure is a primary tool for communicating with stakeholders about the social 
activities of the company. Therefore, it is a key element in building strong relationships and 
creating mutual understanding to manage the potential conflicts (Hess, 2008). Burchell and 
Cook (2006) suggest that disclosure of corporate social responsibility is a report on the social 
and environmental effect of the companies’ operation on stakeholders within the community 
at large. Smith et al. (2005) explain that CSR disclosure is information provided by a company 
about social performance, whether positive or negative. In addition, companies are required to 
report both good and bad CSR information to enhance investors’ decision-making and provide 
fair information for wider stakeholders. Furthermore, social disclosure is voluntary in most 
cases, aimed at enhancing the firm’s respect for natural environment and contributing to 
achievement of social justice as an extension of good business practices (Hassan et al., 2010). 
Based on the above definitions, CSR disclosure can be defined as a broad term that includes 
different issues, such as environment and energy-related disclosure, human resources-related 
information, society involvement-related disclosure and product and customer relations 
information (e.g. Gray et al., 1995; Deegan, 2002; Gao et al., 2005). Fundamentally, CSR 
disclosure is perceived to be a picture of firms’ CSR practices as represented in their annual 
reports. 
2.4 The Importance of CSR Disclosure 
Communities’ needs for CSR information disclosed by listed companies have increased, and 
CSR disclosure has become an important requirement for stakeholders. For instance, Tian & 
Chen (2009) pointed out that voluntary disclosure gives depth and credibility to mandatory 
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disclosure, since it enhances and expands the information provided in mandatory disclosure. 
Investors are increasingly aware of the importance of social responsibility disclosure. Passetti 
et al. (2009) argue that CSR disclosure is one of the factors that influence investment decisions, 
which is used as a reference to the value of investment in intangible assets and managing risks. 
Therefore, it is considered a good indicator of a firm’s value. Many studies have found that 
social responsibility information is useful for making investment decisions, thus there are 
increasing requests from investors for such information (e.g. Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Casey and 
Grenier, 2014; Lee, 2017). Sun et al. (2010) argue that non-financial information which is 
disclosed voluntarily, such as CSR disclosure, may reduce asymmetric information, mitigate 
the uncertainty risk, and thus improve the financial decisions in the capital markets.  
Lungu et al. (2011) also argue that CSR disclosure improves the quality of financial reporting. 
Traditional reports are characterised by their deficiency in providing useful information; this is 
required to identify and report on the economic activities in the context of sustainable 
development. Thus, traditional reports are required to be re-structured in a wider context. This 
should include not only the traditional categories, which are provided in disclosure, but should 
be improved to meet the needs of the various stakeholders.  
In the same context, Luo et al. (2015) suggest that CSR disclosure may contribute to 
maximising the value of companies. Many previous studies have found a positive impact of 
CSR disclosure on the company's value, due to the ability of this disclosure to reduce the cost 
of capital and improve the performance of the stock market. Moreover, CSR disclosure is 
deepening the social role of companies in order to improve their financial performance (Hassan 
and Ibrahim, 2012; Carnevale et al., 2012; Maignan, 2001). 
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2.5 The Motives of CSR Disclosure 
Rikanovic (2005) indicates that the motivation behind the expansion of the disclosure is to 
expand the knowledge and awareness of investors regarding activities related to social 
responsibility. Explanation of the motivations of CSR disclosure has been debated from various 
perspectives, such as legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and social contract theory. 
 In the absence of mandatory disclosure requirements, managers may adopt voluntary 
disclosure of social responsibility in order to legitimise the activities of the company (Branco 
& Rodrigues, 2008). Thus, disclosure of social performance could be used to build a positive 
image to legitimise the company’s activities from the community’s point of view; unless 
companies are seen as legitimate, they face the risk of going out of business. Therefore, 
legitimacy theory arguably contributes to explaining the inclusion of CSR disclosure in the 
annual reports (Suchman, 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Maali et al., 2006).  
Several studies have demonstrated that other motivations besides legislation are driving 
companies to provide CSR information to stakeholders (e.g. Campbell, 2000; Moerman et al., 
2006; Mahoney et al., 2013; Chauvey et al., 2015).  Stakeholder theory is an extension of the 
theory of legitimacy, since it takes into consideration specific groups of stakeholders  (Brown 
and Forster, 2013; Sen and Cowley, 2013). CSR information is a key element which can be 
employed by the management to deal with stakeholders in order to obtain their support or to 
distract the attention of a company's competitors (Moerman et al., 2006). Reinig & Tilt (2012) 
argue that the CSR disclosure in annual reports is affected by the strength of stakeholders, as 
the manager is trying to focus on the environmental aspects and reformulate the challenges that 
are posed by the stronger parties among the stakeholders. However, the manager must run a 
business in an ethical manner to achieve a balance between the conflicting goals of 
stakeholders, regardless of their strength, bearing in mind that each group has a right to 
information. 
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Lanis and Richardson (2012) assume a set of social contracts between various groups within 
society, and between those groups and the society itself. Although those engagements are 
implicit, they are an essential guide for managers' behaviour with various stakeholders. 
Therefore, disclosure of social responsibility is used for indicating the extent to which those 
contracts are fulfilled. Because the company is granted the authority to work in the community, 
creating wealth for shareholders must be within the boundary of social standards. Controversy 
still revolves around the importance of appropriate disclosure of information to a large number 
of stakeholders, which represents the rest of the parties to the social contract (Bondy et al., 
2012; Reinig & Tilt, 2012). 
2.6 The determinants of CSR disclosure 
Prior research has used firms’ characteristics as determinants of CSR disclosure (e.g. Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999; Beattie et al., 2004; Hussainey and Walker; 2009; Aras et al., 2010). Since 
company size is used as a proxy for political visibility, prior studies have found evidence that 
size has a strong impact on disclosure (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). 
Chih et al., (2008) suggest that CSR disclosure could be proposed to reduce asymmetric 
information and mitigate agency costs. CSR disclosure is likely to allow information users to 
evaluate reputational damage to detect potential risks. Gamerschlag et al. (2006) indicated that 
there is a positive relationship between company visibility and its CSR disclosure. Industry 
type is also indicated by prior research as a determinant variable of CSR disclosure (e.g. 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Beattie et al., 2004). Annual reports disclosure may not be similar 
in all sectors (Camfferman & Cooke, 2002), therefore, an assumption has been made for the 
similarity of disclosure practices among firms that belong to the same sector. This is due to 
the existence of regulated industries, adherence to international capital markets’ needs and 
industry sensitivity (e.g. Boutin and Sacaris, 2004; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Jennifer & 
Taylor, 2007). Ahmed and Courtis (1999) report evidence that there is a significant 
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relationship between industry type and disclosure for Swedish and Canadian companies. 
Salama et al. (2012) reveal that industry type among the UK companies has a significant 
influence on CSR disclosures. Profitability is another variable represented as determinants of 
CSR disclosure. Prior research (e.g. Bushee and Noe, 2000; Aras et al., 2010) in this area has 
substantiated that CSR reporting is associated with profitability. Kiattikulwattana (2014) 
indicates that the likelihood of CSR disclosure is higher among profitable companies than 
those companies with lower profits. Finally, agency theory suggests that agency costs increase 
with a high leverage ratio (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). Hussainey and Walker (2009) 
provided evidence that financial leverage ratio is related to CSR disclosure. They argue that 
leveraged companies may provide more information requested by other stakeholders and are 
likely to offer more details of disclosure to meet those needs. Previous literature also indicates 
that financial leverage is statistically related to CSR disclosure (e.g. Fauzi, 2009; Cheng et al., 
2014). 
2.7 The Quality of CSR Disclosure 
The quality of disclosure is a complex concept which can be defined in different ways. For 
example, it is defined as the ease that enables investors to evaluate and interpret the information 
and how it can be used (e.g., Hopkins, 1996). Other studies define quality based on security 
value after receiving the disclosure (e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Botosan (2004) 
argued that the quality of information disclosed is high if it is positively associated with 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Thus, disclosure quality is useful to the users in making 
their decisions (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008), which suggests that disclosure quality is value 
relevant information to market participants (Baek et al., 2004; Healy and Wahlen., 1999).  The 
quality of disclosure is influenced by the managers’ intentions which impacts whether they will 
represent performance transparently or not (Bagnoli and Watts, 2005). IFRS suggests that the 
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characteristics of information, such as relevance, faithfulness, understandability and 
comparability help to support companies to be more transparent in revealing their performance 
(Höring & Gründl, 2011, Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016).  
The current study argues that quality of CSR disclosure can be identified through measuring 
three dimensions: the quantity of information, spread of information and the usefulness of the 
information disclosed. Firstly, the quantity of CSR information disclosed reveals the level of 
disclosure. Secondly, the spread of CSR information helps to evaluate whether the CSR 
disclosure meets different stakeholders’ needs or focuses on specific groups. Finally, the 
usefulness of CSR information helps to evaluate disclosure in terms of information 
characteristics based on IFRS (2010), which are relevance, faithfulness, understandability and 
comparability of information. Thus, the current study suggests a new framework for the value 
of both composite summary measures and measures of individual quality dimensions of CSR 
disclosure. Composite summary measures are useful in relating CSR disclosure quality to other 
variables of interest. However, to obtain a rich understanding of CSR disclosure quality it is 
necessary to focus on the individual dimensions, their inter-relationships and the way in which 
they combine. 
Recently, stakeholders’ concern about corporate social responsibility disclosure has increased 
dramatically (Aribi, 2009). In contrast, there is a small amount of empirical academic evidence 
on the value of CSR disclosure to the information’s users in general (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). 
Botosan (2004) debates whether high quality disclosure is useful to the information's users in 
making financial decisions. Sun et al. (2010) argue that the CSR disclosure which is disclosed 
voluntarily reduces asymmetric information, which may also mitigate the uncertainty risk, 
improve the financial decisions in the capital markets and enhances financial analysts' 
decisions. However, mere disclosure (low quality information) may have a negative impact on 
the market confidence in CSR companies which will, thus, have an influence on the investor’s 
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interest in CSR activities (Botosan et al., 2004). If low quality information is reported by the 
manager, it will not enhance the judgments of financial decision makers and other stakeholders 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2012). Transparency needs to be increased by managers, and rhetoric 
statements about CSR activities also should be improved through higher QCSRD (Delmas and 
Burbano, 2011). Recently, internal managerial practice has been changed due to increased 
concern about firms’ CSR practices, which has changed information users’ understanding 
(Ioannou   and   Serafeim,   2010). Managerial disclosures about CSR, which are quantifiable, 
specific, comparable, relevant and represent  CSR activities faithfully, is more likely to reflect 
the company’s social and environmental behaviour with different stakeholders (Peattie, 2004; 
Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016). Companies which provide CSR activities for various 
stakeholders might attract universal investors (Stout, 2012) who are interested not only in 
owning shares in the company, but also value shares in the community and the entire economic 
environment (Luo et al., 2015). Information users tend to focus on various types of CSR 
disclosure in their reports in order to enhance the investment decision of different investors. 
The QCSRD is related to disclosures that reflect companies’ real commitment to CSR strategies 
and thus increases the accuracy of decision makers (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Empirical prior 
research has investigated how companies issue CSR reports on a voluntary basis and its impact 
on the performance of companies, asymmetric information, the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts 
and companies’ reputation (Maignan, 2001; Carnevale et al., 2012; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; 
Hassan and Ibrahim, 2012; Cheng et al., 2014). Other research has also focused on the impact 
of CSR information on EM (e.g. Sun et al., 2010; Yip et al., 2011; Belgacem & Omri, 2015; 
Muttakin et al., 2015; Martínez et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016). Since singling and agency 
theory suggest that the QCSRD could be used to mitigate information asymmetries (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990; Miller 2002), it can be expected that the QCSRD is useful for various 
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stakeholders and therefore comprises a positive phenomenon for stock markets (Garrido et al., 
2014).  
2.8 Measurement of QCSRD 
Previous literature has indicated that there is controversy regarding the measurement of CSR 
disclosure (HASSAN, 2010). CSR reporting has been criticised for its lack of relevance and 
credibility (Husillos et al., 2011). Prior research has used subjective analyst disclosure quality 
rankings (e.g. Becchetti et al., 2013; Ioannou and Serafeim; 2015), which are not available in 
many countries and, therefore, cannot be applied widely.  Other studies evaluate CSR reporting 
based on issuance of a stand-alone CSR report without analysing the content of CSR reports in 
order to evaluate the information provided to users (e.g. Yip et al., 2011; Thorne et al., 2014). 
The issuance of standalone CSR reports may be an attempt by management to convince 
powerful stakeholders that the firm is acting in the right way and is socially and 
environmentally responsible, regardless of whether actual performance follows (Thorne et al., 
2014). Prior studies also have evaluated CSR reporting based on the theme and amount of 
information disclosed, which have used quantity disclosure as proxy for quality (e.g. Dhaliwal 
et al., 2012; Casey and Grenier, 2014; Belgacem & Omri, 2015; Muttakin & Azim, 2015). 
However, this method does not consider other important dimensions that distinguish the 
information provided to users. Botosan (2004) argued that, although quantity and quality are 
inseparable and difficult to measure, the quantity of information disclosed does not necessarily 
imply quality. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) indicated that quality of disclosure is considered by 
not only the magnitude of disclosure, but also what is disclosed and the diversity of topics 
disclosed. To determine a better measurement model for quality of disclosure, the reported 
information by CSR disclosure must meet the key requirements of users. Users’ key needs from 
disclosure must be relevant and understandable information (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, IFRS suggests that the characteristics of information such as relevance, 
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faithfulness, understandability and comparability are useful for information users and have to 
be considered when QCSRD is evaluated (Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016). Consequently, this 
study seeks to contribute to the above debate by offering new insights concerning the 
complexity of QCSRD, and develop a new multidimensional model to measure QCSRD. This 
framework provides evidence on the nature of a company’s CSR disclosures based on three-
dimensions, which allows capturing the quantitative and qualitative features concerning a 
specific kind of CSR information. The first dimension is the actual amount of disclosure, 
relative to the amount adjusted by two factors, size and complexity, prior studies shows these 
two variables to have a strong impact on disclosure (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008). This is more likely to help for evaluating CSR disclosure taking into account 
the differences in the companies’ size and industry. The second dimension measures the spread 
of CSR information. Using spread dimension in this framework helps to evaluate whether the 
CSR information disclosed meets the need of different stakeholders or focus on specific groups. 
The usefulness dimension helps information users to evaluate CSR disclosure by capturing the 
four type characteristics: the relevance, faithful representation, understandability and 
comparability (based upon the qualitative characteristics of information suggested in the 
conceptual frameworks of IFRS (2010A). These procedures used allow a rich description of 
the nature and patterns of disclosure to emerge, and permits these dimensions to be analysed 
both in combination and individually. 
2.9 The Relationship between QCSRD and EM  
The literature review indicates that EM is an accounting technique used by managers to 
manipulate earnings through the flexibility in the accounting options or real transactions 
decisions (Md. Musfiqur, et al., 2013). EM is broadly interpreted as a strategy used by 
managers to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers 
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(Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  In this context, EM is considered a type of agency cost; managers 
look after their own interests by providing ﬁnancial reports that do not reflect an accurate 
economic picture of the company. On the other hand, CSR is commonly defined as the type 
and scope of social obligations, which should be considered by companies in the course of their 
routine business activities (Shamir, 2005). QCSRD, which is the focus of this research, includes 
financial and non-financial information relating to the company's interaction with the social 
environment, which is presented in their annual reports. Moreover, QCSRD disclosure is a 
primary tool for communicating with stakeholders about the social activities of the company. 
Therefore, it is a key tool in building strong relationships and creating mutual understanding 
as well as for managing the potential conflicts (Hess, 2008). Although CSR reporting and EM 
have established themselves separately as well-researched areas, comparatively less attention 
has been paid to establishing a link between CSR disclosure and EM. EM is affected through 
the incentives and choices of the manager, who is involved in formulating and making 
decisions in the organisation. Thus, consideration of CSR reporting could be an important 
determinant (Choi et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015). Much research has been conducted on the 
link between CSR and EM (e.g. Prior et al, 2008; Chih et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012; Choi et 
al., 2013; Scholtens et al., 2013; Bozzolan et al., 2015; Gao & Zhang, 2015; Hung et al., 2015; 
Shafer, 2015;  Cho and Chun, 2016; Gras-Gil et al., 2016). However, only a few empirical 
studies have examined the association between corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
EM (Sun et al., 2010; Yip et al., 2011; Belgacem & Omri, 2015; Muttakin et al., 2015; Martínez 
et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016). Furthermore, the empirical evidence that was provided by those 
prior studies pointed out mixed results with respect to the relationship between CSR disclosure 
and EM. For instance, Sun et al. (2010), analysed the relationship between corporate 
environmental disclosure and discretionary accruals as proxy of EM using a sample of 245 
non-ﬁnancial companies. They found that the discretionary accruals have an insignificant 
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impact on environmental disclosures among the UK companies for the fiscal year between the 
first of April 2006 and the end of March 2007. Yip et al (2011) investigated the relationship 
between CSRD and EM, employing discretionary accruals as proxy of EM. They used 
companies’ websites and annual reports to measure CSRD through a sample of 120 US listed 
companies for the period 2005-2006. They found a positive association in the food industry 
and a negative relationship in the oil and gas industry between CSRD and EM. They suggested 
that the relationship between CSRD and EM is context-specific and is likely to be affected by 
the political environment of a company more than by moral considerations. Wang et al. (2016) 
examined the impact of mandatory CSRD on EM using a subset of companies that, starting in 
2008, have to report their corporate social responsibility activities. They found that mandatory 
CSRD companies were less likely to engage in EM after 2008.  This result suggested that 
mandatory CSRD mitigates information asymmetry through improving the quality of ﬁnancial 
reporting. Similarly, Martínez et al. (2015) examined the link between the quality of financial 
reporting and the QCSRD. To do so, they examine a sample of 747 international non-financial 
firms from 2002 to 2010. Their findings show that conservative companies, with a low level of 
earnings management practices, report high QCSRD.  
By contrast, Muttakin & Azim (2015) investigated the relationship between CSRD and accruals 
quality as proxy of EM, using a sample of 135 companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
from 2005 to 2009.  A checklist of 20 items was constructed in order to measure CSR 
disclosures in annual reports. Their findings indicate that managers in emerging markets 
provide more CSRD when they engage in EM.  Belgacem & Omri (2015) investigate whether 
voluntary CSRD is related to earnings quality (EQ). Their study is conducted on a sample of 
Tunisian listed companies from 2002 to 2011. Content analysis was used to determine the level 
of CSRD, whereas, four earning attributes (discretionary accruals, conservatism, value-
relevance of earnings and accruals quality) were used to measure EQ. They provide evidence 
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that CSR disclosure is positively related to the degree of discretionary accruals and negatively 
related to the degree of conservatism.  
Prior studies provide inconsistent results. One possible reason for this could be due to the 
biased measurement of CSR disclosure. Given the contradiction of prior studies’ findings and 
the importance of this association for market participants and academics, more research is 
needed. It is not possible to conclude the possible effects of CSR reporting on EM without 
knowing whether CSR disclosure conveys true (as in the ethical perspective) or false 
information (as in the managerial opportunism or legitimacy perspective).  
So far, two methods of measuring CSR disclosure have been employed when examining the 
relationship with EM. The first method uses subjective analyst disclosure quality rankings. 
Such indices rankings are not available in many countries and therefore cannot be applied 
widely. The second method evaluates CSR reporting based on the theme and amount of 
information disclosed. However, this method does not consider other important dimensions 
which distinguish the information provided to users. Another important gap observed from 
previous literature is on the relationship between CSR disclosure and EM. While many 
previous studies (e.g Yip et al., 2011; Muttakin & Azim 2015) have used an accruals base in 
their measurement, no research has used real earnings management to examine the relationship 
between QCSRD and EM. This limitation in measurement, caused by the absence of a broader 
framework and omission of certain important variables, make the findings of these empirical 
studies inappropriate in establishing the relationship between CSR disclosure and EM. 
Furthermore, since the majority of research is conducted in western countries (e.g. Sun et al., 
2010; Yip et al., 2011), not much is known about the relationship between CSR disclosure and 
EM in developing countries. 
Couched within this debate, the current study empirically examines whether Indian listed 
companies exhibiting QCSRD behave appropriately to constrain EM, thereby delivering more 
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transparent and reliable financial information. This study uses two different proxies for EM: 
(1) discretionary accruals, (2) real activities manipulation.  
2.10 Critical Evaluation of the Relationship between CSR and EM 
Literature 
Prior research in this area (as explained above in section 2.9) has substantiated that CSR 
reporting is associated with EM.  Empirical findings, however, remain inconclusive with regard 
to whether commitment to CSR reporting has a positive or negative impact on EM and vice 
versa. For instance, while Wang et al. (2015) and Rezaee et al. (2017) found a negative 
relationship between CSR disclosure and EM, Muttakin & Azim (2015) and Belgacem & Omri 
(2015) reported a positive relationship between them. Moreover, Yip et al. (2011) examined 
the relationship between CSR reporting and EM in a sample of US publicly listed oil and gas 
and food companies. They found a negative relationship in the oil and gas industry between 
CSR disclosures and EM and a positive relationship in the food industry. Conversely, Sun et al 
(2010), investigated the association between environmental disclosure and DA in the UK. Their 
findings suggest no significant statistical relationship between DA and environmental 
disclosure.   
One important gap in the previous studies is related to the measurement of CSR reporting. So 
far, three methods of measuring CSR disclosure have been employed when examining the 
relationship with EM. Firstly, Muttakin & Azim (2015) measured the amount of CSR 
disclosure based on a checklist of 20 items, and Belgacem & Omri (2015) measured CSR 
disclosure based on the total number of sentences provided, under the method of content 
analysis. These methods measure CSR reporting based on the theme and amount of information 
disclosed. However, this method does not consider other important dimensions which 
distinguish the information provided to users. Secondly, Wang et al. (2016) measured 
Mandatory CSR disclosure based on whether companies are mandated to provide CSR reports 
or not, and Yip et al (2011) measured CSR disclosure based on the existence of CSR disclosure 
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or not. The issuance of CSR reports may be an attempt by management to convince powerful 
stakeholders that the firm is acting in the right way and is socially and environmentally 
responsible, regardless of whether actual performance follows (Thorne et al., 2014). Thirdly, 
Sun et al. (2010) measured environmental disclosure based on the UK Government’s 
Environmental Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Martínez et al. (2015) measured 
sustainability information based on the GRI. Although these methods were considered by 
previous studies to be useful methods of evaluating QCSRD, they have ignored important 
dimensions of QCSRD. For instance, they do not take into account the spread of CSR 
information. Using the spread dimension helps to evaluate whether the CSR information 
disclosed meets the needs of different stakeholders or focuses on specific groups. They also 
ignore the usefulness dimension that helps information users to evaluate the relevance, faithful 
representation, understandability and comparability of CSR disclosure. Thus, this study seeks 
to contribute to this critique by offering new insights concerning the complexity of QCSRD 
and their relationship with EM, and develop a new multidimensional model to measure 
QCSRD. This framework provides evidence on the nature of a company’s CSR disclosures 
based on three dimensions, which allows capturing the quantitative and qualitative features 
concerning a specific kind of CSR information. 
Furthermore, another important gap observed from previous literature is on the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and EM. Previous studies (e.g Yip et al., 2011; Muttakin & Azim 
2015) have used an accruals base in their measurements; however, no research has used real 
earnings management to examine the relationship between QCSRD and EM. This limitation in 
measurement, caused by the absence of a broader framework and omission of certain important 
variables, makes the findings of these empirical studies inappropriate in establishing the 
relationship between CSR disclosure and EM. Thus, to bridge this gap, the current study uses 
two different proxies for EM: (1) discretionary accruals, (2) real activities manipulation. 
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Finally, since the majority of research is conducted in developed countries (e.g. Sun et al., 
2010; Yip et al., 2011), not much is known about the relationship between CSR disclosure and 
EM in developing countries. In addition, prior research has also argued that several factors such 
as culture, religion and other societal norms may influence CSR disclosure and EM (e.g. 
Hastings, 2000; Gautam & Singh, 2010).   
Based on the above evidence, this study aims to examine the relationship between QCSRD and 
EM in India using a broader measurement framework of EM and a multidimensional proxy of 
QCSRD among Indian listed companies. 
2.11 Theories Related To EM and CSR disclosure  
Prior literature has suggested different theories to explain the link between CSR disclosure 
and EM, such as signaling theory, agency theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
political cost theory (e.g. Patten, 1992; Gray et al. 1995; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Prior et al., 
2008; Sun et al., 2010). The following sections discuss these theories in order to explain the 
relationship between EM and CSR disclosure. 
2.11.1 Signalling Theory 
In general, the efficient market assumes that investors are rational and their decision will be 
affected by all the available information in the stock market (Sun et al., 2010). It is also well 
known that information users in a capital market, compared to the management personnel, have 
problems gaining access to complete and sufficient information (Arnold & Lange, 2004; Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1990). When a company’s management has more access to information than 
the other users, the asymmetric problem of information could exist (Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990).  
Due to asymmetric information between stakeholders and managers, management chooses 
estimates and accounting methods in their own favour and, in turn, may conceal the company’s 
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true economic value (Sun et al., 2010). According to Prior et al. (2008), managements may use 
certain discretionary actions in order to signal favourable or unfavourable information to the 
capital market about the future prospects of the firm. Signaling theory suggests that companies 
may provide more disclosure to mitigate asymmetric information and signal to the information 
users that its performance is good (Miller 2002; Sun et al., 2010). Nevertheless, Hughes (1986) 
argued that the reliability of disclosure provided by a company is a fundamental factor for 
mitigating the asymmetric information. He also indicates that a company can distinguish itself 
from other competitors by sending a credible signal to capital markets about its quality. In the 
same vein, Gray (2005) suggests that when a company uses CSR disclosure, the predominant 
concern is to signal its management quality. Good quality companies may use CSR disclosure 
with traditional financial reporting, whereas low quality companies concentrate only on 
constrained accounting information. Moreover, the author argues that CSR disclosure signals 
to shareholders and other stakeholders that the company is socially responsible. High QCSRD 
helps companies and their management to obtain a reputation for reliability from shareholders 
and other stakeholders. 
Given that managers might engage in EM when there is high information asymmetry, the 
QCSRD is assumed by signaling theory to be a means of mitigating the information asymmetry 
between management personnel and stakeholders (Chih et al., 2008). Thus, in line with 
previous studies, EM would be reduced through CSR disclosure (Laksmana and Yang, 2009; 
Wang, 2015). Since managers’ decisions are influenced by the marginal benefits to be achieved 
through mitigating asymmetric information in the capital market, Abhayawansa et al., (2009) 
argue that there is no guarantee that firms will issue reliable reporting. Thus, evaluating the 
informational content (i.e. quality) of CSR is an important determinant for EM. 
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2.11.2 Agency Theory 
Due to the existence of agency conflict, managers engage in EM opportunistically for their own 
interests rather than optimising the company’s value, and consequently mislead investors about 
the company’s financial position and market value. Belgacem & Omri (2015) showed that 
managers (agents) might exploit the flexibility of accounting principles in estimating their 
reward. Thus, EM is a kind of agency cost (Sun et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2003; Zahra et al., 2005). 
Managers are more concerned about their ability to remain in power, and to increase their own 
wealth, which in turn is likely to impact negatively on both the firms’ value and reputation 
(Prior et al. 2008). Companies could face serious problems because of the ease with which the 
manager can access the company’s information compared to the shareholders. Therefore, due 
to the existence of agency cost, accountability and transparent systems should be introduced to 
mitigate this problem (Leftwich, 1980; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Agency theory proposes 
that companies might use different strategies to minimise the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. Morris (1987) argues that, without proper monitoring, companies 
may face serious problems. Healy and Palepu (2001) propose several solutions to mitigate the 
agency problem, such as the effective control of the manager by the board, the audit committee 
effectiveness to control the flexibility in the accounting system and financial analysts’ ability 
to use financial and non-financial information disclosed by managers to reduce the information 
asymmetry. These resolutions suggest that corporate governance mechanisms and contractual 
agreements play a vital role in mitigating the agency problem. 
The QCSRD provided by managers should be used to mitigate the conflict of interest (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). It is expected that well-informed shareholders are more likely to scrutinise 
companies based on the information provided about those companies, and thus mitigate the 
agency conflict (Eng and Mak, 2003). CSR disclosure also is considered as a signal that can be 
directed to multiple levels of stakeholders to mitigate the agency problem (Sun et al., 2010). 
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Chih et al. (2008) also suggest that managers are less likely to engage in EM in companies that 
provide high quality disclosure of their social activities which targets all stakeholders, because 
when the transparency of information is increased, the expectation of the information 
asymmetry among the management and stakeholders will be reduced. In contrast, managers 
are more likely to engage in EM in those companies with limited QCSRD (Jo and Kim 2007). 
2.11.3 Legitimacy Theory 
Different rationales have been provided to clarify the phenomenon of CSR disclosure. 
Legitimacy theory is one of the tools employed by prior studies to explain CSR disclosure 
(Nazli et al., 2004; Castelo and Lima, 2006). Guthrie and Parker (1989) suggested that 
companies' reporting is introduced as a response to the companies’ practices and their 
environmental factors, and to legitimise companies’ activities. Suchman (1995) defined 
legitimacy perspective as a general understanding or supposition that the companies' actions 
should be desirable and appropriate within a social system, values and beliefs. Gaining 
legitimacy is important for firms, since the community might cancel its contract with a 
company and stop it from engaging in its business activities if it loses its legitimacy (Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996). In line with this theory, companies are requested to provide CSRD 
voluntarily to meet the wider expectations of various stakeholders relating to environment, 
community and employee welfare (Maali et al., 2006). In the same context, Brown and Deegan 
(1998) indicate that social expectancy is likely to change over time, meaning that managers 
should improve their social practice to constantly protect their legitimacy. There are different 
methods that companies may use to protect their legitimacy. Methods, which can be used, 
involve social disclosure as an instrumentation to show that companies are corresponding to 
the community’s expectations. Lindblom (1994) has classified these methods into four 
strategies. Firstly, the companies may attempt to disclose information for their stakeholders 
about real changes in their activities. Secondly, the companies might attempt to change the 
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views of the related stakeholders without improving their real behaviour. Thirdly, the 
companies might attempt to impact the stakeholders’ perception by distracting their attention 
from relevant issues or by attracting stakeholders through emotive messages. Fourthly, 
companies may attempt to change the expectations of stakeholders. Patten (1992) indicated 
that companies tend to disclose social information in annual reports to protect or increase the 
legitimacy perceptions and respond to the changes in stakeholders’ policy. 
CSR disclosure can be used as an early reaction for the potential legislative pressure from other 
interest groups. CSR disclosure is also likely to be used to distract the attention of stakeholders 
from some undesirable behaviour by managers. Sun et al. (2010) argue that companies which 
engage in EM tend to use CSR disclosure to protect the company’s legitimacy. 
2.11.4 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholders are defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman et al. 2010). This theory has been 
addressed in the prior literature from different views: the instrumental and the normative 
perspectives (Harrison and Freeman, 1999). Whereas the first perspective assumes that 
managers should manage stakeholder’s power through identifying them with the self-interest 
of their companies, the normative perspective assumes that management should address 
all different stakeholder groups from the accountability perspective (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Based on the instrumental perspective, CSR disclosure is considered as a tool to manage 
only the perspective of powerful stakeholders’ groups (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Thus, CSR information is disclosed for the purpose of gaining approval and support for the 
companies to continue in their activities, rather than the purposes of accountability (Deegan 
2002). Consistent with this view, CSR information is provided to manage the powerful 
stakeholder groups. 
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In contrast, the perspective of a normative stakeholder suggests that companies have an 
obligation to different stakeholders, and CSR disclosure is obligatory for companies as it 
provides CSR information to relevant stakeholders (Guay et al. 1996). This perspective 
explains how companies can apply strategies to manage their different stakeholders. 
However, it does not directly explain the expectation of management behaviour decisions 
(Deegan 2002). 
Based on the stakeholder theory, a company is perceived not as a twofold relationship 
between managers and shareholders, but as multilateral relationships between managers and 
different stakeholders. In respect to EM, it also not only affects a company’s shareholders but 
also influences different stakeholders. Therefore, when EM is suspected by stakeholders, the 
stakeholders immediately expect the company to lose value. 
Stakeholder theory is useful as it explains the influencing and influenced groups and what 
accountability managers are willing to recognise (Gray et al. 1997) However, it is criticised 
due to  this theory relying on the particular power of stakeholders and, thereby, may ignore 
the other stakeholders who are likely to be regarded as less important (Deegan 2002). 
2.11.5 Political Economy Theory 
 
This theory focuses on the exchanges that occur in multi-relations between a company and 
different institutions participating in such exchanges (Gray et al., 1995). CSR disclosure is seen 
as a tool to manage the impact of economic and political environment surrounding the company. 
Guthrie and Parker (1989) argue that managers seemingly respond to public or government 
pressure to disclose information on their companies' social impact. Prior research has attempted 
to explain the use of CSR disclosure through political economy theory to understand companies’ 
motivations to provide CSR information through their annual reports (Guthrie and Parker 1989; 
Adams and Harte 1998). This theory is categorised into two approaches: classical political 
economy theory and bourgeois political economy theory (Gray et al., 1996).  
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The first approach suggests that disclosures are used as a tool to manage the preferable position 
of those who own scarce resources. Deegan (2006) argues that the classical political economy 
theory focuses on the structural conflicts within community, which is inherent within society. 
Thus, within this perspective, it may be interesting to try  maintain legitimation of the whole 
system (Arnold, 1990) and, particularly, to try renegotiate elements of the hegemony. 
Lindblom’s (1994) careful use of the term (relevant publics) rather than any more widely 
employed term (such as users or stakeholders) suggests a recognition of the classical political 
economy possibilities of its analysis. 
On the other hand, Cowen et al. (1987) argue that bourgeois political economy theory tends to 
concentrate on the interaction of competing within community. It focuses on the actors’ 
interaction within a pluralistic society (Williams and Ho Wern, 1999). This may indicate that 
different stakeholders seek to preserve their own self-interests. Although this perspective 
emphasises that stakeholders believe in their right to pursue their own goals, managers are likely 
to use CSR disclosure to moderate this issue (Clark, 1991; Gray et al. 1995). 
With regard to EM, managers may engage less in EM as result of regulatory threats; managers 
who have incentives to manipulate earnings may prefer to use CSR disclosure, due to the 
regulatory threats, as an effective means of reducing the likelihood of regulatory actions (Patten 
and Trompeter, 2003; Yip et al., 2011).  
 
Although all the above theories have been used by prior studies to explain the link between CSR 
disclosure and EM, the current research has used only agency and signalling theories to explain 
the relationship between QCSRD and EM for several reasons.  
Firstly, stakeholders’ theory has been criticised due to it not being adequate to explain the 
dynamics which link companies and stakeholders (Key, 1997). It is also not practicable and 
justifiable to determine all stakeholders, as that may negatively impact the company's interest 
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(Etzioni, 1998; Sternberg, 1997). Secondly, legitimacy theory has been criticised by some 
authors as not identifying stakeholders of companies clearly, as well as prioritising financial 
stakeholders (Meek et al., 1995; Parker, 2005).  Thirdly, although political economy theory 
clarifies the incentives for providing CSR disclosure (Guthrie and Parker 1989), it fails to 
consider the internal factors present in companies, such as the corporate characteristics that may 
have an important effect on social disclosure (O’Donovan 2002; Patten 1991). Finally, it can be 
argued that stakeholders’ theory, legitimacy theory, and political economy theory focus on 
disclosure decisions by managers to manage their relationships with different stakeholders and 
to enhance their own reputation. This may explain the quantity of CSR disclosure that is used 
by managers. However, they are less likely to explain the use of CSR disclosure quality. On the 
other hand, agency and signalling theories focus on the problem of conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders, and the problem of asymmetry information between managers and 
other stakeholders. The current research focuses on the quality of CSR disclosure, and tries to 
explain how the QCSRD reduces the agency conflict between managers and shareholders and 
how it mitigates expectation of the asymmetry information, which may lead to reduced EM. 
Thus, to achieve the main aim of this study, only signaling and agency theories are used, since 
these theories are sufficient for developing the hypotheses of this study. 
 
2.12 Conclusions  
The present chapter provides a literature review of CSR disclosure, its definitions and 
motivations, and concentrates on the relationship between QCSRD and EM. Since EM is 
impacted by the incentives and choices of managers who participate in making and 
formulating decisions within the organisations, consideration of CSR reporting could be 
important determinants (Choi et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016). The literature review indicates 
that the agency and legitimacy theories are more appropriate frameworks in which to explain 
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the link between CSR disclosure and EM. It is also indicated that signalling theory is 
associated with the information asymmetry problem and the quality information provided by 
companies. Given that the current research is concerned with the impact of QCSRD and EM, 
the signalling and agency theories are used as a theoretical framework to interpret and explain 
the study findings. The prior research in this area has substantiated that CSR reporting is 
related to EM. Empirical results, however, remain inconclusive as to whether CSR reporting 
has a negative or positive impact on EM and vice versa (for example, Chih et al., 2008; 
Muttakin & Azim, 2015).  
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CHAPTER Three: THE LITERATURE REVIEW ON EM PRACTICES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As clarified in the previous chapter, the first objective of this study is to measure the level of 
REM and AEM practices. Thus, chapter three is organised as follows: definition, types and 
classifications of EM are provided in Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 clarify the motives of 
EM and mitigating factors for EM respectively. Section 3.5 provides the difference between 
the two EM strategies (AEM and REM), and section 3.6 explains the empirical evidence on 
EM. Sections 3.7 and 3.8 shed light on the measurement of EM practices (AEM and REM, 
respectively) and, finally, the summary of this chapter is provided in section 3.8. 
3.2 The Definition of EM 
Recently, the concept of EM has received wide interest in many scientific studies and from 
professional organisations, due to its impact on financial reporting and its influence on 
predicting the future financial performance of companies (Zang, 2011; Chiu et al., 2012; 
Enomoto et al., 2015; Black et al., 2017). Many information users, whether they are inside or 
outside the company, rely on earnings reports for making many financial, operational and 
investment decisions. The manager makes decisions regarding earnings distribution, board 
members’ remuneration, earnings retention, capital expansions implementation and other 
important matters. On the other hand, external parties such as financial analysts, investors, 
existing shareholders and potential shareholders rely on earnings reports to assess the current 
performance of the company and to predict its future performance. Although the importance of 
earnings has been previously emphasised (Schipper and Vincent, 2003), there are deliberate 
managerial interventions which use EM techniques to conceal their true financial performance 
in order to achieve various ambitions and interests (Barghathi, 2014).  
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Owing to the disagreement over the definition of EM, it is defined by researchers in different 
ways and relies on various incentives behind EM and individual perspectives. For instance, 
some definitions have focused on managers’ behaviour when they clarify EM. Rosner (2003) 
suggests that EM is the methods deliberately used by managers to get a certain level of desirable 
earnings. Bayley & Taylor (2007) also define EM as a deliberate intervention in the preparation 
procedures of financial reports in order to obtain some gains. Other definitions have focused 
on clarifying the impact of EM on the economic performance of companies. For example, Shen 
& Chih (2007) defined earnings management as the deliberate modification of the economic 
performance by managers in order to mislead the beneficiaries of the reports or to influence 
the outcomes. McVay (2006) also identified EM as concealing or not displaying the real 
economic performance. Furthermore, other researchers have focused on the legal use of 
alternatives and choices in accounting principles to obtain certain values of earnings. For 
instance, Piot & Janin (2007) define EM as manipulating earnings by using personal judgment 
and existent flexibility in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in order to 
influence the published accounting figures. Chung & Kallapur (2003) also define EM as 
deliberately using of permitted alternatives in the accounting standards for the purpose of 
manipulating earnings. In contrast, Parfet (2000) suggests that EM is not a totally undesirable 
behaviour when more explanations and proper methods are employed in a rationally managed 
way and when it provides value to stakeholders. Similarly, Ronen et al. (2008) claim that 
managing earnings might occur at different levels:  
Firstly, the white level, which occurs when the company exploits the flexibility in choosing the 
accounting treatment to clarify information about the company performance. In this level the 
expansion of explanations about the future cash flow will be done within financial reports. 
Secondly, the grey level, which occurs when selecting the accounting treatment either to 
maximise the benefits of management or because they lead to an increase in reported economic 
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efficiency. This level is the manipulation of financial reports within the limits of accounting 
standards, which may be offered through the flexibility in GAAP. Thirdly, the black level, in 
which the manipulation of earnings and reduction in the disclosure in the financial reports 
occurs. This may represent a type of fraud. Dechow and Skinner (2000) clarify the differences 
between EM and fraud through providing Figure 2.1, which  explains that while EM practices 
occur without exploiting or violating GAAP, accounting fraud occurs through violating GAAP. 
They classify them under two categories; accruals-based and real activities choices. While 
accruals-based EM choices occur at the end of the period, the real activities EM takes place 
throughout the fiscal year, which has a direct effect on the cash flows (Zang, 2011).  
In the light of the above-mentioned definitions, it can be argued that EM is the accounting 
techniques used by managers to manipulate earnings through violating or exploiting the 
flexibility in the accounting options or real transactions decisions. The accounting-based EM 
is typically affected by accounting manipulations, whereby managers violate or exploit the 
flexibility in the GAAP to manage earnings. If the manipulation of earnings is based on the 
selection of particular choices of accounting methods and policies, this will cause a 
contradiction between the timing of the accounting recognition of income and the timing of 
cash flows (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Shafer, 2015). The real transactions EM are typically 
affected by management manipulation of real activities (Kim et al., 2012; Shafer, 2015). 
Manipulations of real activities include influencing earnings through decisions in the firm’s 
daily operations in order to obtain desirable results. Healy and Wahlen (1999) and 
Roychowdhury (2006) argue that delaying maintenance expenditure, research and 
development expenses, the sales acceleration, and adjustment in shipment schedules are 
examples of REM methods available to managers. They also indicate that real earnings 
management have a higher risk than accruals-based earnings management, since they have a 
direct effect on the companies’ performance and cash flows. 
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Table 3.1: The Differences between EM and accounting fraud. 
                Accruals-based EM           Real activities EM 
 
 
Conservative 
Accounting 
with GAAP       
          
Overly aggressive recognition of 
provisions or reserves. 
 
Overvaluation of acquired in-process 
R&D in purchase acquisitions. 
 
Overstatement of restructuring charges 
and assets write-offs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Delaying sales. 
 
 
Accelerating R&D or 
advertising expenditures. 
Neutral 
Earnings 
Earnings that result from a neutral 
operation of the process. 
 
 
 
 
Aggressive 
Accounting 
Understatement of the provision for bad 
debts. 
 
Drawing down provisions or reserves in an 
overly aggressive manner. 
 
 
Postponing R&D or 
advertising expenditures.  
 
Accelerating sales. 
 
                                             Violates GAAP 
 
Fraudulent 
Accounting 
Sales are recorded in advance. 
Recording false sales. 
Overstating inventory through recording 
false inventory. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 239) 
3.3 Earnings management techniques 
Prior literature reports that different techniques can be used in manipulating earnings, for 
instance, income-smoothing, income-increasing, income-decrease, and big bath technique (e.g. 
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Scott and Lochhead, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Markarian et al., 2008; Sun and Rath 2010; Kighir et 
al., 2014).  
3.3.1 Income-Smoothing Technique  
Income-smoothing is produced when the managers reduce the deviation between the published 
earnings and analysts' forecasts, through the use of available accounting flexibility to increase 
or reduce the profits when there is a sudden increase or drop in earnings (Sun and Rath 2010). 
Healy and Wahlen, (1999) argue that income-smoothing is taking steps to reduce or conserve 
earnings during good years in order to use it in years with low earnings. The company may 
have incentives to produce earnings below analysts' expectations through earnings-smoothing, 
since analysts will increase their earnings forecasts of the following years, if their earnings are 
greater than the expectations. Companies usually employ this kind of earnings smoothing to 
avoid a fall in their share price as a result of their inability to achieve analysts’ expectation. On 
the other hand, when the profits in the current year are lower than the previous year, earnings 
are likely to be managed in order to increase the income in the present year. Both the flexibility 
in GAAP and real activities can be used for earnings-smoothing. For instance, Nelson et al. 
(2002) indicate that managers are more likely to apply first-in first-out to estimate the cost of 
inventory if managers’ purpose is to increase earnings. However, they are more likely to use 
last-in first-out in order to decrease earnings. Prior studies suggest that managers change 
between the choice of inventory valuations to achieve their target (Sweeney, 1994; Aljifri, 
2007). For instance, when prices increase managers prefer to use first-in first-out to increase 
earnings and vice versa. Markarian et al. (2008) indicate that Italian listed companies 
manipulate earnings using the cost of research and development expenses, explaining that 
companies with lower earnings tend to capitalise the research and development costs, while 
those companies with higher earnings are more likely to expense the research and development 
costs, which is used in reducing earnings. 
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Kighir et al. (2014) argue that there are two views of earnings-smoothing. The first view 
suggests that earnings-smoothing results in less information about future earnings and cash 
flows. Based on this argument, earnings-smoothing may be harmful to the financial reporting. 
In the second view, it is assumed that EM is used by managers to disclose information expected 
about the future of the company. In this case, earnings smoothing results in more information 
on the future earnings for the company and its cash flows (Chaney and Lewis, 1995; Kothari 
et al., 2015). 
3.3.2 Earnings-increasing technique 
Using the earning-increase technique, managers carry out certain practices that increase 
earnings, which happens in three cases (Scott and Lochhead, 1997; Levitt, 1998). In the first 
case, earnings are increased if the current actual earnings are low and the manager expects them 
to increase in the following period. In this case, manager deal with these expectations to achieve 
their short term targets. For example, managers reduce the accruals or use other strategies in 
order to make higher earnings during the current year to mitigate the capital cost or to increase 
the share price (Segovia, 2003). Secondly, earnings are increased if the current actual earnings 
are low and the management expects it to decrease in the following period. EM, in this case, is 
employed to meet certain contractual terms since it does not reflect the expected future 
performance of the company and may have a negative impact (Levitt, 1998). For example, 
management may announce unplanned discounts in the selling price and credit facilities before 
the end of the year, which increases the revenue at the expense of the following years to avoid 
debt covenant violations. In the third case, earnings are increased if the current actual earnings 
are high and the management expects them to decrease in the following period (Scott and 
Lochhead, 1997). Therefore, EM is used to mislead the investors by giving them false 
expectations about the future of the company. It will present a false picture about the company’s 
real performance (Nelson et al., 2002; Segovia, 2003). 
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3.3.3 Earnings-decreasing technique 
In this situation, the managers may decrease earnings in three ways (Scott and Lochhead, 
1997). Firstly, earnings are reduced if the current actual earnings are high and the management 
expects earnings to be lower in the following period. In this case, management gives 
information to investors about the company's expected performance in the future and their 
earnings expectations. For instance, Managers may increase the estimated accruals at the end 
of the current year and adjusted in the following year (Levitt, 1998). Secondly, earnings are 
reduced if the current actual earnings are high and the management expects them to remain the 
same in the following period. There are several motivations for managers to transfer earnings 
from the current period to the next period (Kighir et al., 2014). For example, the managers do 
not deliver the goods sold at the end of the current year; these will be moved to the beginning 
of next year, in order to manage analysts’ earnings forecast. Thirdly, earnings are reduced if 
the current real profits are low and the management expects to increase them in the following 
period. Management aims, in this case, are to mislead stakeholders by giving them wrong 
information about the company's future performance. Therefore, this action is considered to be 
fraud, which may be used to avoid some political cost (. Scott and Lochhead, 1997; Levitt, 
1998; Kighir et al., 2014). 
3.3.4 Big Bath Accounting 
Managers usually prefer to work to increase the company's share price by increasing earnings. 
However, in some instances they prefer to reduce earnings, which could be achieved by the big 
bath technique. Although the main purpose of EM is to achieve higher earnings, big bath 
practice achieves the opposite. When the company is working poorly, and incurs losses, they 
may overstate the losses as much as possible. The main idea of big bath accounting is to 
increase the losses and add the related bad news to the current financial year which will allow 
an increase in profits in future periods (Sun et al., 2012).  It is clear that big bath accounting is 
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a non-recurring practice, which is used to minimise expenditures in future periods. It is also 
quite common to note that when a new manager is appointed, the new manager may use this 
method, big bath,  in order to attribute the current bad performance to previous managers 
(Pourciau, 1993).  
3.4 The Differences between Accruals and Real Earnings Management  
Although  managers may use AEM and REM without violating  GAAP, these two methods 
have several differences such as timing of manipulation, the consequences on cash flows and 
the scrutiny (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). AEM uses accounting flexibility after the 
fiscal year is ended (Dechow et al., 2010). Specifically, when the fiscal year formally ends, 
management is more likely to know if the reported earnings will meet the target or not. Thus, 
managers use accrual-based EM for adjusting reported earnings to meet the target of the desired 
threshold (Gunny, 2010). Furthermore, accrual-based EM will cause a contradiction between 
the timing of the accounting recognition of income and the timing of cash flows, but does not 
directly affect operating cash flows (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Shafer, 2015). Thus, in these two 
cases, accrual-based EM is more likely to be used to manage earnings. Firstly, if reported 
earnings do not meet the desired threshold, managers may increase earnings to meet the desired 
threshold using AEM. Secondly, when the reported earnings are greater than the expected 
earnings, in this case due to adjustment through REM, managers are more likely to decrease 
income using accrual-based EM to meet targeted earnings (Scott and Lochhead, 1997; Zang, 
2012). In contrast, real activities EM provides flexibility for managers as it can be done during 
the fiscal year (Gunny, 2010). Manipulations of real activities include influencing earnings 
through decisions in the firm’s daily operations in order to obtain desirable results (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Managers may decide the amount and the timing 
of REM with less scrutiny from auditors and other regulators compared to AEM  
(Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Furthermore, Graham et al. (2005) argue 
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that managers might tend to use REM more than AEM if the regulations are used to reduce 
accrual-based manipulation. Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that managers shifted from using 
AEM to REM after the Act of Sarbanes and Oxley in 2002. This is due to the restriction on 
accruals-based manipulation. For instance, Moreover, Zang (2012) indicates that managers are 
more likely to use REM over AEM to avoid auditors’ monitoring. He finds evidence that 
companies which are monitored by the big 4 accounting firms engage intensively in REM to 
avoid the scrutiny of AEM. Abernathy et al. (2014) provides similar evidence that US 
companies are more likely to shift from AEM to REM when less accounting flexibility is found. 
Although managers tend to use REM more than AEM, prior literature indicates that REM has 
a negative impact on subsequent operating periods and cash flows, which are greater than the 
influence of AEM (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
3.5 The Motivations of EM 
Prior research provides evidence that there are many factors motivating managers to engage in 
EM. Thus, this section covers different motivations for managing earnings, which are classified 
as follows: management compensation, earnings benchmarks, debt contracts, political cost and 
other motivations.  
3.5.1 Management Compensation 
Agency theory suggests that the main purpose of management compensations is to reduce the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and management ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, executives could adopt certain transactions which maximise their own interest and 
obtain the largest amount of compensations instead of maximising shareholders’ wealth 
(Oberholzer-Gee & Wulf, 2012). Previous literature indicates that compensations based on the 
performance may motivate managers to manipulate earnings using real activities EM (Dechow 
and Sloan, 1991; Cao and Laksmana, 2010; Cornett, et al., 2008; McAnally et al., 2008), or 
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accruals-based EM (e.g. Healy 1985; McAnally et al., 2008), which negatively affects 
shareholders’ wealth. Dechow and Sloan (1991), for instance, examine the link between 
managers’ performance-based bonus and the R&D expenses. Their findings indicate that 
managers who are approaching retirement are likely to engage in REM through reducing R&D 
expenses. Healy (1985) suggests that increasing the compensations plan is more likely to be an 
incentive for managers to engage in EM. He found that discretionary accruals are strongly 
associated with bonus plans. In the same vein, Guidry et al. (1999) examined whether managers 
engage in EM to maximise their compensations by studying US companies. Their findings 
indicate that managers’ compensations are used as a strong incentive to manipulate earnings in 
order to maximise their compensations. Managers might also try to increase the share price in 
order to obtain personal interests, especially when the managers’ reward may be related to the 
performance of the company in the long-term. Thus, managers could engage in EM to achieve 
the maximum possible value in their own interests (McAnally et al., 2008).  
3.5.2 Earnings Benchmarks 
Earnings are considered as a key indicator which has been used to assess companies’ 
performance and their financial health. Managers try to meet desired earnings through regular 
business activities. Nevertheless, when predicted earnings do not achieve the desired earnings, 
managers are more likely to resort to EM. Previous research indicates that managers may 
manipulate earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts, to avoid reporting losses or to meet the 
previous year’s earnings (e.g. Kim, 2012; Zang, 2011).  
These benchmarks are considered to be the key incentives for managing earnings (Das et al., 
2011). The widespread use of accounting information, by investors and financial analysts in 
the stock market, may create incentives for managers to manipulate accounting profits in an 
attempt to influence the performance of stocks in the short term. Thus, manipulation of earnings 
is used as a powerful tool for companies to inflate their stock price (Athanasakou et al., 2011). 
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For instance, if profits are not consistent with the financial analysts’ earnings forecast, 
managers could face negative consequences. The impact will be greater if the reported earnings 
are less than those predicted by the financial analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, managers change 
accounting earnings in accordance with the financial predictions in order to change share prices 
in the short term (Das et al., 2011). Focusing on the other two of the above benchmarks, 
evidence is provided by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) which indicates that companies 
manipulate earnings upwards using both real activities and accrual-based to avoid losses or to 
meet the previous year’s earnings. Specifically, their results show that few companies report 
losses or small earnings decreases and a large number of companies report small positive 
earnings or slight increases in earnings. Similar evidence is presented by Roychowdhury (2006) 
on real activities EM to meet these three benchmarks. Using a sample of 17,300 company-year 
observations between 1987 and 2001, he finds evidence that companies manipulate earnings 
using real activities to meet analysts’ forecasts and to avoid reporting losses. 
3.5.3 Debt Contracts 
Many companies deliberately engage in an artificial change in profits to meet the conditions 
required by their debt agreements, because debt contracts often include conditions restricting 
management (Jha, 2013). For example, these terms are more likely to undermine the ability of 
management to pay dividends to shareholders or constrain it to get new debt if it is not 
achieving at least the minimum accounting earnings, based on the debt agreement. Therefore, 
companies may deliberately make fundamental changes in their accounting policies to 
influence the accounting income (Kim et al., 2011). 
Previous studies have indicated that companies tend to use accrual-based EM to avoid debt 
covenant violations (e.g. Kim et al., 2012; Doukakis, 2014). Sweeney (1994) investigated 
the debt covenant violations among a sample of 130 US listed companies using a 10-year 
period, from 1980 to 1989 and found that companies used accruals-based manipulation for 
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increasing earnings in order to mitigate the cost imposed by lenders. Rodriguez-Perez and 
Hemmen (2010) examined the link between the debt level and EM using 1,853 company-
year observations in Spain from 1992 to 2002. Their results show a negative relationship 
between the debt level and discretionary accruals. Although there is widespread research 
on accruals-based EM, only a limited number of studies have examined whether real 
activities-based EM is used to avoid debt covenant violations. For instance, Bartov (1993) 
indicated that companies use sales timing of fixed assets to avoid debt covenant violations. 
Kim et al. (2011) also indicate that companies use REM to avoid debt covenant violations. 
3.5.4 Political Cost 
Previous research indicated that companies engage in EM to avoid political cost. Political costs 
are considered by managers when they report earnings, which may lead them to resort to 
income-decrease EM in order to mitigate political risk (Habbash and Alghamdi 2015). Aljifri 
(2007) argues that companies might use earnings manipulation in financial statements to 
mitigate government interference. Key (1997) examines the relationship between EM and 
new regulations during the period from 1989 to 1999. His results indicate that US 
companies tend to use income-decrease EM to reduce the impact of new regulations 
during this period. Han and Wang (1998) also investigate the link between EM and unusual 
increases in oil prices during the Gulf crisis in 1990. They examined a sample of 76 US oil 
companies in 1990; their findings indicate that these companies used accruals-based EM to 
decrease the reported income for the fiscal year. They explain that these companies decrease 
reported earnings to avoid the expected political cost.  
Meilani Purwanti (2013) indicated that political pressure may also motivate companies to 
manage earnings to avoid public attention. In companies with a high level of political cost, 
managers tend to delay reporting earnings from the current period until future periods to 
decrease earnings in the current fiscal year. This may be due to the increase in earnings as a 
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result of political costs, which may attract the attention of the media and the general public  
3.5.5 Tax Avoidance  
Another reason why managers tend to engage in EM is changes in tax policy. Adhikari et al. 
(2005) examined the link between EM and the effective tax rate in Malaysia using data from 
the top 177 companies during the period from 1994 to 1997. They found that tax policy changes 
are related to manipulation of reported earnings. Lemke and Page (1992) also investigated the 
accounting policy choices in 1983 among UK companies. Their results indicate that UK 
companies tend to engage in income-decreasing EM to affect tax liability. Their results suggest 
that managers are willing to decrease reported earnings to reduce tax costs. In the same context, 
Othman and Zeghal (2006) conducted a comparative study through a sample of 1,470 French 
firm-year observations and 1,674 Canadian firm-year observations during the period from 1996 
to 2000. They found that manipulation of earnings in French firms is mostly associated with 
contractual debt reasons and effective tax rates. Consequently, tax is another incentive to 
engage in EM. 
 
3.5.6 Other Motivations 
Earnings manipulation before events such as mergers and new listings in stock markets is a 
widespread phenomenon. Some companies may seek, in certain circumstances, to expand their 
ownership through an initial public offering (IPO). Due to the lack of sufficient (previous) 
information about the company in the stock market, investors will rely on information provided 
in the financial statements. It then becomes a favourable opportunity to adapt the profits so as 
to improve the company's image when issuing new shares (Kamal, 2012). Louis (2004) studied 
a sample of 373 companies, which merged during the period from 1992 to 2000, and 
investigated if these companies engaged in REM and whether REM was related to mergers. 
Specifically, this indicates that companies are more likely to manage earnings before a merger. 
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He also finds evidence that companies which engage in accrual-based EM pre-merger, may 
return to their underperformance after the merger. Companies may also engage in EM before 
they move between stock markets. For instance, Chou and Lin (2003) focus on companies that 
moved from the AMEX stock exchange to the NYSE market during the period from 1990 to 
1997. The findings show that companies engage in upward accruals-based EM before listing 
on the new stock market.  
3.6 Constraints for EM 
Previous literature has identified the relative constraints and costs of AEM and REM (e.g. 
Zang, 2011; Abernathy et al., 2014). It is documented in prior studies that constraints and costs 
(e.g. Cai et al., 2008; Chen et al. 2010; Sun et al., 2011; Zang, 2011; Abernathy, 2014) have 
led to lower EM. This section focuses on the common mitigating factors that are mentioned in 
prior literature, such as audit committees, boards of directors, institutional ownership, auditors’ 
quality, accounting regulations, regulatory environments and other Costs constraining EM (e.g. 
Chi et al., 2011; Abernathy, 2014; Chung et al., 2002). 
3.6.1 The Role of the Board and Audit Committee  
Prior studies have focused on investigating whether board and audit committee constrain EM 
(Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Vafeas, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). The board is 
considered to be a fundamental part of the company's monitoring mechanism on AEM (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). Boards monitor the company by ensuring that executive officers achieve their 
duties in a manner that serves the interests of shareholders (Terjesen, et al., 2009). Thus, board 
effectiveness is predicted to lead to a lower level of AEM (McElveen, 2002; Turley & Zaman, 
2004). According to DeZoort et al. (2002), the purpose of the board of directors is to protect 
shareholders’ interests, which is achieved by choosing qualified members who have adequate 
authority and the necessary resources to diligently offer oversight. According to agency theory, 
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independent directors can play an important role in monitoring executive managers’ 
performance. A higher ratio of independent directors among the board would lead to better 
governance and better monitoring activities by the board. This would also limit managerial 
opportunism (Terjesen et al., 2009) because those directors may be concerned with protecting 
their own reputation and avoiding potential financial loss which may result in litigation 
(Young, 2000). Furthermore, the financial expertise of board members is a significant element 
influencing the quality of financial reporting. Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) provide evidence 
that experience and accumulated knowledge enables directors to be more effective.  Similarly, 
the audit committee is also intended to play a major part in enhancing the financial report’s 
integrity (Allegrini and Greco, 2013). The audit committee also aims to protect shareholders’ 
interests, which is achieved through qualified members and adequate authority (DeZoort et al. 
2002). Parker (2000) shows that the degree of independent audit committees is negatively 
related to income-increasing accruals-based EM. Klein (2002) found that audit committee 
effectiveness is more likely to mitigate the accruals-based AEM. Klein (2002) examines the 
impact of the board and audit committee on AEM. Through examining a sample of 692 
companies in the USA, the author indicates that the characteristics of board directors and 
independent audit committee members are negatively related to AEM. Generally, Klein (2002) 
also argues that an independent and qualified board and audit committee have a significant 
impact on AEM, since they have a powerful monitoring role over the companies’ accounting 
processes. In line with Klein (2002), Peasnell et al (2005) provide additional evidence on the 
role of the board and audit committee in mitigating AEM. By investigating a sample of UK 
firms over the period 1989-2002, Peasnell et al. (2005) indicated that outsider members of the 
board and audit committee decrease AEM. Prior studies also found evidence that managers 
who are constrained for AEM are more likely to engage in other alternative strategies to achieve 
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their own interest (e.g. Zang 2011; Abernathy et al., 2014). This implies that the financial 
reporting will not provide reliable information when EM continues under different strategies. 
3.6.2 The Role of Institutional Ownership 
Unlike AEM, REM has a direct impact on the long-term value of companies. Managers may 
find difficulties engaging in REM when institutional investors are closely monitoring their 
activities. Prior studies suggest that institutional investors are used as a monitoring mechanism, 
since they have a better understanding of the impact of companies’ operating decisions, thus 
helping to mitigate the likelihood of real activities manipulation (Abernathy, 2014). Recent 
reforms in the corporate governance field have resulted in increasing interest in testing whether 
institutional ownership mitigates EM (e.g. Zang, 2011; Abernathy, 2014). Bushee and Noe 
(2000), for instance, examine the relationship between unexpected REM and institutional 
ownership to meet short-term earnings targets.  The study sample of US companies during the 
period from 1983 to 1994. The findings indicate that the developed institutional investors 
mitigate REM using R&D expenses to meet the former fiscal year’s earnings.  Bushee and Noe 
(2000) also provide evidence that, with a higher ratio of institutional ownership, companies 
engage less in REM through cutting research and development expenditures in order to 
increase earnings. Similarly, Roychowdhury (2006) indicates that institutional ownership is 
negatively related to REM.  
3.6.3 Auditors’ Quality  
Much evidence in EM literature indicates that audit quality constitutes a constraint on AEM 
(Becker et al., 1998; Krishnan, 2003; Chi et al., 2011). Managers are also more likely to face 
more difficulties in convincing higher quality auditing firms of their aggressive accruals 
estimates compared to a lower quality auditing firm. The impact of several proxies of auditor 
quality on AEM, such as the biggest auditing firms, audit and non-audit fees have been 
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examined by prior literature (Srinidhi & Gul, 2006; Zang, 2011). Prior research suggests that 
large audit firms provide higher quality audits than small firms (e.g., see Geiger and Rama, 
2006; Khurana and Raman, 2004). It is also argued that companies reviewed by larger auditing 
firms are more likely to estimate less abnormal accruals (Francis et al., 1999). DeAngelo 
(1981), for instance, found that the auditing firms’ size is used as a good proxy of the auditors’ 
quality. Similarly, Becker et al. (1998) investigated the relationship between AEM and 
auditors’ quality using the big 6 audit firms as proxy of auditors’ quality. They found that 
companies audited by higher quality auditing firms report a lower level of AEM than 
companies audited by lower quality auditing firms.  In the same context, Zang (2011) provided 
evidence that managers are more likely to change their strategies of EM as a result of 
constraining AEM by auditing firms.  Besides scrutiny from corporate governance mechanism 
and auditing firms, the accounting system’s flexibility within the companies also constrains 
AEM. Managers who engaged intensively in accruals manipulation in previous fiscal years, 
which led to limited flexibility in the accounting system to continue using accruals for EM, are 
more likely to face a higher risk of being detected. Thus, they are more likely to focus on other 
strategies to achieve their aims.  
3.6.4 The Role of Accounting Regulation 
Doukakis (2014) argued that countries that adopt IFRS might do so because they have higher 
incentives to enhance financial reporting quality. In this case, reform regulations such as IFRS 
serve as a proxy for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting (Soderstrom, 2007). 
Supporters of IFRS adoption also argued that the adoption of IFRS would improve the quality 
of accounting information (Jean and Stolowy 2008; Li 2010). Prior studies have addressed the 
question of whether the adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management and 
provide evidence that accrual-based EM seems to be decreasing after IFRS adoption (e.g. Cai 
et al., 2008; Chen et al. 2010). For example, Cai et al., (2008) investigated the impact of IFRS 
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and its enforcement on AEM in 32 countries and found a decrease in EM after IFRS adoption 
by those countries. Chen et al. (2010) examined the financial reporting quality of listed 
companies in 15 developed countries before and after the adoption of IFRS. Their results show 
a higher accrual quality and lower absolute discretionary accruals after IFRS adoption. In the 
same vein, Sun et al. (2011) studied the impact of IFRS adoption on the earnings quality of 
foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. from countries that have already adopted IFRS on a 
mandatory basis. Their results indicated that IFRS adoption led to an improvement in earnings 
quality for cross-listed firms relative to the matched firms. Adibah et al. (2013) study the 
differences in EM of Malaysian firms after the adoption of accounting standards, namely FRS. 
Their results show that FRS adoption is related to a higher quality of reported earnings. 
Managers may have more incentives to manipulate earnings by real operations, since changes 
in the legal framework and accounting standards have ensured more confidence and 
transparency of financial reports (Kumari & Pattanayak, 2014). In this context, Wagenhofer 
(2005) argues that the existence of stricter accounting standards might have a direct effect on 
AEM, since it reduces the chance of exploiting the flexibility of accounting policies. 
Wagenhofer further concludes that the adoption of stricter accounting regulations may drive 
managers to replace AEM with REM. These imply that managers substitute one form of EM 
with another and highlight unintentional results of IFRS adoption (when the practices of 
manipulating earnings continue under different forms, the information quality will not be 
improved). 
3.6.5 The Role of Regulatory Environment 
Evidence from prior literature indicated that there is a relationship between managers’ EM 
tendencies and the regulatory environments (Graham et al., 2005; Gerakos et al., 2011). 
Graham et al. (2005) conducted a study on the EM practices of financial managers and found 
evidence that financial managers tend to manipulate earnings using REM over AEM to avoid 
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the scrutiny of regulators. In particular, eighty per cent of managers surveyed disclosed their 
use of REM, such as manipulating advertising expenses and R&D, to meet short-term targets. 
Cohen et al. (2008) examined whether the Sarbanes and Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002 is related to 
a lower incidence of EM. They found that companies in the USA switched from using AEM 
pre-SOX to REM post-SOX. These findings are consistent with the results reported by Graham 
et al. (2005), indicating that management in a highly regulated environment are likely to use 
REM over AEM. Similarly, Ewert et al., (2005) also argued that good accounting regulation 
constrains AEM, but suggested that managers are more likely to engage in REM instead. 
Furthermore, Gerakos et al. (2011) investigated whether the regulatory environments are 
related to the characteristics of IPO companies. In particular, they listed companies on the 
lightly regulated AIM stock market vs. companies on the Main market of the London Stock 
Exchange and the developed markets in the USA. They found evidence that the levels of 
asymmetric information, failure rates and liquidity problems are higher in the lightly regulated 
AIM stock market than in the other companies. These findings indicate that the level of EM 
practices in the lightly regulated AIM stock market is higher than EM in the other companies.  
3.6.6 Other constraints for EM  
This section focuses on how other costs can constrain EM. REM may be considered by 
managers as a costly decision when they face high competition in the same industry. Thus, with 
a lower percentage of the industry market share, companies are less likely to engage in REM. 
Using REM is also perceived as relatively costly when companies are facing a poor financial 
position. Companies which are facing insolvency problems may have a greater marginal cost 
if they change their optimal business strategy. A company which is close to bankruptcy is more 
likely to be working on saving itself than working on its financial reporting (Kostas, 2015). 
Graham et al. (2005) conducted a survey of 400 executives and noted that they were aiming to 
produce smooth, attainable earnings every year unless they were in a poor financial position. 
61 
 
Zang (2011) also documents evidence that firms’ poor financial health constrains REM. 
Roychowdhury (2006) indicates that REM has a negative impact on the subsequent operating 
period and its cash flows, which are greater than the influence of AEM. 
3.7 Measurements of Accruals-Based Earnings Management 
AEM is also known by prior research as accrual-based earnings management, in which certain 
accruals are managed which cause a contradiction between the timing of the accounting 
recognition of income and the timing of cash flows (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Shafer, 2015). 
Moreover, prior research on AEM suggests that management are more likely to engage in 
earnings manipulation through accruals-based EM, since AEM is less costly to use. Generally, 
three essential approaches have been used by researchers to examine the EM practices, which 
are specific accruals, (McNichols and Wilson 1988;  Beatty et al. 2002); frequency distribution 
of earnings (Beatty et al., 1999; Degeorge et al. 1999) and aggregate accruals (e.g. Kothari et 
al. 2005; Dechow et al. 1995). These three approaches are discussed in the following sections. 
3.7.1 Specific Accruals Approach    
Based on this approach, previous studies have investigated different specific accruals, for 
instance, bad debt expenses (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), postponed tax assets (Miller et al., 
1998) and loss allowances of insurance claims (Beaver et al., 2001).  McNichols and Wilson 
(1988), assume that bad debt expenses are comprised of normal and abnormal accruals and 
provide evidence that companies engage in EM using accruals with unusually low or high 
earnings. Cecchini et al. (2012) find also that IPO companies engage in EM to decrease 
earnings by employing more allowances. Nevertheless, this approach cannot control the 
hypothesis that management may employ different accruals simultaneously to manage 
earnings. For instance, if no evidence is found that a company manipulates bad debt expenses, 
it may not be enough to suggest that there is no evidence of using accrual-based EM, since the 
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company can manipulate other kinds of specific accruals. Thus, by investigating specific 
accruals, direct evidence can be provided by researchers for standard setters. Furthermore, the 
use of reported loan loss provisions, which is used by researchers in the banks’ valuation, was 
examined by Elnahass et al. (2014). They differentiated the loan loss provisions into normal 
and abnormal accruals and provided evidence that loan loss provision is significantly related 
to investors’ decisions.  
Phillips et al. (2003) used postponed tax expense for measuring AEM, along with the 
discretionary accruals. They provided evidence about the usefulness of postponed tax expense 
through either total accrual or discretionary accrual, which aims to reduce revenue or to avoid 
small losses. Beneish (2001) used the approach of multiple specific accruals through a new 
model for measuring AEM in a sub-sample of firms with high profit level. This model 
comprises variables such as capital structure, time listed, ownership structure, growth of sales, 
previous market performance and other incentives for violating GAAP by managers. The study 
results indicated that there is a relationship between the violating of GAAP flexibility and 
previous market performance, growth of sales and capital structure. 
While the specific accruals approach provides several advantages to estimate abnormal 
accruals in specific circumstances, in most circumstances it has failed to do so (McNichols et 
al., 1988). Furthermore, Beneish (2001) argues that the specific accruals approach is 
insufficiently flexible for examining other factors related to EM. Therefore, the approach of 
specific accruals is meaningless when exploring the relationship between other hypothesised 
variables and EM, since it needs a different model for each kind of specific accrual. This 
approach is more appropriate and is frequently used by financial institutions (such as the 
banking and insurance industries).  
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3.7.2 Frequency Distribution of Earnings  
The frequency distribution approach is based on the supposition that the manager is encouraged 
to meet an earnings target. This approach attempts to detect EM through earnings distribution. 
Prior research has investigated EM  by testing the distribution of reported earnings, which found 
evidence that this approach can be used to focus on suspect areas of earnings management (e.g. 
Beatty et al., 1999; Degeorge et al. 1999). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) employed earnings 
distribution to test whether management engaged in EM to avoid a decrease in earnings and 
losses. Their results suggest that earnings manipulation to avoid losses is conducted by 
abnormally high frequencies of small earnings and abnormally low frequencies of small losses. 
They also indicate that managers with slightly pre-managed earnings are involved in EM to 
increase profit. Degeorge et al. (1999) examined the earnings distribution per share to discover 
whether avoiding losses is a motivation for EM. They found that the management tend to 
manage earnings to avoid loss. Similarly, Beatty et al. (2002) used the distribution approach to 
examine whether managers manipulating earnings to meet the previous year’s earnings is the 
main reason for management in banks to engage in EM practice. Their results indicated that 
fewer small decreases in earnings are conducted by private banks rather than public banks.  
Zhou et al., (2006) suggests that the approach of distribution earnings is more effective in 
detecting EM than other methods. However, Durtschi and Easton (2005) argue that the 
frequency distributions shapes, which researchers use as proof of the existence of EM, may not 
provide sufficient evidence for the existence of EM. As a result, researchers should consider 
these factors before employing earnings distributions shape as evidence for the existence of 
EM. 
3.7.3 Aggregate Accruals Approach 
There are various approaches to estimate AEM. However, the approach of aggregate accruals 
is the most commonly used approach in EM research (Dechow et al. 2010). Aggregate accruals 
64 
 
consist of two components, which are normal accruals and abnormal accruals (Sun et al., 2010). 
Normal accruals are also known as non-discretionary accruals. They are affected by external 
factors, thus, it is outside the control of the management. Normal accrual results from the real 
processes within the company, when there is no availability of accounting choice for registering 
transactions. Therefore, it is recorded without deliberate intervention or personal judgment 
from the management. Abnormal accruals, however, are known also as discretionary accruals, 
which are adjustments selected and managed by the management. Discretionary Accruals are 
used as proxy for AEM (Peasnell et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 2015; Perotti and Windisch, 2017). 
Discretionary Accruals result from the accounting operations through the available flexibility 
in accounting standards. Discretionary accruals are a powerful tool for managing earnings since 
it is difficult to observe or follow them directly in the financial statements (Bergstresser & 
Philippon, 2006; Barghathi, 2014).  Prior research introduces several models to measure AEM. 
The AEM models have difficulty with separating and identifying total accruals into normal and 
abnormal accruals. Thus, prior literature follows two streams of studies, which are 
discretionary accruals and total accruals. Total accrual models are used to measure 
discretionary accruals as proxy for AEM through the change in total accruals (DeAnglo, 1986). 
The second approach is based on the separation of total accruals into normal and abnormal 
accruals and uses abnormal accruals as proxy for AEM (Jones, 1991). The most common 
models used to measure discretionary accruals in the recent research are the modified Jones 
(1995) model and Kothari et al. (2005). The following sections present the most important 
models based on the aggregate approach. 
3.7.3.1 The Healy (1985) model  
Healy (1985) created one of the first quantitative models developed in the accounting literature 
for detecting earnings management practices, whereby the discretionary accrual was estimated 
as the difference between the total accruals and the average of total accruals; this is used as 
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proxy for the normal accruals. Total accruals can be measured of the difference between the 
net income from operations and cash flows. The Healy model, by using accrual, assumed that 
earnings management occurs in all periods. When the change in the value of the normal accrual 
is equal to zero, this suggests that any change in the size of the total accruals as increase or 
decrease is due to the abnormal accrual. Consequently, there is the possibility of manipulation 
by the management to affect reported earnings. The Healy model is the simplest model 
presented to measure earnings management practices (Banseh and Khansalar, 2016). However, 
the assumption of this model, that the level of the change in the value of the normal accrual is 
equal to zero, has been criticised by prior research (Holthausen et al., 1995; Dechow 2010; 
Chen et al., 2015). Since the fluctuation of the normal accruals depends on the company’s 
economic circumstances, the change in the level of normal accruals is not likely to be equal to 
zero at any period (Breton et al, 2009; Dechow 2010).  
3.7.3.2  De Angelo (1986) model 
This model is based on testing earnings management practices through the difference between 
the total accruals in the current period and the previous period. De Angelo (1986) assumed that 
the change is equal to zero in the absence of earnings management practices. The author used 
the total accruals of the previous year as a standard of the expected accruals (Aljifri, 2007). 
This model is relatively easier in terms of application compared to Healy’s (1985) model, 
which does not require estimated periods. While the Healy model requires at least five 
estimated periods, the De Angelo model summarises the estimation to the previous period only. 
However, there are similarities between the two models in terms of the stability of assumption 
of normal accruals. Criticism has been directed at this model because the previous period is 
used as a measure for the manipulation in current earnings, since it cannot determine the periods 
that are free of earnings management practices (Garcia and Sanchez, 2009). This may make the 
measurement inaccurate and biased. DeAngelo (1986) used this model based on the assumption 
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that any changes in normal accruals are constant over time. Thus, it is approximately equal to 
zero in the estimated period. Nevertheless, several EM studies have criticised this since  normal 
accruals are affected by the changes in the companies’ circumstances, which do not remain 
constant over time (Aljifri 2007; Dechow et al., 2010). 
3.7.3.3 The industry model 
Due to the criticisms directed at the Healy (1985) model, which supposes the persistence of the 
normal accruals over time, the industry model was created by Dechow and Sloan (1991) to 
capture AEM. They suggest that the differences in normal accruals should be similar in the 
same industry, thus, they estimate abnormal accruals as the median of aggregate accruals over 
a given period divided by the total assets at the beginning of the given period for all companies 
in the same sector.  This model tries to avoid the criticisms that are directed at the Healy (1985) 
model. However, the industry model was also criticised for some weaknesses. For instance, the 
normal accruals could be different in the same sector. Thus, if the  change in the normal 
accruals does not reveal  instability in a company’s economic circumstances, then abnormal 
accruals might be missclassified as normal accruals (Dechow et al. 1995). 
3.7.3.4 The Jones (1991) Model 
The Jones (1991) model is the most common model used in prior EM research, since this model 
can differentiate between normal and abnormal accruals. Jones (1991) assumes that the total 
accruals are arising from changes in a company’s economic conditions and managers’ 
interventions in the process of financial reporting (Chen, 2012). The variation in normal 
accruals, stemming from changes in business activities and arising from depreciation of the 
company assets (property, plant, equipment) and revenue, are used to measure the normal 
accruals. Jones suggests a regression model to estimate abnormal accruals. Two stages are used 
to divide total accruals into normal and abnormal accruals (Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Sun et 
al., 2010). This model can be applied in two ways (the time series, cross-section). However, it 
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has been found that using the Jones model with a cross-section provides more control than 
using it with a time series (Dechow et al, 2010). A large number of studies have been attracted 
by the Jones model (e.g. Guay et al., 1996; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cornett et al., 2008; 
Jiraporn, et al., 2008). For instance, Guay et al. (1996) suggest that this model is a more 
effective model than the Healy (1985), Dechow and Sloan (1991) and DeAngelo (1986) 
models.  Furthermore, Dechow et al (1995) and Aljifri (2007) also indicate that the Jones 
(1991) model is considered the most powerful for detecting EM. However, it is noted that the 
Jones model implicitly assumes revenues represent normal accrual, which means it is not used 
in EM. Nevertheless, company can manipulate earnings using revenue through accruals 
misclassification.  
3.7.3.5 The modified Jones (1995) Model  
Due to the criticism directed at the Jones (1991) model, Dechow et al. (1995) created a modified 
model to improve the measurement of discretionary accruals. Their model deducts the 
differences in the receivables from the differences in revenues to exclude  the change in future 
revenue, which is expected to be considered  discretionary by  managers. Accordingly, Sun et 
al. (2010) argue that it is easier to manage earnings through the flexibility available in the 
revenue from futures sales, rather than earnings management practices through the revenue 
from cash sales. Therefore, the modified Jones (1995) model uses only variations in cash 
revenue to estimate normal accruals, since some credit is more likely to be discretionary in a 
given period (Dechow et al., 2010). Considerable research has explored the performance of 
abnormal accruals models and suggests that the modified Jones model is the most powerful 
model to detect EM (Habbash, 2010). Although this model was presented as time series, several 
studies  (e.g. Subramanyam, 1996; Bartov et al., 2001) have compared these models as time 
series and cross-section. They suggest that, when detecting EM, the modified Jones (1995) 
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model is more effective as a cross-sectional model than a time-series model (Peasnell et al. 
2000).  
3.7.3.6 Kothari et al.’s (2005) model ( performance matched discretionary accruals)  
The importance of companies’ operating performance is indicated in several EM studies (e.g. 
Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999). These studies indicate that abnormal accruals are 
significantly related to the return on the total assets when the Jones model is used to estimate 
EM. To resolve this issue, Kothari et al. (2005) argue that abnormal accruals, as measured by 
the modified Jones (1995) model, may also include measurement error in abnormal accruals 
since this model neglects the company’s performance. Prior research (Dechow et al.,1998; 
Barber and Lyon, 1996) provides evidence that ROA is an effective variable to control the 
performance of companies. Consistent with these studies, Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that 
using ROA as a proxy for the performance is more likely to increase the effectiveness of the 
modified Jones (1995) model. Thus, the abnormal accruals are estimated by the residuals of 
the regression model.   
3.8 Measurement of Real Earnings Management Activities  
In order to measure REM, previous studies have employed several models, such as discretionary 
expenses (DISX), abnormal cash flows (CFO) and production cost (PROD) (e.g. Cheng, 2004; 
Chi et al., 2011).  
3.8.1 Discretionary Expenses Manipulation  
DISX represents the sum of advertising expenses, selling, general and administrative expenses 
and R&D. Previous research follows two methods to measure DISX manipulation. The first 
method measures the abnormal level through each activity of DISX separately (e.g. Bushee and 
Noe, 2000; Gunny, 2010).The second method measures the DISX manipulation for the sum of 
advertising expenses, selling, general and administrative expenses and R&D (e.g. Cohen et al., 
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2008; Zang, 2012). In order to increase reported earnings, management typically attempts to use 
all or one of these expenses. 
Perry and Grinaker (1994) investigated the relationship between the expenses of R&D and 
earnings forecast. They used one of the first models for estimating the manipulation of R&D 
using a sample of 99 companies. They created their model for measuring abnormal R&D 
expenses based on Berger’s (1993) model. In line with this method, which used a single activity 
of DISX, another model, created by Gunny (2010) to estimate the manipulation of R&D 
expenses, is based on the prior model (Berger’s (1993) model). Furthermore, another model 
developed by Gunny (2010) estimates non-discretionary sales expenses, general and 
administrative. 
Roychowdhury (2006) has used a slightly different approach. He measured the discretionary 
expenses as the sum of advertising expenses, R&D and selling, general and administrative 
expenditures. Specifically, Roychowdhury (2006) built this model based on a Dechow et al. 
(1998) model, when he measured the sum of DISX as a linear function on sales. Nevertheless, 
Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that measuring the DISX as specified by Roychowdhury (2006) 
will cause a problem if a company manipulates earnings upwards using sales for increasing 
reported earnings. To overcome this issue, DISX is measured as a function of sales at the end 
of the previous year. Therefore, DISX is measured through a regression for each sector and year. 
3.8.2 Operation Cash Flows Manipulation   
Previous studies found evidence that companies manipulate sales through increasing the 
discounted price and/or giving more lenient credit terms (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008; Kim et al., 
2012). If managers manipulate earnings through discounts of sales price or giving more lenient 
credit terms to increase the current year’s profit, these decisions will lead to a lower level of 
cash flows from operations in the current year (Kim et al., 2012). Roychowdhury (2006) 
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estimates   the normal operations cash flows as a linear function of change of sales and sales at 
the current year.  
3.8.3 Production Cost Manipulation  
The purpose of PROD manipulation is to increase the earnings margin in the present period 
through increasing production units and reducing the cost of goods sold. Furthermore, 
companies try to reduce the fixed cost per unit through increasing the number of units produced, 
as this will not increase the marginal unit cost (Dechow et al., 1998). Roychowdhury (2006) 
estimates PROD, and defines it as the cost of goods sold (CGS) and inventory change (Ch-INV) 
during the year. He measures CGS as a linear function of current sales. Roychowdhury (2006) 
defined PROD as GSC + CH-INV.  
3.8.4 Asset Sales Timing  
Asset sales timing is a flexible technique used by managers to manipulate earnings for meeting 
the desired threshold. The model developed by Gunny (2010) to estimate the asset sales 
manipulation is based on Herrmann et al.’s (2003) model. The following cross-sectional 
regression suggests the residue from the regression can be used as proxy for manipulating asset 
sales.  
3.9 Empirical evidence on accruals-based and real earnings management 
 It has been documented that earnings management (EM) exists not only using accounting 
policies, but also when management manipulates real transactions in order to disclose a level 
of earnings in accordance with their own interest (Dechow and Skinner 2000; Callao and Jarne 
2010). There is a significant difference when EM occurs in real transactions as opposed to 
accounting-based ones, as this has a direct impact on the cash flow. It is defined as management 
actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of 
meeting specific earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury, 2006). It is documented in prior studies 
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that the increased scrutiny on accrual-based accounting has led to lower AEM (e.g. Cai et al., 
2008; Chen et al. 2010; Sun et al., 2011). Managers presumably realise that the costs and risks 
of detecting EM are higher than its benefits in a stronger regulatory environment. Cohen et al. 
(2010) noted that REM is more difficult to detect than AEM. Although REM has not been 
studied on as large a scale as AEM, it has been argued that managers may prefer to use REM 
than AEM (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). Managers have more incentives to manipulate 
earnings by real operations, since changes in the legal framework and accounting standards 
have ensured more confidence and transparency of financial reports (Kumari & Pattanayak, 
2014). Similarly, Graham et al. (2005) document strong evidence that managers may prefer to 
use REM instead of AEM. In particular, they interviewed 400 executives and emailed the 
survey to 3174 financial executives in the USA. Their findings indicate that eighty percent of 
survey participants are inclined to use REM through decreasing advertising expenses, 
maintenance and R&D rather than applying the accruals options in order to meet specific aims. 
Roychowdhury (2006) investigates EM through real activities manipulation using a large US 
sample over the period 1987–2001. The study finds higher levels of REM across different 
earnings thresholds and, more specifically, provides evidence that US companies engage more 
in REM to avoid reporting losses. Cohen et al. (2008) empirically investigate the interrelation 
between real and accrual EM post SOX among US companies. Their findings indicate that 
firms switched from AEM to REM following the stricter legislation. Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) document that companies engage in both EM strategies in the period of a seasoned 
equity offering. Ipino and Parbonetti (2017) and Ferentinou et al. (2016) investigate the 
relationship between REM and AEM before and after the IFRS adoption and show evidence 
of a significant switch from AEM to REM after the IFRS adoption. The limitation found in the 
methods that were used in the above research is they propose that the costs of managing AEM 
are constant among all companies. They also do not provide empirical evidence for both costs 
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together for both strategies, AEM and REM. Therefore, these empirical studies did not consider 
the trade-off based on their relative costs.  
There are only a few studies which have examined the trade-off between AEM and REM based 
on their relative costs. Zang (2012), for example, investigates the trade-off decision between 
AEM and REM using a large sample of companies during the period from 1987 to 2008 in the 
USA. She analyses the managers’ trade-off decisions based on different costs of both AEM 
and REM. Her results provide evidence which suggests that the substitution between AEM and 
REM is based on the relative costs or constraints of each strategy. Abernathy et al. (2014) also 
examine how previously identified EM constraints are associated with the use of trade-off 
strategies to manage earnings. They indicate that the use of trade-off increases when one of the 
EM methods is more costly and constrained. Their findings suggest that the trade-off from 
REM to AEM is more likely to increase when REM is constrained by lower financial health, 
high institutional ownership levels and high industry market competition. Moreover, managers 
may also use the trade-off from AEM to REM more when AEM is constrained by lower 
accounting flexibility. 
Based on the above discussion, since the majority of studies on the relationship between AEM 
and REM are conducted in western countries (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008; Abernathy, 2014), not 
much is known about the relationship between AEM and REM in developing countries. Only 
a few empirical studies in developing countries have investigated this relationship (e.g. 
Matsuura, 2008; Kuo et al., 2014), and have focused only on some constraints for AEM. 
Moreover, evidence found by previous literature in the developed countries may not be helpful 
in understanding the relationship in developing countries due to the differences in environment 
and standards between these countries (Anglin et al., 2013). Prior research has also argued that 
several factors, such as culture, religion and other societal norms, may influence accruals-based 
and real activities earnings management (e.g. Gautam & Singh, 2010; Hastings, 2000). Most 
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notably, previous studies which examine the relationship between AEM and REM have 
identified several factors that impact either AEM or REM, such as the Sarbanes and Oxley Act 
of 2002 (Cohen et al., 2008), IFRS (e.g. Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017; Ferentinou et al., 2016) 
and relative costliness related to REM or AEM (Zang, 2012; Abernathy, 2014). However, no 
study examines the impact of the effectiveness of the board and audit committee on this 
relationship. We argue that any choice of EM is not without costs for the companies. Every 
decision to manipulate earnings should take into account their relative cost. Prior research 
(Zang, 2012; Abernathy, 2014) suggests that REM is constrained by institutional ownership, 
lower financial health and higher industry competition, while AEM is constrained by the 
existence of lower accounting flexibility, corporate governance, and high quality auditing. 
3.10 Conclusions  
The current chapter discusses the literature review related to EM definitions, activities, and 
measurement. EM literature presented in this chapter also indicated that REM and AEM are 
the most commonly used methods in manipulating earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Kim et 
al., 2012; Shafer, 2015). Previous research found evidence which suggests that the substitution 
between AEM and REM is based on the relative costs or constraints of each strategy (Zang, 
2012; Abernathy et al., 2014).  In addition, while the empirical research that measures REM is 
comparatively new and needs more attention and development (e.g., Gunny, 2010, Kim et al., 
2012), measuring AEM has been developed and given more attention by previous EM literature 
(e.g. Dechow et al., 1995, Kothari et al., 2005). Other interesting conclusions might be drawn 
based on the prior EM literature. Although it seems there is no agreement about a particular 
model that can measure AEM with great accuracy, the majority of previous researchers have 
employed the modified Jones (1995) model and Kothari et al.’s (2005) model (the performance 
matched method) to measure AEM (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). In respect of 
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measurement of REM, the majority of prior researchers have used Dechow et al.’s (1995) 
model, which is applied by Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate REM (Kim et al., 2012). 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to justify the research methodology in accordance with 
the study objectives. Thus, the current chapter presents the study methods and approaches, 
which are structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the hypotheses development and section 
4.3 clarifies the research method. Section 4.4 shows the process of process of data collection 
and constructing the sample. Sections 4.5 presents the processes of measuring REM and 
AEM, and section 4.6  explains the processes of measuring QCSRD. Control variables and 
the main empirical research model are then presented in Section 4.7. In section 4.8 the 
analytical procedures are presented and, finally, section 4.9 presents the summary of the entire 
chapter.   
4.2 Hypotheses Development     
The main purpose of this study is to understand the relationship between EM and QCSRD 
among the top 500 Indian listed companies. To achieve the aim of this thesis, the study 
hypotheses are built as follows.  
In order to explain the association between QCSRD and EM, previous studies have suggested 
two perspectives, namely, the moral perspective and the opportunistic perspective (Kim et al., 
2012). The opportunistic perspective suggests that managers who engage in EM are more likely 
to use CSR disclosure to mask their opportunistic behaviour (Khan and Azim, 2015). 
According to this perspective, CSR disclosure has become an important incentive for managers 
to achieve financial gain and personal rewards at the same time. Sun et al. (2010) argued that 
when agency conflicts exist, managers might manipulate earnings opportunistically in their 
favour. Managers who use EM may attempt to distract stakeholders about their opportunistic 
behaviour. Those managers voluntarily issue CSR reporting to promote an impression of their 
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CSR values, which may or may not be substantiated (Mahoney et al, 2013). Following this 
argument, the relationship between EM and CSR reporting could be substitutive, since CSR 
disclosure is used by companies with poor financial reporting quality as a mechanism to gain 
legitimacy for substitution of their low quality financial reporting (Martínez-Ferrero, et al, 
2015). CSR disclosure, in this sense, is used as window-dressing to distract the attention of the 
firms’ stakeholders from their questionable and poor financial reporting practice. Owing to 
this, many empirical studies have shown evidence of a positive association between CSR 
disclosure and EM. Nevertheless, according to the moral perspective, it is assumed that 
companies which are socially responsible and disclose quality information of their CSR are 
less likely to manipulate earnings (Yip et al., 2011). Kim et al. (2012), argue that firms which 
spend their resources in the activities of CSR and conduct programs in moral perspective for 
the interest of stakeholders are expected to engage less in EM and prepare more reliable and 
transparent financial reporting. Choi et al. (2013) point out that since EM is inconsistent with 
CSR principles, companies with a higher commitment to CSR are seemingly acting in a 
responsible way when they prepare their financial statements. Given that managers are more 
likely to engage in EM when there is high information asymmetry, CSR reporting is assumed 
by signalling theory to be a means of mitigating the information asymmetry between 
management personnel and stakeholders. Owing to this, many empirical studies have shown 
evidence of a negative relationship between CSR reporting and EM (e.g. Laksmana & Yang, 
2009; Kim et al., 2012).  
The above two theoretical perspectives pose an important research question"Is there a positive 
or negative relationship between the QCSRD and the level of AEM and REM among Indian 
listed companies?”. A closer look at the arguments behind these two perspectives, however, 
reveals that they can be reconciled if one can evaluate the informational content (i.e. quality) 
of CSR. 
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Furthermore, QCSRD is suggested by signalling and agency theories to be a means of 
mitigating EM (Chih et al., 2008). Agency problems arise, and conflicts occur, between 
shareholders and managers when the agents act in their own interests rather than optimising 
companies’ value (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Asymmetric information arises when 
managers have more access to information than the owners (Fields et al. 2001). This is due to 
the fact that managers work within the company every day and are informed about all the 
companies’ transactions. On the other hand, stakeholders rely on periodic information, such as 
annual reports, in order to enable them evaluating companies’ value. Therefore, asymmetric 
information will be higher when the information quality is low. 
Signalling and agency theories assume that companies, by providing QCSRD, are more likely 
to reduce the asymmetric information and mitigate the problem of conflicting interests (Prado-
Lorenzo et al. 2008; Miller 2002). Agency theory suggests that the problem of conflicting 
interests increases when both the managers and shareholders attempt to maximise their wealth. 
The key factor that leads to this problem of conflicting interests is asymmetry information. 
According to the agency perspective, a company is more likely to use several methods, such as 
QCSRD, to mitigate the agency problem between agents and shareholders, and then it reduces 
EM (Li et al., 2008). Given that managers are more likely to manipulate earnings with high 
information asymmetry, QCSRD is also suggested by signalling theory as a tool for reducing 
the asymmetric information between management personnel and stakeholders. Laksmana and 
Yang (2009) and Chih et al., (2008) argue that when the transparency of information is 
increased the expectation of the asymmetric information between the management and 
stakeholders will be reduced and, therefore, EM would be reduced.  
The prior research in this area has substantiated that CSR reporting is associated with EM. 
Empirical findings, however, remain inconclusive with regard to whether commitment to CSR 
reporting has a positive or negative impact on EM and vice versa (e.g. Sun et al., 2010; Yip et 
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al., 2011; Muttakin & Azim, 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Belgacem & Omri, 2015). One possible 
reason for this could be due to the biased measurement of CSR disclosure. The methods of 
measuring CSR disclosure that have been employed when examining the relationship with EM 
do not consider the QCSRD, which is important for distinguishing the information provided to 
users. It is not possible to draw a conclusion on the possible effects of CSR reporting on EM 
without knowing whether CSR disclosure conveys true (as in the stakeholder and ethical 
perspective) or false information (as in the managerial opportunism or legitimacy perspective). 
Since singling and agency theories suggest that the QCSRD could be used to mitigate 
information asymmetries (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Miller 2002), it can be expected that 
the QCSRD is useful for various stakeholders and, therefore, comprises a positive phenomenon 
for stockmarkets (Garrido et al., 2014).  
Chih et al., (2008) argue that it will be unlikely that managers will engage in EM in companies 
that provide high quality disclosure of their social activities which targets all stakeholders 
because, when the transparency of information is increased, the expectation of the information 
asymmetry among management and stakeholders will be reduced. Since the reduction in 
information asymmetry tends to constrain EM (Wang et al, 2015), the current study expects a 
negative relationship between QCSRD and EM and, thus, supports the first and second 
hypotheses: 
H1: there is a negative relationship between AEM and QCSRD. 
H2: there is a negative relationship between REM and QCSRD. 
4.3 Research Method 
To examine the current study hypotheses, this section discusses the research paradigm and its 
influence on the study’s methodology and methods. The choice of research philosophy and 
strategy is based on the objectives of the current study.  
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The research philosophy points to the methods that can be used in gathering data, analysing it 
and then using this data (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Prior research suggests two main 
approaches: interpretivism and positivism. Interpretivism prefers humanistic qualitative 
methods, while positivism employs scientific quantitative methods (e.g. Berg et al., 2004; 
Bryman, 2004). Annells (1996) also indicated that the interpretivism philosophy concentrates 
on the differences between conducting research and the reality, which should be understood. 
The positivists’ philosophy, on the other hand, edges towards a steady reality observed and 
explained using an objective perspective. In the current study, positivism was followed, since 
it is investigating the actuality of a phenomenon which already exists between EM and QCSRD 
in Indian listed companies. This study also requires the use of existing theories in developing 
hypotheses, which can be rejected or confirmed according to the study results (Saunders et al., 
2009). 
Furthermore, these seemingly conflicting philosophies could result in two fundamental 
research strategies, namely qualitative and quantitative (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015). 
Basically, the qualitative research approach proposes a descriptive and non-numeric method 
for collecting data that helps to comprehend the phenomenon (Berg et al., 2004). Babbie (2015) 
argues that the qualitative research approach is an active and flexible method for investigating 
slight nuances in the attitudes, behaviour and in examining the changes in social procedures 
during the research process. On the other hand, the quantitative research strategy hinges on 
numbers and measurements, which seeks to test the link between specified variables. 
Quantitative research concentrates on the quantification of gathered data; generating figures or 
results that could be converted to numerical data. It is also important to recognise that this 
method allows the researchers to remain distant and independent (Howell, 2013). Collis and 
Hussey (2013) indicated that quantitative analysis includes various forms of statistical 
analyses; providing a more reliable and accurate measurement of the identified variables in 
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order to generalise the study results. The research method used in the present study is consistent 
with the quantitative strategy, based on the positivism philosophy. This strategy uses theories 
that help the researcher to find a link between study variables and achieves the research aims 
(Crotty, 1998). 
In addition, Babbie (2010) argues that there are two main research approaches, which are 
inductive and deductive approaches. Inductive reasoning is used through moving from specific 
observations to wider generalisations, hence forming theories. The deductive approach, on the 
other hand, hinges on theories in order to develop an appropriate hypothesis, meaning that the 
study hypothesis is built based on the theories. Thus, the research strategy is planned to 
examine the hypothesis through the collected data. The current study applied the deductive 
approach, since the study’s hypotheses were built according to the existing literature and 
theories. Furthermore, in line with the positivists’ approach, statistical analysis techniques were 
used to examine these hypotheses. This method is in line with the main aim of this research, 
which is to examine the association between EM and QCSRD. 
4.4 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Table 4.1 shows that the initial sample for this study is the top 500 Indian listed companies in 
the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during the period from 2007 to 2015. The current 
study chooses this sample to examine the link between QCSRD and EM due to several reasons. 
Firstly, the Indian context makes an interesting example as an environment that has one of the 
highest level of CSR practices among other developing countries (Reserve Bank of India, 2009; 
UNIDO, 2002). India passed Section 135 of the Companies Act, in 2013, recommending a 
mandatory “CSR spend of 2% of average net income during the ending financial year” for all 
companies meeting specified financial thresholds by this Act. Thus, it has gone further than 
any other country.  Secondly, the focus on one of the fastest growing economies can inform 
general managers and CSR managers about the characteristics of the Indian approach to 
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QCSRD and EM. Thirdly, this study believes that there are additional factors to be analysed, 
which are not included in developed countries’ paradigms. Prior research has argued that 
several factors, such as culture, religion and other societal norms, may influence CSR 
disclosure and EM. The focus on the quality of CSR disclosure and EM in the Indian context, 
and the practices of its leading companies, could provide practitioners and scholars with a new 
model (Cappelli et al., 2010). Fourthly, Indian listed companies exhibit a strong presence of 
family and promoter groups’ ownership (Chauhan et al. 2016). It is also a fact that Indian 
institutional laws, mechanisms and governance are weak compared to Western countries 
(Reddy, 2016). Since the majority of prior studies in this area have been conducted in 
developed countries, research findings for western countries may not be applicable for the 
Indian context in terms of determinant of EM. Finally, the Indian stock market is comprised of 
23 stock exchanges. The main stock market in India is the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). 
The BSE was established in 1878, and is the oldest stock exchange in Asia. This study chooses 
the top 500 companies in the BSE due to The BSE-500 index, which represents approximately 
93 percent of the total market capitalisation of the BSE, which itself represents about 90 percent 
of all Indian market capitalisation.  The current study focuses on the period from 2007 to 2015 
to ensure an adequate and consistent observation which strengthens the results of this study. 
Following prior studies (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 2002; Sun et al., 2010; Arun 
et al. 2015), financial and utilities companies are excluded because of the unique characteristics 
of their ﬁnancial statements. Due to the characteristics of their financial statements, prior 
studies have used specific methods to measure EM, for instance EM via loan loss provision. 
Since methods for measuring EM in non-financial companies are different compared to 
financial and utilities companies, these companies are excluded to ensure the consistent results 
of this study (Sun et al., 2010; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Alqatamin et al., 2017). 
Further to this, foreign cross-listed firms and companies controlled by the government are 
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excluded, since they are influenced by different regulations and social obligations (Haldar & 
Rao, 2011). Firms with missing data were also excluded from the sample to ensure an adequate 
and consistent observation which strengthens the study findings (Habbash et al., 2014). The 
final sample consists of 1908 firm-year observations during the study period. 
Qualitative and quantitative data are required in order to achieve the empirical aims for this 
study. Qualitative data were used to measure QCSRD and quantitative data were used for 
measuring EM. Annual reports are the main public source of corporate information (Botosan, 
1997). They are produced regularly and are easily accessible by researchers (Chan et al., 2014). 
Spence (2009) suggests that annual reports are considered the main source of information for 
investors; therefore, any details related to companies’ social and environmental issues will be 
taken from firms’ annual reports. In addition, the annual financial reports are more easy to use 
when comparing between companies than other channels; for example press releases or 
standalone reports, which are irregularly issued (Orens and Lybaert, 2007; Marquis and Toffel, 
2012). Most of the Indian listed companies publish their annual reports regularly and they are 
available on the companies’ websites. Most of their annual reports were released within the 
first quarter of the following fiscal year. Thus, the main study data were collected and reviewed 
manually from each annual report published during the period from 2007 to 2015. The OSIRIS 
database was also used for collecting Quantitative data to measure EM, which contains reliable 
information on listed companies. To cover some unavailable financial information in the annual 
reports and OSIRIS database, additional resources such as Bloomberg and companies’ websites 
were used. 
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Table 4.1 Sample selection 
Type of sector:  Excluded companies Total final sample 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . 
 
Population 
of study  
Financial 
companies 
Foreign 
Companies 
Government 
Controlled 
Companies 
Established 
after 2006 
Missing 
data 
Companies Observations 
Financial companies 94 94 - - - - 0 0 
Oil & Gas companies 48 - 11 8 2 6 21 189 
 Services companies 79 - 13 7 6 11 42 378 
Agriculture & Fishing  24 - 4 1 2 3 14 126 
Clothes companies 22 - 0 0 3 5 14 126 
Automobile companies 17 - 5 0 0 0 12 108 
Construction companies 48 - 13 2 4 7 22 198 
Trading companies  20 - 0 0 1 4 15 135 
Pharmaceutical and 
healthcare companies 
42 - 2 0 1 8 31 279 
 Metals & Mining 27 - 0 12 2 4 9 81 
Food and Drinks   29 - 3 3 3 6 14 126 
Equipment companies 18 - 14 10 1 7 18 162 
Total 500 94 65 43 25 61 212 1908 
 
4.5. Measuring Earnings Management (EM). 
Prior literature argues that investigating each EM strategy (accruals-based earnings 
management (AEM) and real activities earnings management (REM)) individually is 
inadequate to capture the influence of EM (e.g. Fields et al. 2001; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017; 
Ho, L. et al., 2015; Ferentinou et al., 2016). The prior research also indicates that managers can 
use a combination of EM methods (i.e. AEM and REM) to meet their target (e.g. Zang, 2011; 
Sellami, 2016). Thus, this measures EM using both AEM and REM.  
4.5.1 Measuring Accruals-Based Earnings Management. 
Previous literature has suggested various models which have been utilised to estimate 
discretionary accruals, which are used as an AEM proxy (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 
2005; Patro & Pattanayak, 2014; Alhadab et al., 2015; Gao & Zhang, 2015;Persakis & Iatridis, 
2015). A large amount of prior research has suggested that the modified Jones  (1995) and 
Kothari et al. (2005) models are more accurate than the alternative models for detecting 
discretionary accruals as proxy for AEM (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998; Sun et al. 2010; Dechow et 
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al., 2010; Islam et al., 2011; Khan & Azim, 2015; Katmon & Al Farooque, 2017). To estimate 
discretionary accruals, a cross-sectional regression is utilised to control the samples for each 
industry-year group. This approach controls the variations in the effect of economic conditions 
on the accruals among various industry groups (Cohen et al., 2010).  Dechow et al. (2010) 
argue that the modified Jones model with cross-sectional regression is more powerful for 
detecting AEM than other models based on times series measurement. Thus, in the current 
study, the cross-sectional modified Jones (1995) model is used  as the main proxy to measure 
AEM practices, and the Kothari et al. (2005) model is used as an alternative test. 
4.5.1.1 Modified Jones (1995) Model 
Based on the Modified Jones (1995) model, the existence of AEM was estimated through 
discretionary accruals by differentiating them from non-discretionary accruals. Following 
previous literature (e.g. Islam, 2011; Dechow et al., 2010; Khan & Azim, 2015; Collins, 
2016;Katmon & Al Farooque, 2017;  Hong, 2017), this study employed the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995), as the main measure, to estimate current discretionary accruals 
(DA). In the  amended Jones (1991) model, the  assumption is  that all credit policies  and 
future sales changes will lead to changes in revenue, which is  one of the EM practices. 
Accordingly, it is easier to manage earnings through flexibility, which is available in the 
recognition of revenue from futures sales, than by EM practices through the recognition of 
revenue from cash sales (Sun et al., 2010). Thus, the following cross-sectional regression 
equation is used to estimate current accruals: 
TAC it / A it-1 = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it - ∆RECit) / A it-1) + β2 (PPE it / A it -1) + ε it (1)      
Where: 
TACit = total accruals 
TA it-1= the book value of total assets of company i at the end of year t-1 
∆REV it = revenues of company i in year t deducted from revenues in year t-1 
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∆REC = change in accounts receivable scaled by TA it-1 
PPE it / TA it-1= gross property, plant and equipment of company i at the end of year t scaled by 
TA it-1 
α, β1, β2 = estimated parameters 
ε it = the residual.  
It then employed the coefficient estimated from equation (1) to calculate normal accruals 
(NAit) for all observation in the sample: 
NA it-1 = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it - ∆RECit) / A it-1) + β2 (PPE it / A it -1)  
DA measured by the difference between TAC and the fitted NA. 
4.5.1.2 Kothari et al.’s (2005) Model 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue for the possibility of error in the DA measurement without 
controlling for company performance. Thus, they suggested a specific model to control for 
company performance by using ROA in the current year to enhance the power of the modified 
Jones model. The following equations express the Kothari et al. model ( Dechow et al., 2010; 
Sun et al., 2010). 
TAC it / A it-1 = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it - ∆RECit) / A it-1) + β2 (PPE it / A it -1) + β3 
(ROA/A i,t-1+ ε it (2)      
Where:  
TAC it = total accruals 
TA it-1= the book value of total assets of company i at the end of year t-1 
∆REV it = revenues of company i in year t deducted from revenues in year t-1 
∆REC it = change in accounts receivable scaled by TA it-1 
PPE it / TA it-1= gross property, plant and equipment of company i at the end of year t scaled by 
TA it-1 
ROA it = Return on assets 
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α, β1, β2 = estimated parameters 
ε it = the residual.   
It then employed the coefficient estimates from equation (2) to calculate normal accruals 
(NAit) for all observations in the sample: 
NA it-1 = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it - ∆RECit) / A it-1) + β2 (PPE it / A it -1)  
The current study uses Kothari et al.’s (2005) model as alternative measurement to enhance its 
validity and explanatory power with regards to the study’s results, because it is believed that 
controlling for company performance makes the EM more accurate (Sun et al., 2010). 
4.5.2 Measuring Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Dechow et al. (1998), the current study considers three 
metrics to develop the study proxies for real earnings management activities: the abnormal 
levels of cash flows from operations (ACFO), abnormal production costs (APROD) and 
discretionary expenses (ADISX). Previous literature (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Zang, 2011) offers evidence of the validity of these three proxies. Consistent with 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Dechow et al. (1998), the current study uses the following models 
to measure REM. 
CFO it / A it-1 =α + α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Sales i,t) / A i,t-1) + β2 (ΔSales it / A i,t -1) + ε it (3) 
PRODi,t / Assetsi,t-1 = α + α (1/Assetsi,t-1)+ β1 (Salesi,t /Assetsi,t-1) + β2 (ΔSales i,t /Assetsi,t-1) + 
β3 (ΔSalesi,t-1/Assetsi,t-1) + εi,t   (4) 
DISXi,t /Assetsi,t-1 = α + α (1/Assetsi,t-1) + β1 (Salesi,t /Assetsi,t-1) + εi,t (5) 
Where CFOi,t  = cash flow from operations for the company i in the current year;  
PRODit = total production costs, defined as the cost of goods sold and the change in inventories 
for the company i in the current year;  
DISXi,t  = expenses such as advertisements, administration, R&D and sales expenses;  
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Ai,t-1  = the total assets in the previous year;  
Salesi,t = the company’s sales in the current year,   
 ΔSalesi,t = changes in the company's sales in the current year.  
ACFO, APROD and ADISX are expected to capture REM. The residuals computed by 
equations (3), (4), and (5), which are used by previous studies (e.g. Prior et al, 2008; Choi et 
al., 2013; Gras-Gil et al., 2016) as proxies of ACFO, APROD and ADISX, are calculated as 
the difference between the actual values (CFO, PROD, DISX) and the normal levels predicted 
by equations (3), (4) and (5). Roychowdhury (2006) explains that, while the higher ACFO and 
ADISX indicate lower REM, the higher APROD indicates higher REM. Thus, following 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Dechow et al. (1998), this study multiplies the ACFO and ADISX 
by −1 then adds them to the APROD using the following equation:  
REM = - ACFO - ADISX + APROD (6) 
 The lower level of REM indicates a lower level of earnings manipulations in real activities. 
 4.6 Measurement of QCSRD 
Previous literature has indicated that there is controversy regarding the measurement of CSR 
disclosure (HASSAN, 2010). CSR reporting has been criticised for its lack of relevance and 
credibility (Husillos, Larrinaga, & Álvarez, 2011).  Prior research has used subjective analyst 
disclosure quality rankings (e.g. Becchetti et al., 2013; Ioannou and Serafeim; 2015), which 
are not available in many countries and therefore cannot be applied widely.  Prior studies also 
have evaluated CSR reporting based on the theme and amount of information disclosed, which 
have used quantity disclosure as proxy for quality (e.g. Raar, 2002; Cormier et al., 2005; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Casey and Grenier, 2014). However, this method does not consider 
other important dimensions that distinguish the information provided to users. Botosan (2004) 
argued that, although quantity and quality are inseparable and difficult to measure, the quantity 
of information disclosed does not necessarily imply quality. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) 
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indicated that quality of disclosure is considered by not only the magnitude of disclosure, but 
also what is disclosed and the diversity of topics disclosed. Beattie et al. (2004) created a new 
model to measure two dimensions of disclosure, namely quantity and spread information. 
However, they do not include an important dimension which distinguishes the information 
provided in terms of information depth and its characteristics.  The key needs from disclosure 
for users must consist of relevant and understandable information (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, IFRS suggest that the characteristics of information such as relevance, 
faithfulness, understandability and comparability are useful for information users and have to 
be considered when QCSRD is evaluated (Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016). Alotaibi and 
Hussainey (2016) created a new model to measure the quality of CSR disclosure. Although 
their model is based on the information characteristics that are suggested by IFRS, it does not 
consider important dimensions such as the spread of information, which allows evaluation of 
whether the CSR information disclosed meets the need of different stakeholders or focuses on 
specific groups.  
To determine a better measurement model for quality of disclosure, the reported information 
by CSR disclosure must meet the key requirements of different users. Consequently, this study 
seeks to contribute to the above debate by offering new insights concerning the complexity of 
QCSRD, and develop a new multidimensional model to measure QCSRD which considers the 
quantity of information, its spread and usefulness for users. Specifically, the current study has 
taken into account both of the frameworks proposed by Beattie et al. (2004) and Alotaibi and 
Hussainey (2016).  In line with their work, this study develops a framework to capture three 
dimensions: (i) the quantity of CSR information disclosed (what and how much is disclosed) 
(ii) the spread of CSR information disclosed (coverage and concentration of CSR disclosure) 
and (iii) the usefulness of CSR information (the qualitative characteristics of information). This 
framework provides evidence on the nature of a company’s CSR disclosures based on three 
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dimensions, which allows the capture of quantitative and qualitative features concerning a 
specific kind of CSR information. Figure 1 explains these three dimensions. 
Figure 1: The proposed framework and the quality-related dimensions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRQ = Standardised Relative quantity, which is used as proxy of quantity dimension. Di,t = the disclosure for 
company i in year t measured by the content analysis as frequency of items that are disclosed in the annual reports, 
SIZE = size of companies, the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets is used to measure the size of the company. 
Type = the industry type based on the Bombay Stock Exchange.  RQ = the relative quantity index, ℇi,t = estimated 
disclosure by the residual for each company in each year are used as the relative quantity index. SPR = the spread 
of CSR information, DIS = CSR disclosure dispersion, COV = the CSR disclosure coverage. REL= Relevance, 
UND = Understandability, FAITH = Faithfulness, COMP = Comparability 
This figure explains the new multidimensional framework developed by this study to measure 
the quality of CSR disclosure. The following sections discuss the three dimensions of CSR 
disclosure as they are indicated by figure 1. 
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4.6.1 The Quantity Dimension (STRQ): 
The first dimension of QCSRD is the actual amount of disclosure, relative to the amount 
adjusted by two factors, size and complexity. Prior studies show these two variables to have a 
strong impact on disclosure (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). This is more 
likely to help in evaluating CSR disclosure, taking into account the differences in the 
companies’ size and industry. 
To measure the quantity of CSR disclosure in annual reports1, this study uses the content 
analysis technique method as the essential measurement. Several steps are required when 
content analysis is used to measure the level of CSR disclosure, starting by determining the 
documents which are used as a source of the CSR disclosure, and ending with testing the 
reliability and validity (Wolfe, 1991). Content analysis involves at least four steps 
(Krippendorff, 1980). These steps are: determining the document required for measuring 
disclosure; determining the themes and items of the CSR disclosure; determining the recoding 
unit; testing the viability of reliability. The current study uses 1908 annual reports as a sample 
of the top 500 Indian companies as the main source for measuring the essential amount of CSR 
disclosure. The first process is conducted to measure the essential quantity of CSR disclosure 
is identifying themes and sub-themes of CSR disclosure, which are expected to be found in the 
annual reports.  
The choice of the themes and sub-themes of CSR disclosure is based on a literature review, 
and reading a chosen sample of the annual reports. In order to construct a comprehensive 
                                                          
1 The researcher has found less than 10% of the study sample issued stand-alone  CSR reports. These companies 
have not issued their CSR reports regularly, which is not sufficient to be compared across companies and time. 
Thus, the current study uses the annual reports as the main resource for data collection. Most of the Indian 
listed companies publish their annual reports regularly and they are available on the companies’ websites. Most 
of their annual reports were released within the first quarter of the following fiscal year. 
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categories of required disclosure, and to reduce the potential bias if some elements are excluded 
from the list, some steps to create a disclosure categories were followed. 
1- Prior studies have been reviewed on CSR disclosure (see e.g. Haniffa and Cooke 2002; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Ghazali, 2007; Aribi & Gao, 2010; Gautam & Singh, 2010; 
Khan et al., 2013; Kansal et al., 2014; Oikonomou et al.,2015; Alotaibi and Hussainey, 
2016). On the basis of reviewing previous studies, an initial list for the disclosure of 
social responsibility items has been built. The primary list of CSR disclosure items 
consists of 45 items, classified into 6 key categories 1- Community development (8 
items), 2- Human resources (16 items), 3- Product/customer (5 items), 4- Environment 
(8 items), 5- Energy (4 items) and 6- Emission of carbon and harmful gases (4 items). 
2- A 25 annual reports were selected randomly from study’ sample across various 
industries in order to achieve stability in the results and to avoid potential problems. 
The pilot test helped to determine the existence or the absence of CSR disclosure items. 
3- To reduce the bias element on a particular item, the potential items were sent by emails 
to some of the key scholars in this area; the scholars were chosen from the important 
papers on the CSR disclosure whose their emails were available on the internet. The 
list of CSR disclosure items was also discussed with some members of academia, who 
were asked to give their perspective about this list. 
To improve the list of CSR disclosure items, the responses of scholars by email were taken. 
These were added to the comments of members of academia as well as the results of the pilot 
study. This test was done on a sample of 25 annual reports.  All these procedures help this study 
to effectively improve the checklist of CSR disclosure. The final checklist that was used by 
this study is 27 items and classified into 6 themes: Community development (5 items), Human 
resources (5 items), Products and services (5 items), customer (3 items), Environment (8 items) 
and other CSR information (one item) (see appendix1), as primary measurement. This process 
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is in line with prior studies (e.g. Ghazali, 2007; Gautam & Singh, 2010; Khan et al., 2013; 
Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016). 
The techniques used, in previous studies, in content analysis units of disclosure are words, text, 
sentences, paragraphs or pages of CSR disclosure. Each technique has its own advantages and 
drawbacks (Campbell, 2004). Coding by sentences, paragraphs and words have been criticised 
on the basis that different information may be included in the same paragraphs or sentences 
related to the CSR disclosure. Individual words are also meaningless. As a result, a text unit 
was employed to measure CSR disclosure in this study, which was identified by Beattie and 
Thomson (2007) as “part of sentence that captures a piece of information’’. To calculate the 
essential amount of CSR disclosure, this study employed a manual counting method of the 
frequency of each sub-theme from the final checklist to verify whether this item is found in 
specific annual reports for each company in each year of the study sample. 
Following Beattie et al. (2004) the dimension of disclosure quantity is measured by using the 
relative number of text units, which is adjusted by two factors: size and industry type. These 
have consistently been found to influence the level of disclosure. The standardised residuals 
from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of the number of text units on industry and 
size are used as proxy of the quantity dimension. 
 
1-           D i,t   = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 SIZEi,t   + 𝛽2 Type i,t   + ℇ i,t    
Where,  
Di,t = the disclosure for company i in year t measured by the content analysis as frequency of 
items that are disclosed in the annual reports, 
SIZEi,t  = size of companies, the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets is used to measure 
the size of company. 
Type = industry type, identified based on the Bombay market. 
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ℇi,t   = the estimate of disclosure by the residual for each company in each year is used as the 
relative quantity index (RQ), Standardised RQ (STRQ) is used as proxy of quantity 
dimension as follows: 
STRQ = 1- 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑄 −  𝑅𝑄𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑄 −  𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑅𝑄
 
 
4.6.2 The Spread Dimension (SPR) 
The second dimension measures the spread of CSR information. Using spread dimension in 
this framework allows evaluation of whether the CSR information disclosed meets the needs 
of different stakeholders or focuses on specific groups. 
Following Beattie et al. (2004), we determine the spread as a function of the CSR disclosure 
coverage (COV), and CSR disclosure dispersion (DIS). The coverage is measured by the 
percentage of items (sub items) filled in by at least one piece of information out of the total 
number of items (sub items) in the checklist. The coverage ranges from 0 (non-disclosed) to 1 
and assumes its maximum value when a company makes disclosure over each of the topics 
(subtopics) in the checklist. COV is measured as per the following equation:   
COV =  
1
st
 INF𝑠𝑗=1  
Where, INF = 1 if company i discloses information about the item j in the annual report, 
otherwise = 0, and s = number of subcategories.  
Furthermore, disclosure dispersion (DIS) indicates how concentrated disclosed items are 
among checklist items. DIS is defined as follows: 
DIS =  1 −  𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1  
2 
Where, Pj = proportion of disclosure of item i measured by the frequency of text units disclosed 
in category j to total frequency of text units in company i. The minimum value of DIS is 0 when 
all CSR disclosure text units fall into one category and the value is larger when CSR disclosure 
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text units are spread between categories. The higher the value of the DIS index, the higher the 
quality of disclosure. 
COV and DIS indices help in estimating how information in annual reports is distributed across 
themes in the disclosure checklist. Larger DIS and COV indices reveal the higher spread of 
information (SPR). Thus, the current study calculates the spread as the average of COV and 
DIS as follows: 
SPR =   
1
2
 (DIS + COV) 
4.6.3 The Usefulness Dimension (USEF) 
The usefulness dimension helps information users to evaluate QCSRD by capturing the four 
type characteristics: the relevance, faithful representation, understandability and comparability 
(based upon the qualitative characteristics of information suggested in the conceptual 
frameworks of IFRS (2010A). Following Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), to measure the 
usefulness of CSR disclosure the present study develops a disclosure index based on the 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information suggested in the conceptual frameworks 
of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (2010A). These are “relevance” 
“faithful representation,” “understandability” and “comparability”. This allows for measuring 
the QCSRD by the weighted method as provided in earlier studies (Alotaibi and Hussainey, 
2016; Braam and van Beest, 2013) (see Appendix 2).Thus, we define the Usefulness as: 
USEF =    
1
4
 ( 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
The overall index of quality is the average of USEF, SPR and STRQ as follows: 
The Quality Index of CSR Disclosure (QCSRD) =  
1
3
 (𝑈𝑆𝐸𝐹 + 𝑆𝑃𝑅 + 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑄) 
Finally, process used is expected to provide a rich description of the nature and patterns of 
disclosure, and permits these dimensions to be analysed, both in combination and individually. 
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4.6.4 Checking the Validity and Reliability 
Reliability and validity suggest that, if a measuring procedure can be repeated through the same 
data, it will produce the same results (Milne & Adler, 1999). Krippendorff (1980) suggested 
three types of reliability: (i) Stability refers to the ability of measuring disclosure in annual 
reports by one coder which is then repeated again after a period. If the results are unchanged 
each time, the stability will be perfect. (ii) Reproducibility refers to the level of proportion of 
agreement achieved when different coders are involved.  If a higher proportion of agreement 
is achieved between two different coders through measuring disclosure in annual reports, the 
reproducibility will be better. (iii) Accuracy refers to evaluation of coding through 
predetermined standards or from previous research. 
Special considerations were given to reliability and validity of the study measurements of 
QCSRD. Firstly, in order to ensure the reliability and validity of the CSR disclosure checklist 
and the characteristics of the information index, several procedures have been adopted. In the 
first procedure, the initial CSR disclosure checklist was tested by using 20 Indian companies 
as a pilot study in order to compare each of the themes in the CSR disclosure checklist and 
annual reports. This also provides a valuable practical experience related to the process of 
content analysis. The items’ validity in the initial CSR disclosure checklist were reviewed 
independently by three expert scholars, who discussed the ambiguities raised in the review; the 
final checklist is mentioned in Appendix 1. One way of improving reliability is to use multiple 
coders (Holsti, 1969; Aribi and Gao 2011) and, in this study, another two coders scored the 
research instrument. Any problems and discrepancies that arose were discussed and resolved 
accordingly via a set of basic coding rules. In addition, the disclosure coding scores were 
checked by comparing between the scores produced by the first author with those produced by 
the other two coders for a sample of annual reports. In particular, following Newson & Deegan 
(2002), this study uses the proportion of coding agreement to assess the performance between 
96 
 
coders. To check the reliability of CSR disclosure checklist (Appendix 1) this study uses the 
following steps:  
1- The coding instrument is checked through two coders using a sample of 6 annual reports 
(for 2010). 
2- The ratio of coding agreement is used to compare between the two coders. 
3- A discussion is carried out between the coders to identify the reasons for the differences 
between their results.  
4- Another sample of 6 annual reports (for 2011) is evaluated by the same coders. 
5- The coding instrument is estimated after obtaining the results using the ratio of coding 
agreement. In this regard, table 4.2 shows that, on average, the reliability measurement presents 
a high degree of agreement between the coders (0.875), suggesting that the reproducibility of 
the study measures is good. The result also indicates that there are only slight differences 
between 2010 and 2011, which suggests that the stability of the study measures is also good. 
Table 4.2: Reliability of the CSR disclosure checklist measurement 
                Percent agreement 
                          2010 
 
Percent error Percent agreement 
2011 
 
Percent error 
COMD 75% 25% 84% 16% 
HUMR 79% 21% 89% 11% 
PRODS 71% 29% 88% 12% 
CUST 73% 27% 87% 13% 
ENV 75% 25% 91% 9% 
OTH 77% 23% 86% 14% 
Overall 75% 23% 87.5% 12.5% 
COMD = Community development; HUMR = Human resources; PRODS = Products and services; CUST = 
customer; ENV = Environment; OTH = other CSR information. 
 
This study uses the same steps which were used to estimate the reliability of the checklist of 
CSR disclosure, and to estimate the reliability of the usefulness dimension checklist (appendix 
2). The annual reports for both 2010 and 2011 were used by the two coders to estimate the 
reliability of the Usefulness dimension checklist. 
Based on the discussion between coders, the coding instrument was improved, which leads to 
reduce the differences between coders. Table 4.3 shows that, on average, the reliability 
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measurement of the usefulness dimension index presents a high degree of agreement between 
the coders (0.89), which suggests that the reproducibility is good. The result also indicated that 
there are only slight differences between 2010 and 2011, suggesting the stability across time is 
also good. 
Table 4.3: Reliability of the Usefulness Measurement 
    Percent agreement 
              2010   
B   
Percent error Percent agreement 
2011 
 
Percent error  
Relevance 78% 22% 88% 12%  
Faithful 
representation 
76% 24% 85% 15%  
Und rstandability 80% 20% 90% 10%  
comparability 86% 14% 93% 7%  
Overall 80% 20 % 89% 11%  
 
Finally, this section examines whether QCSRD is related to the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts to check the validity of the QCSRD framework. Botosan (2004) suggests that high 
quality disclosure is useful to the information's users in making financial decisions. Prior 
empirical studies have documented a significant relationship between the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and disclosure (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Lee, 2017).  They conclude 
that the quality of disclosure is useful to improve the ability of analysts to evaluate cash flows 
in future through considering better earnings forecasts. Since the key task of financial analysts 
is to forecast future earnings (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008), the study’s definition of QCSRD 
is associated with the accuracy of their estimates. The current study contends that CSR 
disclosure is of a high quality if it is positively associated with the accuracy of the analysts’ 
forecast (ACCU). Following Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) we 
measure the accuracy as follows: 
 ACCU = -1 (EPSt – AFt) /SPt) 
Where, 
EPS = actual earnings per share in period t, 
AF = the median analysts’ forecast of earnings per share in period t, 
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SP = share price at the end of period t 
The current study controls for variables such as industry type, leverage, profitability, company 
size, and variation in accounting earnings, to check the link between QCSRD and ACCU. The 
results of the validity of QCSRD is presented in section 6.3, p 135. 
4.7 The Relationship between EM and QCSRD 
Since the main aim of this study is to examine the relationship between EM and QCSRD, this 
section shows the main regression to test the relationship between EM (which is used as the 
dependent variable) and QCSRD (which used as an independent variable) during the period 
from 2007 to 2015. The current study includes control variables for other factors in this 
regression due to their impact on both EM and QCSRD (Becker et al., 1998; Bowen et al., 
2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2011; Zaman et al., 2011; Ferentinou et al., 2016). 
4.7.1 Control Variables 
The current study used a number of control variables (in addition to the dependent and 
independent variables) to control for the possible influence on the  dependent and independent 
variables, which were pointed out by previous studies (Klein, 2002; Sun et al., 2010; Zang, 
2011; Zaman et al., 2011;Abernathy, 2014). In particular, this study used the internal 
mechanisms of corporate governance (effectiveness of the audit committee, board and the 
ownership structure) as a control variable since they may have an influence on EM and QCSRD 
(Peasnell et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2010). This study also employs the firm’s characteristics (Size, 
Growth, Leverage, Industry and Profitability) as control variables because previous literature 
has indicated their impact on QCSRD and EM (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008;Wang et al., 
2015; Ferentinou et al., 2016). 
4.7.1.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness (ACEF) 
ACEF is intended to play a major part in enhancing the financial reports’ integrity (Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013). According to DeZoort et al. (2002), the audit committee has the purpose of 
99 
 
protecting shareholders’ interests, which is achieved by choosing qualified members who have 
adequate authority and the necessary resources to diligently offer oversight. Prior studies 
document evidence that audit committee characteristics have a negative relationship with AEM 
and are positively associated with CSR disclosure (e.g. Klein, 2002; Sun et al., 2010). Smith 
(2003) listed four characteristics (independence, expertise, number of meetings and size of 
meetings) which are the minimum which need to be exhibited by an effective audit committee. 
Zaman et al. (2011) argue that a composite measurement of more than one proxy is likely to 
have the most impact on ACEF. Combining the impact of all ACEF characteristics together, 
as an empirical proxy for ACEF, will improve its suitability as a construct when examining 
ACEF (Zaman et al., 2011). Thus the current study utilises a composite measure for ACEF by 
using a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the presence of all four audit committee 
characteristics comply with the Indian code of corporate governance (code 49)2 and 0 
otherwise. Specifically, when all the following proxies score one, the board effectiveness will 
award one and otherwise zero: 
• If two-thirds of the audit committee members are independent directors,   
• If there is financial literacy among all audit committee members and at least one of 
them is a financial expert. 
• If an audit committee meeting is held at least four times every year, 
• If the audit committee comprises of at least three members, 
This indicates that the audit committee for the company i and year t is effective .If it complies 
with all the above conditions, 1 will be awarded, otherwise zero. Based on the above, audit 
committee effectiveness is used as the cost of AEM for the relationship between AEM and 
                                                          
2 New norms of CG for Indian listed companies through the amendments to CG code 49 of the Equity Listing 
Agreement that a circular dated April 17th 2014. The revised code 49 updates and aligns the Listing Agreement 
with CG changes brought out in the Companies Act (2013). .There are also certain changes in the new Companies 
Act, 2013. 
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REM in Chapter five and is also used as a control variable when the link between QCSRD and 
EM is examined in Chapter seven. Figure 2 explains the measurement of ACEF. 
 
Figure 2: The composite measure for ACEF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7.1.2 Board Effectiveness (BEF) 
The board is considered a fundamental part of the company's monitoring mechanism (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Thus, BEF is predicted to lead to a higher level of reliability and transparency 
of financial reporting (e.g. McElveen, 2002; Turley & Zaman, 2004). Klein (2002) found 
negative correlation between board characteristics and AEM. On the other hand, Khan et al. 
(2013) found evidence indicating that board characteristics are positively related to CSR 
disclosure. Board effectiveness is particularly seen in previous literature as a function of CEO 
duality, board meetings and independence and board size (Terjesen et al., 2009; Zaman et al., 
2011; Kamardin et al., 2011). The proportions of independent directors, board meetings, duality 
of CEO and board size are likely to have the most impact on the effectiveness of the board 
(Zaman et al., 2011). Combining the impact of all board effectiveness characteristics together 
Audit committee effectiveness 
Audit committee independence 
Audit committee 
meetings 
Audit committee size 
Audit committee expertise 
If all four audit committee characteristics are presented in the 
company i at year t, then the audit committee is considered to be 
effective and it scores one. 
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as an empirical proxy for board effectiveness will improve its suitability as a construct when 
examining board effectiveness (Zaman et al., 2011). Therefore, the current study uses the four 
most likely dimensions, board independence, board meetings, CEO duality and board size, that 
have an influence on the board of directors. The current study utilises a composite measure for 
BEF and uses a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the presence of all four board committee 
characteristics comply with the Indian code of corporate governance (code 49) and 0 otherwise. 
Specifically, when all the following proxies score 1, the board effectiveness will be awarded 1 
and otherwise 0 : 
• If the independent directors account for at least fifty percent of the board committee, 
• If the chairman does not also act as an executive director,  
• If the board committee meets at least four times a year, 
• If at least 8 members make up the board committee.  
These will indicate the effectiveness of the board for the company i and year t. If it complies 
with all the above conditions, 1 will be awarded, otherwise zero. Based on the above, board 
effectiveness is used as cost of AEM for the trade-off between AEM and REM in Chapter five, 
and is also used as a control variable for the link between QCSRD and EM in Chapter seven. 
Figure 3 explains the measurement of BEF. 
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Figure 3: The composite measure for BEF 
 
 
 
4.7.1.3 Institutional Ownership 
Prior research indicates that institutional ownership mitigates the likelihood of REM by 
improving the overall monitoring procedure and assumes that, through the institutional 
ownership, the level of QCSRD is more likely to be improved (e.g. Cho et al., 2013; Abernathy, 
2014).  Furthermore, to ensure the financial disclosure quality, institutional ownership can play 
a role in determining the companies’ voluntary disclosure policy. Due to their fiduciary duty 
toward institutional investors, outside directors are more likely to protect the interest of 
investors by ensuring transparency (Osterland, 2004). Prior studies have shown that companies 
with a higher proportion of institutional ownership have more incentive to disclose CSR 
information (e.g. Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990 Saleh et al., 2010; Cho et al., 2013). In addition, 
empirical studies found that institutional ownership has a positive relationship with voluntary 
disclosure (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Barako, 2007). Thus, institutional ownership is used as a 
control variable for the link between QCSRD and EM. Following prior studies, institutional 
ownership was measured through the institutional ownership percentage at the beginning of 
the same year (e.g. Zang, 2011; Abernathy, 2014). 
Board effectiveness 
Board independence 
CEO duality  Board size 
Board meetings 
If all four audit committee characteristics are presented in the 
company i at year t, then the audit committee is considered to be 
effective and it scores one. 
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4.7.1.4 Blockholder Ownership 
The second proxy of ownership is blockholder ownership, which  consists of different types of 
investors, such as individuals, mutual and pension funds, corporations and banks. (Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach, 2009). Prior literature indicates that blockholder ownership has a significant 
impact on controlling managers’ behaviour (e.g.Lasfer, 2006; Habbash, 2013), and suggests 
two such possible impacts. Firstly, it is argued that a higher concentration of ownership could 
achieve effective corporate governance mechanisms through reducing opportunistic activities; 
this is more likely to be found in environments that have strict regulations and investors’ 
protection (Habbash, 2013).  Secondly, it is argued that the major shareholders may influence 
managerial action against minority investors to maximise their wealth. This might be found in 
a market which has weak investor protection, weak rules and regulation and poor accounting 
disclosure  (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Prior studies also indicate that blockholder ownership 
plays a significant role in the increase or decrease of CSR disclosure (e.g. Ching et al., 2006; 
Prior et al., 2007; Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Barnea and Rubin, 2005). Thus, blockholder 
ownership is used as a control variable for the relationship between QCSRD and EM. 
Following prior studies, the current study measures the blockholder ownership through the 
proportion of ownership more than or equal to 0.05 (e.g. Habbash, 2013; Edmans, 2014).  
4.7.1.5 Big 4 Auditors 
The auditors’ role is to ensure proper application of  principles and polices of accounting. 
Francis (2008) argued that good quality auditing is more likely to prevent  companies 
misreporting and show a positive impact on the reputation of firms. Using Big 4 auditors may 
ensure higher reliability of the reported accounting information (e.g. Krishnan, 2003; Cohene 
et al., 2008). Prior studies provide evidence that earnings reported by companies which are 
audited by Big 4 auditing firms are of a higher quality compared to earnings  of companies that 
use non-expert auditors (Krishnan 2003; Francis, 2008). According to Simunic and Stein 
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(1987),  the Big 4 accounting firms develop and ensure uniformity across the globe through 
standardised staff training practices, and international application of uniform auditing methods, 
which improves their reputation. Based on this perspective, the distinctive behaviour of Big 4 
firms when dealing with their global clients is to enforce higher earnings quality. A number of 
studies have found a negative relationship between Big 4 and AEM, indicating that these 
auditing companies use their expertise to constrain AEM (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Francis, 
2008;Jordan and Clark, 2011). Thus Big 4 is used as a control variable for examining the link 
between QCSRD and EM. It is measured by assigning the value of 1 if a company is audited 
through Big4 and 0 if otherwise. 
4.7.1.6 Profitability of Company  
Previous studies indicate that Profitability is related to EM (Hassan and Ahmed, 2012). It is 
argued that more profitable firms  might choose accounting policies that lead to a reduction 
in earnings to mitigate political pressure (Piot and Janin, 2007). Yang et al. (2013) found a 
significant and positive relationship between profitability and EM. Similarly, Jo and Kim 
(2007) provide evidence that high profitability is statistically significant and positively related 
to EM. Prior research has also documented that profitability is related to CSR disclosure 
(Bushee and Noe, 2000;  Aras et al., 2010). Kiattikulwattana (2014) indicates that the 
likelihood of CSR disclosure is higher among profitable companies than those companies with 
lower profits. Thus, the current study  uses the companies’ profitability as a control variable, 
due to its impact on both EM and QCSRD  (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Sonnier, 2007;  
Alkhatib and Marji, 2012; Lu and Abeysekera,2014) In line with Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2015), the current study measures the  companies’ profitability as a ratio of income from 
operations to total assets (ROA). 
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4.7.1.7 Firm Size 
Company size as a determinant of disclosure has received greater attention in prior literature, 
and  several empirical studies have found that size has an impact on companies’ disclosure 
(Chih et al. 2008;Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Urquiza et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2010; Kim et al. 
2012),. Jennifer& Taylor, (2007) generally argue that larger companies are likely to disclose 
more CSR information since these companies  have higher agency costs.  Richardson (2000) 
also argued that larger companies have more incentive to engage in EM since these companies  
may  be exposed to more market pressure than smaller ones. A number of empirical studies 
have reported that company size is significantly associated with EM (Kim et al. 2012; Martínez 
et al.,2015). Thus, company size was used as a control variable for regression models that are 
used to examine the relationship between EM and QCSRD in the current study.  Consistent 
with previous literature (Urquiza et al., 2009; Kim et al. 2012; Martínez et al.,2015 ), the current 
study used the natural logarithm of lagged total assets to measure the  company size.  
4.7.1.8 Financial Leverage 
Previous literature has used financial leverage as a proxy for evaluating a company’s debt 
structure. (e.g. Prior et al., 2008;Yip et al., 2011). Companies with a higher gearing ratio have 
more incentive to decrease discretionary accruals (Chih et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010; Yip et 
al., 2011). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990), companies with difficulties related to 
financial leverage tend to avoid violation of debt covenant by managing earnings upwards to 
increase income.  Thus, financial leverage is expected to be  positively related to EM. 
Hussainey and Walker (2009) provided evidence that the financial leverage ratio is related to 
CSR disclosure. They argue that leveraged companies may provide more information requested 
by other stakeholders and are likely to offer more details of disclosure to meet those needs. 
Previous literature indicates that financial leverage is statistically related to CSR disclosure 
(Fauzi, 2009;Cheng et al., 2014). Therefore, this study used financial leverage as a control 
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variable for regression models that are employed to measure the relationship between EM and 
QCSRD in this study. Following Jo and Kim (2007), leverage was measured by long-term debt 
to total assets ratio. 
4.7.1.9 Industry Type 
Industry type is indicated by prior research as a determinant variable of CSR disclosure (e.g. 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Beattie et al., 2004). Annual reports disclosure may not be similar 
in all sectors (Camfferman & Cooke, 2002), therefore an assumption has been made for the 
similarity of disclosure practices among firms that belong to the same sector. This is due to the 
existence of regulated industries, adherence to  international capital markets’ needs and 
industry sensitivity (Boutin and Sacaris, 2004; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Jennifer & Taylor, 
2007). Ahmed and Courtis (1999) report evidence that there is a significant relationship 
between industry type and disclosure for Swedish and Canadian companies. Salama et al. 
(2012) reveal that industry type among the UK companies has a significant influence on CSR 
disclosures. As a result, the current study uses industry type as a control variable for the 
regression models to examine the link between EM and QCSRD in the present study. To 
identify the industry type, the present study used the classification of the Bombay Market for 
the top 500 Indian listed companies. 
4.7.2 The Main Empirical research model 
The relationship between EM and QCSRD is examined in Chapter seven to achieve the main 
aim of this study. To capture the relationship between EM and QCSRD, this study employs the 
following model: 
EM it = α + β1 QCSRD it + β2 REM it /AEM it + β3 Size it + β4 Growth it + β5 Leverage it +β6 
Industry +  β7 ROA it + β8 BEFS it + β9 ACEF it + β10 Big4 it + β11 INSOW it + β12 Block it + 
ɛ it 
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Where, 
EM = AEM, REM, CFO, PROD or DISX. 
AEM   = absolute value or discretionary accruals for company i and period t; discretionary 
accruals are used as a dependent variable in the first equation.  
REM   = combined proxy, which is calculated by aggregating CFO, PROD and DISX of 
company i and period t; REM is used as a dependent variable in the second equation. 
CFO = abnormal cash flows from operations, which is used as a dependent variable in the 
third equation. 
PROD = abnormal production costs, which is used as a dependent variable in the fourth 
equation. 
DISX = abnormal discretionary expenses, which is used as a dependent variable in the fifth 
equation.  
Managers are likely to use a mix of AEM and REM as tools to manage earnings. The trade-
off between REM and AEM is a function of their relative costs (Zang, 2012). Therefore, 
following Kim (2012), we include REM as a control variable in the first equation and AEM 
as a control variable in second, third, fourth and fifth equations. 
QCSRD = the quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure index  
SIZEit = size of companies, the natural logarithm of firms’ assets. Total assets is used to 
measure the size of the company.   
GROWTH = Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. 
LEV   = financial leverage measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio.  
ROA   = the profitability of the company, the income from operations divided by the total 
assets. 
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ACEF = audit committee effectiveness. We award 1 if the company complies with Indian code 
number 49 for corporate governance, otherwise zero 
BEF = board effectiveness. We award 1 if the company complies with Indian code number 49 
for corporate governance, otherwise zero. 
Big4 = largest four auditing firms. We award 1 if the company was audited by one of the largest 
company, otherwise zero. 
BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or 
equal 0.05. 
 INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions. 
ɛ = residual error. 
4.8 Empirical Procedures of Data Analysis 
Overall, three main steps were used by this study in data analysis. These steps consist of the 
preliminary analysis of the study’s results, the regression analysis and finally the robustness 
checks.  
4.8.1 Preliminary Analysis 
In this initial analysis, the current study discussed the descriptive statistics and checked for any 
multicollinearity problem using a correlation matrix and VIF Test. The description of data with 
regards to the central tendency test on a single variable is achieved through descriptive 
statistics; this includes the description of mean, standard deviation, minimum, median and 
maximum for all study variables. Multicollinearity is a common problem when estimating 
linear models. Due to multicollinearity, it is difficult to distinguish the individual effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. High multicollinearity is a problem because 
it is likely to increase the variance of the coefficients and make them very sensitive to smaller 
changes in the model (Farrar et al., 1967). It occurs when there are high correlations among at 
least two independent variables that lead to unstable and unreliable estimates in coefficients of 
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the regression. There are, however, different opinions as to  how to determine multicollinearity. 
The common method for checking the extent of the multicollinearity problem between 
independent variables are the correlation coefficients matrix and VIF methods (e.g.Anderson 
et al., 1996;  Grewal et al., 2004; Hair et al. 2006; Li, et al., 2010; ALghamdi and Ali 2012; 
Choi et al., 2013; Shafer, 2015; Muttakin et al., 2015; Banseh & Khansalar, 2016). The 
correlation between independent variables of a study sample is tested through a pairwise 
correlation matrix in order to explain whether the study analysis is affected by the linear 
relationship between independent variables. Grewal et al. (2004) argue that a multicollinearity 
problem above 80%  might harm the findings of the regression analysis. In addition to the use 
of pairwise pearson correlation matrix and to examining the multicollinearity problem, VIF 
methods were applied and are discussed in chapters five, six and seven. 
4.8.2 Regression Analysis 
In the present research, regression analysis is employed to test the study hypotheses. In order 
to test whether the more suitable model is the panel or the pooled model, the Chow test and the 
Breusch-Pagan LaGrange Multiplier (LM) are conducted for the study regression models 
(Twumasi et al., 2015), which are used in examining the study hypotheses. Panel regression 
models were chosen as more suitable models than pooled models in the current study. Panel 
data could be categorised by random effect or fixed effect, which helps to mitigate the 
influences of various companies and time series (Kim et al., 2012; Clark and Linzer, 2015). In 
order to determine the suitability of the fixed effect or random effect for the current study, the 
Hausman test is conducted. Based on the results of the Hausman test, the fixed effect model 
was used in all study regressions. Furthermore, Gujarati (2003) suggests that normality, 
linearity and heteroscedasticity problems should be checked for a fitted regression model. The 
normality was checked by using the histogram test, the Quantile-Quantile test was used to 
examine the linearity and the heterogeneity plot test is used to check for heteroscedasticity. 
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4.8.3 Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks 
The present study conducted several additional analyses to ensure the robustness of the main 
study results. To increase the power of the primary test, and ensure the accuracy of the main 
results and their ability to represent the trend in EM practice, the following analysis was used. 
Firstly, the current study uses suspect firms that may manipulate earnings based on four sub-
samples of companies with strong EM incentives. Secondly, the present study also examines 
whether EM differs between the high QCSRD and low QCSRD companies. Thirdly, using an 
alternative measurement of the explanatory variables, AEM and REM, the current study tests 
whether the primary findings are robust to various measures or not.  Finally, the main results, 
in the current study, are robust to control for endogeneity.  
 
4.9 Summary 
The current chapter clarifies and justifies the study’s methodology in accordance with its 
objectives. To achieve the aim of this thesis, a negative relationship between QCSRD and EM 
is expected by this study, based on agency theory and signalling theory together with the 
ethical perspective. In order to examine and provide evidence on the relationship between EM 
and QCSRD, the panel data regression models were used to test the study hypotheses. Overall, 
the main steps which were used in data analysis were explained by this chapter. These steps 
consist of measuring the study’s variables, the preliminary analysis of the study’s results, the 
regression analysis and finally the robustness checks. This study uses 1908 company-year 
observations during the period from 2007 to 2015 as a sample among the top 500 Indian listed 
companies.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN 
INDIAN LISTED COMPANIES 
  
5.1 Introduction 
The first objective of this study is to measure AEM and REM and their relationship. Thus, this 
chapter measures and discusses real and accruals EM, and addresses their behaviour by 
examining the interaction between AEM and REM based on their relative costs. This chapter 
starts by measuring and discussing AEM and REM in section 5.2. Then, the trade-off between 
AEM and REM, based on their relative costs and constraints, is presented in section 5.3. 
Finally, section 5.4 presents the conclusion of this chapter. 
5.2 Measuring and Discussing AEM and REM 
As mention in Chapter four, this study uses two proxies of EM (AEM and REM) that allow for 
a wider perspective on EM. This section measures and discusses AEM and REM based on full 
sample, industry type and year’s trend. 
5.2.1 AEM and REM Based on the Full Sample 
Table 5.1 describes the mean, median, standard deviation and minimum and maximum values 
for all earnings management measures used in this study. AEM is the absolute discretionary 
accruals value measured by the modified Jones (1995) model. The descriptive statistics indicate 
that the mean value of AEM is 4.5 per cent. This result is consistent with findings reported by 
Rao & Dandale (2008) and Rudra & Bhattacharjee (2012), who found that the mean value of 
AEM among Indian companies is around 5 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively. Nevertheless, 
these findings imply that the levels of AEM in India are likely to be higher than those reported 
for developed countries. For instance, Piot & Janin (2007) Cohen & Zarowin, (2010) and 
Chahine et al. (2012) found that French, US and UK companies have mean absolute values of 
AEM of 1.9 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 3 per cent respectively. With reference to real earnings 
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management, table 5.1 shows the mean value of real activity earnings management is 0.1 per 
cent. Table 5.1 also shows that the mean values for the three individual proxies of real earnings 
management (ACFO, APROD and ADISX) are 0.23 per cent, 0.27 per cent and 0.29 per cent 
respectively. These results are similar to the findings of Ferentinou (2016), who found that the 
mean values of ACFO, APROD and ADISX are 0.5 per cent, 0.2 per cent and 0.3 per cent 
respectively. However, these results imply that the level of REM in Indian listed companies 
are likely to be lower than those reported by Doukakis (2014) and Kuo et al. (2014), who found 
that European companies and Chinese companies have  mean values of REM of 0.7 per cent 
and 0.5 per cent respectively. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
variable Mean sd p25 p50 p75 
AEM 
 
 
 
.045 .106 .007 .021 .049 
REM -.001 .128 -.037 .002 .048 
CFO -.0023 .107 -.037 -.002 .029 
PROD -.0027 .102 -.032 -.001 .025 
DISX -.0029 .113 -.043 -.003 .034 
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in this section. AEM = discretionary accruals measured through employing 
modified Jones model. REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury 
model (2006). ACFO = abnormal operation cash flows, ADISX = abnormal discretionary expenses, APROD = abnormal production cost.  
This information is provided through industry type. 
 
5.2.2 AEM and REM Based on Different Industries 
Table 5.2 describes the mean, median, standard deviation and minimum and maximum values 
of the AEM and REM based on different industries during the period from 2007 to 2015. The 
findings in table 5.2 show that Food and Drinks companies report the highest mean values of 
AEM (10.42 per cent). These results suggest that Food and Drinks companies are more likely 
to engage in AEM practices than other sectors. In contrast, the results indicate that the lowest 
mean values of AEM are reported by Oil and Gas companies, which is 1.2 per cent, followed 
by Metals and Mining (1.5 per cent). In respect of real activities measures, REM models 
indicate that Food and Drinks companies report the highest mean value of REM as a combined 
113 
 
measure (0.5 per cent). These results suggest that Food and Drinks companies may also 
manipulate earnings using real activities more than other companies do. It can also be seen that 
the lowest mean value of REM was among Construction companies (approximately zero), and 
then Oil & Gas companies. It is also interesting to note that the above results suggest that these 
two sectors are less like to engage in REM compared to other sectors. Furthermore, table 5.2 
shows that the highest mean value of ACFO was among Food and Drinks companies (1.15 per 
cent) and the lowest mean value of ACFO (approximately zero) was among Oil & Gas 
companies. The mean value of APROD (approximately zero), reported by Metals and Mining 
companies, was the lowest among Indian listed companies while Food and Drinks companies 
reported the highest mean value of APROD. Finally, the highest mean value of ADISX was 
reported among service companies, whereas the lowest mean value of DISX is approximately 
zero among Oil & Gas companies.  
Based on the above discussion, it is interesting to note that Oil & Gas companies are less likely 
to engage in both EM strategies in comparison with other sectors. In contrast, Food and Drinks 
companies are more likely to manipulate earnings using both AEM and REM than other 
companies. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics by Industry for AEM and REM 
Measures Full Sample 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
AEM mean .045 .012 .058 .0261 .0240 .0230 .0958 .1042 .0272 .0254 .0680 .0155 
sd .106 .015 .170 .0171 .0209 .0209 .1401 .1459 .0392 .0258 .0932 .0306 
min .000 .000 .000 .0001 .0008 .0008 .0016 .0005 .00005 .0004 .0005 .0001 
p50 .021 .006 .032 .0173 .0170 .0170 .0594 .0571 .0174 .0142 .0349 .0072 
max 2.126 .109 2.12 .0815 .1048 .1048 .9846 .8514 .5213 .1129 .6010 .2222 
REM mean -.001 .00001 -.001 .00001 .0004 -.0004 .0002 .0050 -.0002 .0006 .0002  -0008 
sd .128 .063 .2213 .0850 .06555 .06555 .0889 .1523 .0979 .0768 .0836 .1058 
min -2.252 -.304 -2.25 -.1987 .2339 -.233 -.4216 -.7795 -.5770 -.2538 -.2638 -.6500 
p50 .002 -.001 .0194 .000002 .001890 -.00189 .0098 -.0061 .0045 .0070 .0080 .0034 
max 1.24 .213 .8213 .3652 .2802 .2802 .4263 1.240 .3131 .1712 .2367 .3268 
ACFO mean -.0023 .000005 -.0016   .0001 .0002 .0002 -.0002 .0115 .0001 .0002 -.0004 -.0002 
sd .107 .039 .195 .0554 .04208 .04208 .0786 .1100 .0910 .0435 .0663 .0631 
min -2.163 -.151 -2.163 -.2528 -.1854 -.1854 -.2624 -.3319 -.2872 -.1124 -.1378 -.2049 
p50 .002 .00001 -.0187 -.0035 -.00190 -.00190 -.0091 .0008 -.0068 -.0029 -.0055 -.0035 
max .881 .145 .594 .1270 .13705 .13705 .3902 .8813 .4547 .1711 .2268 .3710 
APROD mean -.0027 .00005 -.0017 .0002 -.0002 -.0002 -.0005 .0080 -.0001 .0002 .0001 -.00004 
sd .102 .031 .1900 .0465 .03414 .03414 .0770 .0957 .0897 .0341 .0628 .0426 
min -2.092 -.104 -2.092 -.1978 -.09135 -.09135 -.2615 -.4841 -.2747 -.1234 -.1059 -.3139 
p50 .001 .00001 -.0181 -.0037 -.00373 -.00373  -.0102 -.0016 -.0033 .0016 -.0062 .0001 
max .615 .114 .4124 .1157 .09461 .09461 .3847   .6153 .4543 .0866 .2172 .1713 
ADISX mean -.0029 .00001 .0201 .0001 .0001 .0001 .003 .0127 .0001 .0002 .0003 .0003 
sd .113 .046 .2022 .0673 .0498 .0498 .0847 .1182 .0942 .0608 .0751 .0686 
min -2.18 -.156 -2.18 -.3103 -.1827 -.1827 -.4099 -.1659 -.287 -.1243 -.1653 -.2048 
p50 .003 -.0001 -.0229 .0052 -.0017 -.0017 -.0121 -.0020 -.0056 -.0010 -.0069 -.0057 
max .974 .1799 .6013 .1290 .1683 .1683 .4161 .9744 .5766 .2005 .2437 .3707 
Table 5.1 provide descriptive statistics describe real and accruals-based earnings management REM = real activities earnings, AEM = accruals-based earnings management. ACFO = abnormal operation cash flows, 
ADISX = abnormal discretionary expenses, APROD = abnormal production cost.  This information is provided through industry type. Where, 1= Oil and Gas companies, 2= Service Companies, 3=Construction 
companies, 4=Trade companies, 5= Pharmaceutical and health Care companies, 6= Clothes companies, 7= Food and Drinks Companies,8= Automobile manufactures, 9= Equipment companies, 10 = Agriculture and 
Fishing, 11=  Metals and Mini 
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5.2.3 AEM and REM Based on Years’ Trend 
Table 5.3 describes the mean, median, standard deviation and minimum and maximum values 
of the AEM and REM during the period from 2007 to 2015. As can be seen in Table 5.3, the 
mean of AEM decreases from .046 cent in 2007 to 0.036 per cent in 2015. Similarly, the median 
value of AEM decreases from 0.028 per cent in 2007 to 0.014 per cent in 2015. These decreases 
in earning management show that companies engaged in EM using accruals based to a lesser 
extent in 2015. It can also be seen that the lowest value of AEM is zero in 2015 and the highest 
value is 2.12 in 2009. With respect to REM, the mean of REM increases from approximately 
zero in 2007 to 0.001 in 2015. The results in table 5.3 also show that the mean values of 
APROD increase from approximately zero in 2007 and 2008 to 0.0195, 0.0012 and 0.0011 in 
2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. This explains that Indian listed companies engaged in REM 
using slightly larger APROD recently (in the period from 2013 to 2015). In the same line, the 
results show that Indian listed companies engaged in REM using ACFO in the years 2014 and 
2015 (0.0115, 0.0017, respectively) more than in years 2007, 2008, 2009 (0.00001, 0.0002, 
0.00064, respectively). Similarly, table 5.3 shows that the mean value of DISX increases from 
-0.00001 in 2007 to 0.01993 and 0.00189 in 2013 and 2014 respectively. The findings also 
indicate that there is higher engagement in real earnings management using abnormal cash flow 
from operations in the years 2013 and 2014 compared to the year 2007.   
A noteworthy conclusion may be drawn from the above discussion. In general, there are 
differences in the trends of REM and AEM. For instance, while AEM shows an overall 
decrease during the period of study, REM increased in the same period. To obtain more 
understanding of EM practices in Indian companies, it will be useful to investigate the reasons 
behind EM behaviour. Previous studies argue that examining each EM strategy (AEM and 
REM) individually is inadequate to capture the impact of EM, (e.g. Fields et al. 2001; Ipino 
and Parbonetti, 2017; Ho, L. et al., 2015; Ferentinou et al., 2016). Managers’ decision to engage 
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in any EM strategy will be influenced by how constrained and costly this strategy is. Managers 
will face different levels of constraints for each strategy, which will influence their decision. 
When the constraints of using one EM method are high, managers are more likely to substitute 
to the less costly alternative to manipulate earnings. The relative degree of AEM vis-a-vis REM 
relies on the relative costs of each strategy. Thus, the next sections discuss and analyse the 
trade-off between AEM and REM based on their costs and constraints. 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics by years for AEM and REM  
Measures Full Sample 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
AEM mean .045 .046 .048 .058 .048 .047 .033 .048 .037 .036 
sd .106 .101 .091 .164 .127 .072 .063 .145 .063 .077 
min .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 .000 
med .021 .028 .024 .025 .023 .024 .016 .020 .020 .0144 
max 2.126 ..98 .843 2.12 1.57 .52 .639 1.91 .533 .601 
REM mean -.001 .00001 .00001 .00041 .0048 -.0051 .0001 -.0029 .0012 .0016 
sd .128 .113 .133 .2343 .0765 .1133 .0841 .1620 .0856 .0693 
min -2.252 -.411 -.650 -2.252 -2251 -1.216 -.5770 -2.111 -.3651 -.4889 
p50 .002 .0052 .0084 .0099 .0043 -.00379 .0010 -.006098 .0011 .006 
max 1.24 .471 .3652 1.240 .2820 .1689 .2802 .2955 .3210 .2555 
ACFO mean -.0023 .00001 -.0002   .00064 .00052 .0002 -.0002 .0001 .0115 .0017 
sd .107 .096 .103 .1922 .06859 .06870 .06637 .1551 .0707 .06388 
min -2.163 -.490 -.252 -2.1633 -.2890 -.1693 -.1854 -.2072 -.2872 -.2553 
p50 .002 .0034 -.00293 -.0047 .0012 -.00543 .00001 -.00529 -.0028 -.0014 
max .881 .3814 .5294 .88135 .2271 .42516 .4547 .1899 .3452 .3971 
APROD mean -.0027 .00001 -.00001 -.01040 -.00506 .00506 -.0001 -.01956 .00122 .0011 
sd .102 .0926 .09322 .17841 .06595 .06712 .06176 .15432 .06825 .06244 
min -2.092 -.4924 -.3139 -2.0923 -.02890 -.17603 -.17460 -2.0741 -.2649 -.2747 
p50 .001 .00057 -.0037 -.0012 -.00001 .00451  -.00001 -.00252 -.00014 .00054 
max .615 .37997 .4124 .6153 .2273 .42072 .45435   .18681 .3337 .30583 
ADISX mean -.0029 .00001 -.00001 .01169 .00495 .0001 .0001 -.01993 .00189 .0001 
sd .113 .10328 .10713 .20779 .0693 .07263 .07282 .15827 .07922 .06529 
min -2.18 -.47332 -.31038 -2.1819 -.2820 -.17032 -.1827 -2.1128 -.3046 -.2702 
p50 .003 -.0020 -.0077 -.006624 -.002991 -.00773 -.00185 -.00604 -.0031 -.0018 
max .974 .4101 .5332 .97440 .22528 .43448 .57660 .20602 .3536 .3975 
Table 5.1 provide descriptive statistics describe real and accruals-based earnings management REM = real activities earnings, AEM = accruals-based earnings management, AEM-K = accruals-based earnings 
management measured through Kothari model (2005), ACFO = abnormal operation cash flows, ADISX = abnormal discretionary expenses, APROD = abnormal production cost. .  
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5.3 The trade-off between AEM and REM  
To understand the behaviour of AEM and REM, this section examines the trade-off between 
AEM and REM based on their costs and constraints. Thus, the current section presents the costs 
and constraints related to both AEM and REM and their impact on the trade-off between them. 
5.3.1 Relative cost related to EM. 
Four types of costs related to AEM were identified, based on prior research (e.g. Zang, 2012; 
Abrnathy, 2014). The first cost is related to the scrutiny of auditors. Big4 is used as a relative 
cost related to AEM, as the Big4 are more experienced, and can invest more resources in 
auditing (Zhang, 2012). Previous studies show that Big 4 audit companies constrain AEM (e.g., 
Krishnan, 2003; Francis & Wang, 2008). Therefore, the current study considers Big 4 as a 
proxy for auditor scrutiny and measure it as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm auditor 
is one of the Big 4, and zero otherwise. Secondly, audit committee effectiveness is also used 
as a relative cost constraining AEM. Prior research (Smith, 2003; Zaman et al., 2011) listed 
four characteristics that must at least be exhibited by an effective audit committee. In 2015 
Indian code number 49 also suggested the same characteristics for the audit committee 
effectiveness, as follows: two-thirds of the members of the audit committee should be 
independent directors; all audit committee members should be financially literate and at least 
one of the audit committee member should have financial expertise; the audit committee should 
meet at least four times a year and the audit committee should be composed of at least three 
members. There are consistent with both previous studies (Smith, 2003; Zaman et al., 2011) 
and Indian code number 49. We consider the audit committee for the company i and year t is 
effective if it complies with all above conditions, and it will be awarded 1, otherwise zero. 
Thirdly, this study employs board effectiveness as a relative cost related to AEM. Zaman et al. 
(2011) suggest four characteristics that must at least be exhibited by the board for it to show 
119 
 
 
effectiveness. In 2015 Indian code number 49 also suggested the same characteristics for the 
board effectiveness, as follows: independent directors account for at least fifty percent of the 
all board members; the chairman is a non-executive director; the meeting of the board 
committee is at least four times a year and at least 8 members make up the board committee. 
There are consistent with both Zaman et al. (2011) and Indian code number 49. The present 
study considers the board effectiveness for the company i and year t if it comply with all above 
conditions; 1 will be awarded if this is the case, otherwise zero. Fourthly, following prior 
studies (Zang, 2012; Abrnathy, 2014), the length of operating cycles is employed as proxy of 
accounting flexibility. This study argues that longer operating cycles lead to greater flexibility 
for AEM, since they have a longer period for accruals to be reversed. The operating cycle is 
measured as defined by Dechow (1994), and is the addition of days’ inventory outstanding, 
days’ sales outstanding and days’ payable outstanding.  
This study also identifies three types of cost related to REM. First, Following Zhang (2012) 
and Abernathy (2014) this study uses a company’s market-share in the industry as a relative 
cost related REM. The company’s market share is measured as the company’s sales divided by 
the industry's total sales. The second type of cost recognises the company’s financial health. 
Following previous studies (e.g. Wang et al., 2007; Gorg & Spaliara, 2009), the current study 
employed solvency3 as proxy of financial health. The third relative cost is the influence of 
institutional ownership (Zang, 2012; Abernathy, 2014), This was measured through the 
institutional ownership percentage at the beginning of the same year. 
 
 
                                                          
3Solvency is the ability of a company to meet its long-term financial obligations. Solvency is essential to staying 
in business as it asserts a company’s ability to continue operations into the foreseeable future.  
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5.3.2 The Impact of Costs Related to AEM and REM on Their Trade-off  
The current section examines the impact of the relative cost related to either AEM or REM on 
the trade-off between the two EM strategies. It tests the impact of these costs on AEM and 
REM by employing panel regression analysis, which allows control for other variables that 
have a possible impact on AEM and REM. Two regressions4 with firm-year observations are 
estimated to test the impact of relative costs on both earnings management methods 
individually, and the probability of switch strategy between real and accruals-based EM, during 
the period from 2007 to 2015. We include control variables for other factors in the following 
two regressions, such as firm size, leverage, profitability and growth, due to their impact on 
both AEM and REM (Becker et al., 1998; Bowen et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Sun et al., 
2011; Zaman et al., 2011; Ferentinou et al., 2016). 
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics for AEM, REM and the three individual proxies of 
REM (ACFO, APROD and ADISX), which are also explained in detail above in sections 5.2, 
5.3 and 5.4. Table 5.4 also shows that the mean for BEF is 0.367, which indicates that 36.7 per 
cent of Indian companies have efficient boards. This result is consistent with results reported 
                                                          
4 AEMit = β0 + β1  REMit+β2 Big4it+ β3 BEF+β4  ACEF +β5 Block+β6 INSOW+ β7 FI_HE+ β8 AC_FL+ β9 SH_MA+ 
β10 SIZE+  β11 LEV+ β12 ROA +β13 GROWTH + eit (1) 
REMit = β0 + β1  AEMit+β2 Big4it+ β3 BEF+β4  ACEF +β5 Block+β6 INSOW+ β7 FI_HE+ β8 AC_FL+ β9 SH_MA+ 
β10 SIZE+  β11 LEV+ β12 ROA +β13 GROWTH + eit  (2) 
AEM = accruals based earning management of company i and period t, AEM is used as dependent variable in 
equation (1). REM = earning management using real activities of company i and period t, REM is used as 
dependent variable in equation (2). β0 = the constant Big4 = the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 4 BEF = board 
effectiveness. ACEF = audit committee effectiveness. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through the 
proportion of shares held by institutions.  AC_FL = accounting flexibility. FI_HE = financial health of company. 
SH_MA = share market. SIZEit = size of companies, the natural logarithm of firms’ assets. Company size is 
measured using its total assetsLEV = financial leverage is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. ROA = a proxy for a firm’s profitability and it is measured as the ratio of the income from operation to 
total asset. GROWTH = Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. 
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by Garcia (2010), who shows that the ratio of board effectiveness is 33.65 per cent in Spain. It 
can be also seen that the mean for ACEF is 0.621, which indicates that 62.1 per cent of Indian 
companies have efficient audit committees. These findings indicate that the ratio of audit 
committee effectiveness in Indian companies is higher than the findings reported by Rochmah 
and Mohd (2012), who indicate that the ratio of audit committee effectiveness among 
Indonesian companies is 40.3 per cent. On average, 28 per cent of the study sample is audited 
by the Big4 international accounting firms, and the average value of accounting flexibility, 
measured as the number of operation cycle days, is 49.8. The mean value of the market-share 
is 1.3 per cent and the mean value of financial health is 43.1 per cent, which are consistent with 
results reported by Zang (2011). It is also noted that the mean value of institutional ownership 
is 0.264. This finding is less than the results documented by Abernathy (2014), who documents 
that the ratio of institutional ownership is 53.3 per cent among US companies. Table 5.2 also 
reports descriptive statistics for various firm-specific variables and shows that the mean 
company log total assets (company size) is 7.48. Finally, the mean value of ROA, financial 
leverage and growth are around 11 per cent, 64 per cent and 25.5 per cent respectively. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics 
variable Mean sd p25 p50 p75 
AEM 
 
 
 
.045 .106 .007 .021 .049 
REM -.001 .128 -.037 .002 .048 
CFO -.0023 .107 -.037 -.002 .029 
PROD -.0027 .102 -.032 -.001 .025 
DISX -.0029 .113 -.043 -.003 .034 
ROA .112 .124 .041 .090 .15 
SIZE 7.48 .663 7.00 7.39 7.8 
GROWTH .255 .325 .088 .189 .32 
LEV .546 .224 .392 .583 .71 
BEF .367 .482 0          0        1 
ACEF  .621 .485 0 1 1  
INSOW .264 .155 .15 .24 .35 
AC-FL  49.8 .602 9.6 28.6 67.8 
MA-SH  .013   .040 .0008   .003 0.09 
FI-HE   .431  .185  .311     .403 .566 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through employing 
modified Jones model. REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings management. Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit 
committee firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size  
measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= 
leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the 
proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by 
institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter 
four,   AC-FL= accounting flexibility, MA-SH = market share, FI-HE = financial health.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance 
at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
5.3.4 Multicollinearity Test 
The common method for checking the extent of the multicollinearity problem between 
independent variables are the correlation coefficients matrix and VIF methods (e.g. Anderson 
et al., 1996;  Grewal et al., 2004; Hair et al. 2006; Li, et al., 2010; ALghamdi and Ali 2012; 
Choi et al., 2013; Shafer, 2015; Muttakin et al., 2015; Banseh & Khansalar, 2016). Grewal et 
al. (2004) argue that a multicollinearity problem above 80%  might harm the findings of the 
regression analysis. It is also argued that multicollinearity problems exist among independent 
variables when the average value of VIF is more than 10 (Gujarati, 2003). The current study 
uses the correlation matrix to examine whether there is high correlation between the 
independent variables. Tables 5.5 A and 5.5 B report the correlation coefficients between 
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independent variables. They show that the highest correlation coefficient is between the market 
share and INSOW, which is 0.237. Thus, the correlation coefficients of all other study variables 
are less than the conventional thresholds. Furthermore, to confirm the the results of  correlation 
matrix, the VIF was also conducted by this study. Table 5.6 A and 5.6 B show the highest value 
of  VIF is very low (1.11) and the mean value is 1.05, which confirms that there is no 
multicollinearity problem between the study’s independent variables. 
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Table 5.5 Correlation Matrix Analysis 
. 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Equation 1 (AEM is dependent variable). 
 REM Big4 Type ROA Size Growth Lev Block INSOW BEF ACEF Solvency Cycle Status 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
REM 1.000              
Big4 -.015 1.000             
Type .0093 -.141*** 1.000            
ROA -.09*** .0256 .045* 1.000           
SIZE  .009 -0.61*** -.074*** -.113*** 1.000          
GROWTH -.016 -0.002 -.035 .0127 .0091 1.000         
Lev -.005 -.070*** .006 .071*** 0.059*** -.0117 1.0000        
Block -.036 .006 .017 .004 .120*** .0135 -0321 1.0000       
INSOW -.071** .0248 -.117*** -.025 -.060*** .0076 -0.0225 .360*** 1.0000      
BEF .020 -.018 -.042* .045** -.078*** -.032*** -.0089 .0320 -0.0185 1.0000     
ACEF -.051** -.014 .001 -.0106 .0183 -.0108 -0.006 .042* -.087*** .098*** 1.0000    
FI-HE -.031 .12*** -.009 .110*** .087*** -.0194 -.0101 .0077 -.078*** .038* .0187 1.0000   
AC-FL -.08*** 0.0315 -.170*** -107*** .099*** -.004 .059** -.0115 .0129 -.0133 -.006 0.0023 1.0000  
MA-SH .037* 0.237*** .058*** -.0163 .121*** -.022 .0129 .0109 .0516** .009 -0.041* 0.0133 -.071*** 1.0000 
Table 5.5 reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings management. ROA = profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total 
assets. SIZE = company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH = Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV = leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets.. BLOCK = block 
holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions. BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF = 
audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four. AC-FL= accounting flexibility, MA-SH = market share, FI-HE = financial health, more explanation in chapter four.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, 
*** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.  
Panel B:  Correlation Matrix for Equation 2 (REM is dependent variable). 
 AEM Big4 Type ROA Size Growth Lev Block INSOW BEF ACEF Solvency Cycle Status 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
AEM 1.000              
Big4 -.066*** 1.000             
Type .0182 -.141*** 1.000            
ROA -.0487** .0256 .045* 1.000           
SIZE  -.0480** -0.61*** -.074*** -.113*** 1.000          
GROWTH -.052** -0.002 -.035 .0127 .0091 1.000         
Lev -.0114 -.070*** .006 .071*** 0.059*** -.0117 1.0000        
Block -.007 .006 .017 .004 .120*** .0135 -0321 1.0000       
INSOW -.0359 .0248 -.117*** -.025 -.060*** .0076 -0.0225 .360*** 1.0000      
BEF -.121*** -.018 -.042* .045** -.078*** -.032*** -.0089 .0320 -0.0185 1.0000     
ACEF -.066*** -.014 .001 -.0106 .0183 -.0108 -0.006 .042* -.087*** .098*** 1.0000    
FI-HE -.053** .12*** -.009 .110*** .087*** -.0194 -.0101 .0077 -.078*** .038* .0187 1.0000   
AC-FL .097*** 0.0315 -.170*** -107*** .099*** -.004 .059** -.0115 .0129 -.0133 -.006 0.0023 1.0000  
MA-SH -.056** 0.237*** .058*** -.0163 .121*** -.022 .0129 .0109 .0516** .009 -0.041* 0.0133 -.071*** 1.0000 
Table 5.5 reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through employing modified Jones model as a mean proxy of accruals-based EM.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 
level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level
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Table 5.6 VIF Test Analysis. 
Panel A:  VIF Test Analysis Equation 1 (AEM is dependent variable).               . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Variable        VIF        1/VIF   
REM       1.03     0.973065. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Big4       1.11     0.904119 
MA-SH       1.09     0.919840. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
type       1.07     0.930388 
AC-FL       1.07     0.932425 
size       1.06     0.940368. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ROA       1.06     0.946618 
FI-HE       1.04     0.958628 
INSOW       1.04     0.962056. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
BEF       1.03     0.974965 
ACEF       1.02     0.978155           . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Lev       1.02     0.978587 
Growth       1.00         0.995714       . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mean VIF       1.05 . 
Table 5.6 panel A reports results of multicollinearity problem analysis, by using VIF test, between the independent variables. AEM = 
Discretionary accruals measured through employing modified Jones model as a mean proxy of accruals-based EM. ROA = profitability, 
measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. SIZE = company size measured through the natural log of company’s 
total assets. GROWTH = Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV = leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled 
by total assets.. BLOCK = block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = 
institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions. BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. 
ACEF = audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four. AC-FL= accounting flexibility, MA-SH = market share, FI-HE = 
financial health, more explanation in chapter four.   
Panel B:  VIF Test analysis Equation 2 (REM is dependent variable). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Variable        VIF        1/VIF      . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
AEM       1.04     0.958770        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Big4       1.11     0.902369 
MA-SH       1.09     0.920204        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        
type       1.08     0.929941 
AC-FL       1.07     0.931206. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
size       1.07     0.938221 
ROA       1.04    0.954888 
FI-HE       1.04     0.957559          . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
INSOW       1.04     0.966120 
BEF       1.04   0.964297 
ACEF       1.02     0.977203. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Lev       1.02     0.978328 
Growth       1.01         0.993323 
Mean VIF       1.05   
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 5.6 panel B reports results of multicollinearity problem analysis  between the independent variables. REM = combined proxy of real 
activities earnings management. 
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5.3.5 Regression Analysis Results 
In order to achieve the first objective of this study and to understand EM behaviour, this section 
examined the relationship between AEM and REM. To test this relationship, the current study, 
firstly, used REM as a dependent variable and AEM as an independent variable in equation 1 
(as explained in section 4.7 p 107). Secondly, AEM is used as a dependent variable and REM 
is used as an independent variable in equation 2 (as explained in section 4.7 p 107). 
Furthermore, the relative costs of both AEM and REM (Big4, board effectiveness, audit 
committee effectiveness, institutional, market share, financial health and accounting flexibility) 
and the company characteristics (size, industry type, profitability, growth and financial 
leverage) are included in the regression model as control variables. 
To identify the most appropriate model for this study, some statistical issues need to be taken 
into account. To test whether the suitable model is the panel or pooled model, the Chow test is 
conducted for the two regressions, which are used in examining the relationship between AEM 
and REM. Twumasi et al. (2015) indicate that if the F-value in the Chow test is less than 0.05, 
panel data is a more suitable method than the pooled method. Since the findings of the Chow 
test revealed that the F-value was significant at the 0.01 level for the two models (see appendix 
5), the panel data model is the more appropriate method for these two regressions for examining 
the relationship between AEM and REM.  
Panel data could be categorised into random effect or fixed effect, which would help to mitigate 
the influences of various companies and time series. Due to data emanating from various 
companies and time series, it is believed that panel data offers suitable models, which 
differentiate between different companies and changes over time (Kim et al., 2012; Clark and 
Linzer, 2015). In order to determine whether the effect is fixed or random, the Hausman test is 
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conducted for the two regression models to allow the researcher to choose between the random 
and fixed effects models. The null hypothesis is that the random effects model is the preferred 
model while the alternate hypothesis shows a preference for the fixed effects model (Clark and 
Linzer, 2015). Clark and Linzer (2015) indicate that if the p-value is less than 0.05, the null 
hypothesis will be rejected. Since the results of the Hausman test in the two models were very 
significant at the 0.01 level, the fixed effect method is more suitable for examining the 
relationship between AEM and REM in the two regressions (see appendix 4). 
Table 5.7 indicates that the values of overall R2 for the two regression models (AEM and REM) 
are 0.228 and 0.401 respectively. These figures show that the combination of the independent 
variables explains the variation in the dependent variable in the two models respectively. These 
figures of R2 are in line with prior research related to this type of AEM and REM regressions 
(e.g. Geiger and North 2006; Jenkins and Velury 2008). P-Values in the above two regressions 
are highly significant (0.001) suggesting that these models have a good explanatory power for 
the current study.  
Table 5.7 presents the results of the trade-off between REM and AEM. Table 5.7 indicates that 
AEM is significantly and negatively related to REM (coef = -0.410, p < 0.01), while REM is 
significantly and negatively associated with AEM (coef = -0.182, p < 0.01). This result supports 
the predictions that managers can use a mixture of EM methods (i.e. AEM and REM) to meet 
their target. These results are consistent with previous studies (e.g. Zang, 2011; Abernathy et 
al., 2014; Ferentinou et al., 2016; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017) suggesting that the managers’ 
decision to engage in any EM strategy will be influenced by how constrained and costly this 
strategy is. Managers will face different levels of constraints for each strategy, which will 
influence their decision. When the constraints of using one EM method are high, managers are 
more likely to substitute the less costly alternative to manipulate earnings. Thus the relative 
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degree of AEM vis-a-vis REM relies on the relative costs of each strategy (see. e.g. Graham et 
al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012; Abernathy et al., 2014).  
 Table 5.7 shows that all of the costs associated with AEM have significant coefficients with 
the predicted signs. The coefficients on BEF, ACEF and Big4 (Coef = -0.011, Coef = -0.013, 
Coef = -0.161) are negative, indicating that these costs are more likely to constrain the 
company’s ability to manage accrual-based earnings. These findings indicate that better the 
effectiveness of the board, and audit committee and a high standard of auditing results in 
mitigating AEM. Consequently, managers may engage more in REM to achieve their target 
earnings. These results are in line with results reported by Zang (2011), who examined the 
trade-off decision between using AEM and REM and provided evidence suggesting that BEF, 
ACEF and Big4 have a significantly negative impact on AEM and a positive effect on REM 
among companies in the USA. The positive coefficient on accounting flexibility suggests that 
companies with less accounting flexibility are less likely to use AEM to manipulate earnings, 
and thus use REM more. Similarly, Abernathy et al. (2014) indicate that accounting flexibility 
is significantly and positively associated with AEM, and negatively related to REM.    .  
The second set of costs are used to examine how firms engage relatively more in AEM when 
the costs associated with REM are higher. In the REM equation (see footnote 3 page 124), the 
coefficients on market share and financial health are positive and significant at the 0.01 and 
0.05 levels respectively. These results are in line with Zang (2011), who also examines the 
relationship between AEM and REM among US companies and finds similar evidence that 
financial health and market share are positively and significantly related to REM and negatively 
correlated with AEM. This would suggest that companies with poorer financial health and 
smaller market shares have less flexibility for REM, and thus use an AEM strategy.  
Table 5.7 also provides evidence that the negative coefficient on institutional ownership 
supports the notion that the institutional investors impose more constraint and scrutiny over 
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real activities manipulation than accrual based earnings management; this is perhaps because 
of the longer-term real consequences of the REM on firms’ values (Zhang, 2011). 
Consequently, managers trying to achieve their target earnings may engage more in AEM.  
 
Thus, the first aim of this study is achieved through measuring the two EM strategies (AEM 
and REM) and examining the trade-off between them. The significant and negative relationship 
between AEM and REM supports that managers in the Indian context can use AEM or REM 
methods to meet their target. The negative impact of the board effectiveness, audit committee 
effectiveness and Big4 on AEM indicates that these costs may constrain the company’s ability 
to engage in AEM. The positive effect of accounting flexibility on AEM suggests that Indian 
companies with less accounting flexibility are less likely to use AEM to manipulate earnings. 
These results are consistent with the theoretical underpinnings derived from the agency theory, 
suggesting that companies might use different strategies to minimise the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders. Morris (1987) argues that, without proper monitoring, 
companies may face serious problems. Healy and Palepu (2001) propose several solutions to 
mitigate the agency problem, such as the effective control of the manager by the board, the 
audit committee effectiveness to control the flexibility in the accounting system and financial 
analysts’ ability to use financial and non-financial information disclosed by managers to reduce 
the information asymmetry. These resolutions suggest that corporate governance mechanisms 
and contractual agreements play a vital role in mitigating the agency problem. The 
effectiveness of the audit committee and board of directors can decrease information 
asymmetry between managers and owners, which is more likely to constrain EM.  
Due to the positive influence of the market share and financial health on REM, and the negative 
impact of the institutional ownership on REM, managers may try to achieve their target 
earnings through engaging more in AEM. These results are in line with agency theory which 
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suggests that, due to the existence of agency conflict, managers engage in EM opportunistically 
for their own interests rather than optimising the company’s value. When the costs and 
constraints of using one REM strategy are high, managers are more likely to use the less costly 
alternative to manage earnings (AEM). Belgacem & Omri (2015) showed that managers 
(agents) might exploit the flexibility of accounting principles in estimating their reward. On 
the other hand, when AEM is constrained, managers may try to achieve their target earnings 
through engaging more in REM.  Thus, EM is a kind of agency cost (Sun et al., 2010; Xie et 
al., 2003; Zahra et al., 2005). Managers are more concerned about their ability to remain in 
power, and to increase their own wealth, which in turn is likely to impact negatively on both 
the firms’ value and reputation (Prior et al. 2008). Companies could face serious problems 
because of the ease with which the manager can access the company’s information compared 
to the shareholders. Therefore, due to the existence of agency costs, accountability and 
transparent systems should be introduced to mitigate this problem (Leftwich, 1980; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990). 
 
With respect to the other control variables, table 5 shows that there is a negative and significant 
impact of profitability on both AEM and REM (Coef = -0.090, p < 0.01; Coef = -0.101, p < 
0.01 respectively). This suggests that less profitable companies are more likely to engage in 
EM. Company size is also significantly and negatively related to AEM at a level of 0.01, 
indicating that smaller companies may have a higher incentive to engage in AEM than larger 
companies. This is also consistent with previous studies (Scholtens & Kang, 2013; Kim et al., 
2012). 
 Taken together, the above results suggest a substitute relationship between AEM and REM. 
These results provide evidence that managers change their EM strategies from AEM to REM 
and vice-versa based on relative costs related to EM strategy, which is consistent with previous 
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studies (e.g. Zang, 2012; Abernathy et al., 2014; Ho, L. et al., 2015; Ferentinou et al., 2016; 
Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017).  
Table 5.7: Results of panel regression of the relationship between AEM and REM 
         REM (1)   AEM (2)    
     Coef t                 Coef                 t  
AEM/REM -.410*** -11.75 -.184*** -11.75 
Big4 .215*** 10.43 -.161*** -20.61 
ROA -.101** -3.68 -.090*** -4.98 
Size .013  1.53 -.037*** -6.06 
Growth -.003 -0.04 .010* 1.92 
Type .013 0.89 .003 0.31 
Lev   .009 0.62 -.011 -1.11 
FI-HE .001 2.57 -.001*** -1.88 
AC-FL -.001*** -1.91 .001*** 3.62 
MA-SH .334*** 3.01 .144 1.94 
BEF .008** 1.30 -.011*** -2.45 
ACEF .006* 0.94 -.0138*** -2.65 
INSOW -.046*** -1.28 .070** 2.88 
R2             0.2287             0.406  
P-value             0.001             0.001  
Table 5.7 reports the findings of the primary analysis examining the relationship between AEM and REM. REM = combined proxy of real 
activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006). AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through 
employing modified Jones model as a mean proxy of AEM. ROA = profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by 
total assets. SIZE = company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH = Growth ratio measured through 
the change of sale. LEV = leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets.. BLOCK = block holder ownership measured 
through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held 
by institutions. BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF = audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter 
four. AC-FL= accounting flexibility, MA-SH = market share, FI-HE = financial health, more explanation in chapter four.  * Signiﬁcance at 
the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
5.3.6 Additional Analyses 
To increase the power of the main test and obtain more confidence that the above results do 
represent the trend in earnings management practice, we also run the following analysis. The 
current study performs a cross-sectional analysis using a sub-sample of firms that are likely to 
have strong incentives to manage earnings. The study argues that, if associated costs related to 
both AEM and REM strategies play a prominent role in determining how managers choose 
between the two strategies, and then the trade-off between AEM and REM, and the effect of 
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their associated costs, should be observed even for companies with strong incentives for 
earnings management. 
 The current study constructs a range of company-years sub-samples with strong firm-level 
incentives for earnings management. Firstly, following Roychowdhury (2006) and Doukakis 
(2014), this study creates a sub-sample of firm-years with small positive earnings (SPE), 
defined as firm-years that report net income from operation over lagged total assets higher than 
or equal to zero but less than 0.005. Prior studies provide evidence that these firms are likely 
to manipulate their earnings to report income marginally above zero (see. e.g. Cohen et.al. 
2008; Doukakis, 2014). Secondly, we identify firm-years with changes in net income before 
extraordinary items (SEC) scaled by total assets which lie in the interval (0, 0.005), since it is 
likely that these firms, during these years, managed their earnings in order to meet the prior 
years’ earnings figures (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). Thirdly, recent research has 
suggested that meet or beat analysts’ forecast is considered as a significant benchmark for 
management, and they are likely to manipulate earnings to achieve this (Burgstahler and 
Dichev 1997; DeGeorge et al. 1999; Cohen et al., 2008). Thus, this study also focuses on firm-
years that have a small error in the analysts’ forecast (SEAF), defined as the differences 
between actual earnings per share reported in financial statements and the earnings forecast per 
share reported by analysts. Specifically, it focuses on firm-year observations in which the 
analysts’ forecast error is one cent per share or less (Kim et al., 2012). Finally, this study 
focuses on high-debt firms (HDF), defined as firm-years that fall above the median value of the 
sample. This definition is consistent with the evidence in prior research that highly leveraged 
firms have strong incentives to engage in both real and accruals-based earnings management 
(Doukakis, 2014). 
Table 7.6 shows results of the suspect analysis regressions. The outcomes are reported in eight 
columns. In columns 1and 2, the regression estimates of AEM and REM, measured by using 
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SPE, are reported. Columns 3 and 4 report the regression findings of AEM and REM, measured 
by using SEC. Columns 5 and 6 show the regression outcomes of AEM and REM, measured 
by using SEAF. In columns 7 and 8, the regression estimates of AEM and REM, which are 
measured by using sub-sample of HDF. Table 5.8 indicate that the values of overall R2 for the 
eight regression models are 72.29 per cent; 71.09 per cent; 76.99 per cent; 78.12 per cent; 29.46 
per cent; 21.08 per cent; 23.77 per cent and 23.98 per cent, respectively. These figures show 
that the combination of the independent variables explains the variation in the dependent 
variable in all models respectively. P-Values in the above eight regressions are highly 
significant (0.001), suggesting that these models have a good explanatory power for all the 
models used in this section.   
 Table 5.8 presents the empirical findings for the four suspect samples. An analysis of the EM 
behaviour of these suspect firms indicates that all of the costs associated with AEM and REM 
have significant coefficients (at least at the 0.05 level) with the predicted signs, which is 
consistent with the study’s main results in table 5.7. Specifically, table 5.8 shows that when  
AEM is used as a dependent variable in the four suspect samples (SPE, SPEC, SEAF, and 
SHM), the relationship between AEM and REM is significant and negative (coef  = -.321, p < 
0.01; coef  =  -.164 , p <  0.10; coef  =  -.149, p<  0.05; and coef = -.135, p <  0.10 respectively). 
Similarly, all suspect samples results, when REM is employed as a dependent variable, indicate 
that REM is related negatively to AEM (Coef = -.455, p < 0.01; Coef = -.191, p < 0.10; Coef 
= -.194, p < 0.05; and Coef = -0.820 p < 0.10 respectively). These results indicated that the 
negative relationship between AEM and REM is consistent with the main findings in table 5.7, 
which are still unchanged even in the samples with strong incentives to manage earnings. It 
can also be seen (in table 5.8) that the relative costs related to AEM constrain AEM, and lead 
to an increase in REM. Furthermore, the same results show that the relative costs related to 
REM limit the flexibility for companies to engage in REM, and lead to increased AEM. Thus, 
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the relative costliness related to both AEM and REM can explain the trade-off between them, 
which is in line with the main results reported in table 5.7.
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Table 5.8: analysis of Suspect firms  
 
 SPE  SPEC  SEAF  HDF  
 AEM  REM  AEM  REM  AEM  REM  AEM  REM  
 Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
AEM/REM -.321*** -12.71 -.455*** -12.71 -.164* -1.77 -.191* -1.77 -.149** -2.01 -.194** -2.01 -.135* -1.77 -.820* -1.77 
Big4 -.015** -2.21 -.009 -1.15 -.073** -1.95 -.026 -0.64 .005 0.43 -.010 -0.72 -.048** -1.78 -.190 -1.26 
ROA -.024 -0.96 -.111*** -3.70 -.059 -0.28 -.28 -1.25 -.013 -0.35 -.020 -0.45 -.991 -0.60 .278 0.69 
size .001 0.14 .006 1.16 -.039* -1.62 -.033* -1.30 -.002 -0.26 -.003 -0.32 -.034 -0.73 -.087 -0.75 
Growth .010 1.09 .006 0.57 .015 0.31 .036 0.69 .001 0.01 .006 0.36 .016 0.27 .061 0.41 
Type .0086 0.58 .073** 2.50 -.002 -.24    -.021** -2.48 .002 0.67 .001 0.77 .0016 1,30 .0027* 1.77 
Leve .072** 2.08 -.038 -0.94 -.130* -1.72 -.108 -1.30 .029 1.31 .015 0.60 -.163* -1.14 .194 0.54 
BEF -.019** -2.44 .029*** 3.23 -.129*** -2.72 .164*** 3.24 -.020* -1.88 .004 0.33 -.123** -2.20 .221* 1.52 
ACEF -.019** -3.05 .014** 1.94  -.149*** -4.80 -.035 -0.94 -.025 -2.14 .026* 1.93 -.191*** -2.82 .182 0.97 
INSOW .033* 1.61 -.051** -2.12 .069 0.79 -.44*** -5.33 -.023 -0.55 -.179*** -3.85 .033 0.22 -.103*** -3.36 
FI-HE -.001* -1.78 .001** 2.49 -.001** -1.98 .001*** 2.90 -.002* -1.76 -.002* -1.87 -.001 -0.33 .001 0.95 
AC-FL .470 0.75 .001 0.90 .001*** 4.75 -.001** -2.50 .001* 1.78 -.001** -2.08 .001*** 2.89 .003** 2.59 
MA-SH -.006** -2.25 .005* 1.64 .350 1.51 .721*** 2.98    .436 1.50     .739** 2.25 -.167* -1.57 .596** 2.41 
R2 0.7729 0.7109 0.7699 0.7812 0.2946 0.2108     0.2377 0.2398 
P-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Table 5.8 reports the findings of the Suspect firms’ analysis to examine the relationship between AEM and REM. AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through employing 
modified Jones model. REM=combined proxy of real activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006). Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of 
audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of 
company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. INSOW = 
institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, 
more explanation in chapter four. AC-FL= accounting flexibility, MA-SH = market share, FI-HE = financial health, more explanation in chapter four.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 
level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
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5.3.7 Robustness Check 
To check for more robustness of the study results, a series of alternative tests were conducted. 
Firstly, an alternative measure of discretionary accruals is used to test whether the primary 
findings are robust to various measures or not. The main empirical analyses of AEM were 
repeated by estimating DA according to the modified Jones model, adjusted again for 
operating performance using Kothari et al.’s (2005) model.  Secondly, an alternative measure 
of REM is used to provide reasonable assurance for whether the primary findings are robust 
to various measures or not. Previous literature (Zang, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012) combines the 
individual proxies for REM (i.e. ACFO, APROD and ADISX) to compute the measure of 
REM. However, Doukakis (2014), argues that excluding the abnormal DISX variable has the 
advantage of making clear the net impact on abnormal cash flows from operations. Thus, this 
research estimated REM through combining only the other two individual proxies, abnormal 
CFO and abnormal PROD. Thirdly, following prior research (e.g. Zang, 2012; Choi et al. 
2013), this study controls for endogeneity to check for robustness of our results. Previous 
studies (e.g. Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017; Sellami, 2016) suggest that both AEM and REM are 
affected by managerial decisions. Since the managers are likely to influence both AEM and 
REM, the relationship between them may be affected by an endogeneity problem (Zang, 
2012). If AEM and REM are simultaneously determined by management’s overall policies, 
the findings presented in table 5.7 could be biased and inefficient. Previous literature has 
pointed out several methods to control the endogeneity problem. The common method used 
in prior studies is the instrumental variables (IV) (e.g. Bound et al., 1995; Gujarati, 2008; 
McKnight and Weir 2009; Choi et al. 2013). In this context, the Hausman test has been used 
to check whether bias for the independent variables and endogeneity exists. The findings of 
the Hausman test for  the lagged value of AEM and REM (R2 = 0.0965; P = 0.01, R2 = 0.127; 
P = 0.01 respectively) confirm that the dependent variable and its interaction variables in the 
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two regression models are endogenous and that the two-stage least squares approach should 
be adopted in the endogeneity analysis. The two main regression models, reported in table 
5.7, are repeated by employing the two-stage least squares method. The results of these 
robustness tests provide evidence that the essential findings of this study are robust and 
unchanged with different alternative measures. Although some coefficients’ values were 
lower and showed a lower level of significance, the direction of the relationship between AEM 
and REM and their relative cost remain the same. 
      Table 5.9: Results of panel regression of the alternative test 
         REM (1)   AEM (2)    
     Coef t                 Coef                 t  
AEM/REM -.188*** -12.51 -.718*** -13.34 
Big4 -1.60*** -21.33 2.68*** 13.75 
ROA -.087*** -4.99 -.036 -0.86 
Size -.035*** -6.18 -.057*** -4.14 
Growth .009 1.91 .008 0.70 
Type        .003 0.41 -.002 -0.12 
LEV -.003 -0.31 .007 0.30 
BEF -.008* -1.87 -.022** -2.20 
ACEF -.006* -1.73 .001 0.17 
INSOW .048** 2.03 -.236*** -4.08 
FI-HE -.001 -0.82 .001*** 5.20 
AC-FL .001*** 3.50 -.001 -1.06 
MA-SH .140* 1.96 .566*** 3.31 
R2 0.4192 0.3694  
P-value 0.001 0.001  
Table 5.9 reports the findings of the alternative analysis examining the relationship between AEM and REM. REM = combined proxy of real 
activities earnings management measured through employing Doukakis model (2014). AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through 
employing Kothari model as a mean proxy of AEM. ROA = profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. 
SIZE = company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH = Growth ratio measured through the change 
of sale. LEV = leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets.. BLOCK = block holder ownership measured through 
the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by 
institutions. BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF = audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four. 
AC-FL= accounting flexibility, MA-SH = market share, FI-HE = financial health, more explanation in chapter four.  * Signiﬁcance at the 
0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 5.10: Instrumental variables two-stage (IV 2SLS) model 
 
         REM (1)   AEM (2)    
     Coef z                 Coef                 t  
Lagged AEM/REM -1.33*** -11.38 -1.24*** -9.35 
Big4 .0156 -1.59 -.017* -1.76 
ROA -.079** -2.27 -.190*** -4.91 
Size .003 0.47 -.0167*** -2.50 
Growth -.017 -1.35 -.0012* -.10 
Type .013 0.89 .001 0.04 
Lev   -.014 0.78 -.010 -.53 
Block -.027 -0.96 -.001 -.05 
INSOW -.036 -1.25 -.041 -1.37 
BEF .0177** 3.01 -.013 -1.56 
ACEF .018** 2.14 -.018** -2.14 
Solvency .001 -.83 -.001*** -4.47 
Cycle -.002*** -3.02 .0002*** 3.52 
Status -.061 -0.55 .0086 0.08 
R2             0.1277             0.09  
P-value             0.001             0.001    
Table 5.10 reports the findings of the analysis examining the Endogeneity problem between AEM and REM. REM = combined proxy of real 
activities earnings management measured through employing Doukakis model (2014). AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through 
employing Kothari model as a mean proxy of AEM. ROA = profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. 
SIZE = company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH = Growth ratio measured through the change 
of sale. LEV = leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets.. BLOCK = block holder ownership measured through 
the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by 
institutions. BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF = audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four. 
AC-FL= accounting flexibility, MA-SH = market share, FI-HE = financial health, more explanation in chapter four.  * Signiﬁcance at the 
0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter measures the level of AEM and REM and examines the interaction between AEM 
and REM based on their relative costs and constraints. While the results in Chapter five show 
that Food and Drinks companies report the highest mean values of AEM, the lowest mean 
values of AEM are reported by Oil and Gas companies. In the same vein, REM models indicate 
that Food and Drinks companies report the highest mean value of REM as a combined measure. 
In contrast, the lowest mean value of REM was among Construction companies. In respect of 
EM trend, in general, there are differences in the tendencies of REM and AEM. For instance, 
while AEM shows an overall decrease during the period of study, REM increased in the same 
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period. The results also provide evidence that REM and AEM are substitutes for one another 
throughout the sample period from 2007 to 2015. Based on the relative constraints of the 
different EM strategies, this study finds evidence consistent with an increased use of REM 
when AEM is constrained, and vice-versa.  By examining the trade-off between AEM and 
REM based on their costs, it provides insights for practitioners, policy makers and academics. 
Firstly, practitioners may understand the function and importance of corporate governance 
roles in constraining EM and improving financial reporting quality. Managers may refer to this 
result when they purpose to persuade investors of the quality of financial reporting. Secondly, 
this study has policy implications for standard setters and regulators to continue improving the 
guidance and framework to assist firms to provide high-quality financial reporting. Finally, to 
the academics, the impact of BEEF and ACEF on the relation between REM and AEM has not 
been examined by previous research. This is the first study to examine this relationship based 
on Indian data. Thus, further research can re-examine this research question using data other 
than Indian data. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE QUALITY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURE IN INDIA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The second objective of this study is to measure the quality of CSR disclosure (QCSRD). Thus, 
this chapter measures and verifies QCSRD among Indian listed companies over a nine-year 
period from 2007 to 2015. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 measures and 
discusses the QCSRD and its dimensions based on the full sample, different years and different 
industries. Section 6.3 examines the relationship between QCSRD and the accuracy of financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts to check the validity of the QCSRD framework, and section 6.6 
presents the summary of this chapter. 
6.2 Measuring and Discussion QCSRD 
This section uses a multidimensional framework that allows for a wider perspective on CSR 
disclosure to measure the QCSRD.  CSR reporting has been criticised for its lack of relevance 
and credibility (Husillos, Larrinaga, & Álvarez, 2011). This study seeks to contribute to this 
critique by offering new insights concerning the complexity of QCSRD, and develop a new 
multidimensional model to measure QCSRD. This framework provides evidence on the nature 
of a company’s CSR disclosures based on three dimensions, which allows the capture of the 
quantitative and qualitative features concerning a specific kind of CSR information. The first 
dimension is the actual amount of disclosure, relative to the amount adjusted by two factors: 
size and complexity. Prior studies show these two variables to have a strong impact on 
disclosure (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). This is more likely to help in 
evaluating CSR disclosure, taking into account the differences in the companies’ size and 
industry. The second dimension measures the spread of CSR information. Using a spread 
dimension in this framework helps to evaluate whether the CSR information disclosed meets 
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the need of different stakeholders or focuses on specific groups. The usefulness dimension 
helps information users to evaluate CSR disclosure by capturing the four characteristic types: 
the relevance, faithful representation, understandability and comparability (based upon the 
qualitative characteristics of information suggested in the conceptual frameworks of IFRS 
(2010A)). These procedures used allow a rich description of the nature and patterns of 
disclosure to emerge, and permits these dimensions to be analysed both in combination and 
individually. 
6.2.1 The QCSRD and its dimensions 
Table 6.1 describes the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for 
all the dimensions used in measuring QCSRD during the period from 2007 to 2015. Table 6.1 
shows that QCSRD has a mean of 53.3 per cent and a median value of 50.8 per cent, which is 
used as a benchmark to classify the low and high levels of QCSRD in the current study. These 
finding are consistent with previous results reported by Martinez et al. (2015), who found that 
the mean value of the quality of CSR disclosure among international listed companies was 50 
per cent. However, these findings imply that the levels of QCSRD in India are likely to be 
higher than those reported in other developing countries. For instance, Said (2009) and Alotaibi 
and Hussainey (2015), found that Malaysian and Saudi companies have mean values of the 
quality of CSR disclosure of 23 per cent and 33.4 per cent respectively. Conversely, these are 
lower than the findings reported by Adnan et al. (2010), who found that the mean value of 
QCSRD among UK companies was 64 per cent. In respect to the three dimensions, which are 
used in measuring the QCSRD, table 6.1 also shows estimates related to USEF, STRQ, and 
SPR. The mean value of the USEF dimension was 40 per cent. Table 6.1 also shows that the 
mean value of SPR is 58 per cent. These results indicate that Indian companies disclose 
information related to 58 per cent of the items that are expected to cover the CSR issues 
142 
 
 
suggested by this study. Finally, as can be seen from table 6.1, STRQ (the quantity dimension 
of corporate social responsibility disclosure) has a mean value of 51 per cent.   
Table 6.1: descriptive statistics of the QCSRD and its dimensions 
Variable Mean sd p25 median p75  
QCSRD .533 .104 .18 .508 .81 
SPR .58 .10 .19 .58 .83 
STRQ .51 .21 .10 .52 .98 
USEF 40 .16 0 .33 .91 
Table 6.3 presents descriptive statistics for all dimensions of QCSRD in this study. QCSRD = the quality of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. STRQ = the quantity dimension of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. SPR = the width dimension of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. USFUL = the usefulness 
dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. 
 
6.2.2 The QCSRD and Its Dimensions Based on Different Years 
The current section provides a summary of descriptive statistics of the QCSRD in order to 
explain whether the direction of QCSRD is increasing or decreasing over the period from 2007 
to 2015. To analyse the QCSRD trend, this section also describes the mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values for all the dimensions of QCSRD for each fiscal 
year over the period  2007 to 2015. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the mean values of QCSRD 
increased from 45 per cent in 2007 to 53 per cent in 2015. The highest value of QCSRD (81 
per cent) was reported in 2010 and 2011, whereas the lowest value was reported in 2008 (18 
per cent). Similarly, the results in table 6.2 show that the mean values of disclosure measured,  
STRQ, USFUL and SPR (that make up QCSRD) also increased from 47 per cent, 35 per cent 
and 52 per cent respectively in 2007 to 52 per cent, 44 per cent and 63 per cent in 2015. These 
results suggest that Indian companies recently paid more attention to the quality of CSR 
disclosure than before 2010. This could be attributed to the increase of investment trends from 
foreign companies in India after 2010 (Srivastava & Bhutani, 2012), which demanded that the 
financial reporting system should bring harmonisation in the financial reports in order to make 
them internationally acceptable. This is in line with previous studies’ findings, which suggest 
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that companies which have higher quality disclosure have a higher percentage of foreign sales 
and a higher number of foreign exchange listings (e.g.  El-Gazzar et al. 1999; Murphy, 1999).  
This could be also attributed to a suggestion by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. 
With a view to setting up a plan for IFRS adoption and providing the necessary road map for 
convergence, the Accounting Standards Board set up an IFRS Task Force (Poria, 2009). Based 
on the recommendations from the IFRS Task Force, the council of the Institute suggested the 
adoption of IFRS as of 1 April 2011 (Srivastava & Bhutani, 2012). This suggestion of the new 
reform is believed to represent a significant commitment to transparent financial reporting and 
enhanced financial reporting quality. 
Table 6.2: descriptive statistics of the QCSRD and its dimensions 
Measures  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
STRQ Mean .47 .48 .51 .52 .53 .53 .53 .53 .52 
Sd .22 .22 .20 .21 .21 .20 .21 .21 .21 
Min .06 .11 .11 .01 .10 .05 .04 .04 .04 
Med .52 .52 .53 .52 .52 .52 .52 .51 .51 
Max .97 .95 .90 .93 .92 .98 .98 .97 .97 
max .85 .88 .88 .88 .88 .88 .88 .92 .92 
USEF mean .35 .36 .37 .39 .41 .43 .44 .44 .44 
sd .14 .14 .15 .15 .16 .16 .17 .17 .18 
min 16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 
Med .33 .33 .33 .33 .41 .41 .5 .5 .5 
max .83 .83 .83 .83 .83 .91 .91 .91 .91 
SPR mean .52 .54 .55 .57 .59 .59 .60 .62 .63 
sd .10 .10 .10 .09 .10 .09 .10 .10 .10 
min .19 .28 .25 .36 .30 .37 .35 .34 .27 
Med .52 .53 .54 .57 .60 .60 .60 .62 .63 
max .81 .83 .83 .83 .83 .82 .81 .83 .83 
QCSRD mean .45 .47 .48 .50 .51 .52 .53 .53 .53 
 sd .13 .13 .12 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 
 min .21 .18 .22 .22 .26 .27 .28 .27 .27 
 Med .48 .48 .49 .50 .51 .51 .53 .52 .53 
 max .74 .75 .75 .75 .81 .81 .80 .79 .79 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 6.2 provide descriptive statistics wherw, QCSRD = the quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured through 
employing multidimensional proxy index. STRQ = the quantity dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through 
employing multidimensional proxy index. WID = the width dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through 
employing multidimensional proxy index. USFUL = the usefulness dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through 
employing multidimensional proxy index. DIS= dispersion CSR disclosure. COV = coverage of CSR disclosure.  This information is provided 
through industry type. Where, 1= Oil and Gas companies, 2= Service Companies, 3=Construction companies, 4=Trade companies, 5= 
Pharmaceutical and health Care companies, 6= Clothes companies, 7= Food and Drinks Companies, 8= Automobile manufactures, 9= 
Equipment and Companies, 10 = Agriculture and Fishing, 11= Diversified Metals and Mining. 
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6.2.3 The QCSRD Dimensions Based on Different Industries 
Table 6.3 describes the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for 
CSR disclosure in different industries. As can be seen from Table 6.3 in panel A, the highest 
mean value of QCSRD (61 per cent) was reported by metals and mining companies. Metals 
and mining companies also reported the highest maximum value (81 per cent) of QCSRD 
among Indian companies. These results suggest that metals and mining companies paid more 
attention to QCSRD in comparison with other industries. It can be also seen that service 
companies reported the lowest mean value (37 per cent). In regard to the three dimensions of 
the QCSRD, the SPR dimension reported the lowest values of CSR disclosure across metals 
and mining companies (19 per cent), which also showed the third lowest mean value of SPR 
(55 per cent). These results suggest that less attention was paid by metals and mining companies 
to disclose of CSR information which helps different levels of stakeholders, based on the SPR 
dimension, compared to other sectors. Food and drinks companies reported the highest mean 
value of USEF (47 per cent), whereas the pharmaceutical and health care companies had the 
lowest mean value of USEF (32 per cent). These results indicate that food and drinks companies 
may present their CSR disclosure based on the qualitative characteristics of information 
suggested in the conceptual frameworks of the IFRS more than the other sectors do. Table 6.4 
also shows that equipment companies have reported the highest mean values of CSR disclosure 
measured by STRQ dimension (70 per cent). These results suggest that equipment companies 
pay more attention to the amount of information in CSR disclosure compared to other Indian 
listed companies. In contrast, the lowest mean value, based on the STRQ dimension, was found 
in the annual reports of agriculture and fishing companies (37 per cent).  Finally, it is interesting 
to note that, when sectors were ranked based on the values of the different dimensions, the 
findings indicate that there are differences between these ranks. For instance, equipment 
companies come first in the ranking when using the STRQ dimension, but take fifth position 
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when the SPR dimension is used. However, the same sector comes last in the ranking according 
to the USEF dimension. This issue could be an important motivation for the researcher to use 
the multidimensional framework (QCSRD index) for the current study. 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics of the QCSRD in Different Industries. 
Industries  QCSRD  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mean Sd Med MIN MAX 
Oil and Gas  .50 .11 .50 .19 .74 
Service Companies. .37 .13 .49 .22 .76 
Construction companies. .54 .13 .53 .25 .76 
Trade companies. .47 .11 .50 .28 .71 
Pharmaceutical and health Care  .50 .13 .49 .29 .72 
Clothes companies. .51 .13 .53 .19 .77 
Food and Drinks Companies. .54 .15 .54 .26 .75 
Automobile manufactures. .50 13 .51 .27 .77 
Equipment and Companies. .48 .15 .48 .30 .78 
Agriculture and Fishing. .50 .14 .51 .24 .78 
Metals and Mining. .61 .13 .53 .28 .81 
Table 6.1 provide descriptive statistics where, QCSRD = the quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured through 
employing multidimensional proxy index..  This information is provided through industry type.  
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Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of the QCSRD Dimensions in Different Industries 
  
Industries  STRQ   USEF   SPR 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mean Sd Med MIN MAX Mean Sd Med MIN MAX Mean Sd Med MIN MAX 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Oil and Gas  .51 .20 .53 .10 .95 .38 .14 .33  0 .66 .60 .11 .61 .35 .83 
Service Companies. .48 .20 .51 .01 .98 .41 .16 .41 .25 .91 .51 .08 .51 .27 .70 
Construction companies. .57 .22 .55 .12 .86 .39 .15 .33 .25 .75 .61 .08 .62 .35 .76 
Trade companies. .50 .16 .53 .21 .85 .37 .11 .33 .25 .75 .54 .11 .53 .32 .77 
Pharmaceutical and health Care  .52 .22 .51 .13 .88 .32 .12 .25 .16 .58 .63 .09 .65 .46 .82 
Clothes companies. .51 .21 .52 .6 .87 .43 .19 .41 .16 .91 .60 .10 .62 .35 .80 
Food and Drinks Companies. .52 .24 .53 .01 .85 .47 .20 .5 .16 .91 .63 .12 .64 .29 .83 
Automobile manufactures. .52 .21 .52 .04 .86 .41 .16 .33 .16 .83 .56 .06 .50 .37 .74 
Equipment and Companies. .70 .06 .71 .53 .79 .35 .13 .25 .25 .66 .60 .10 .61 .44 .77 
Agriculture and Fishing. .37 .23 .48 .05 .98 .38 .16 .33 .16 .75 .67 .10 .70 .40 .83 
Metals and Mining. .58 .20 .53 .13 .95 .45 .16 .50 .25 .75 .55 .11 .63 .19 .79 
Table 6.1 provide descriptive statistics where, STRQ = the quantity dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. SPR = the width dimension of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. USFUL = the usefulness dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing 
multidimensional proxy index.  This information is provided through industry type.  
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6.3 The Validity of the QCSRD Framework 
To validate the QCSRD framework, this section investigates whether the disclosure quality is 
related to the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Botosan (2004) debates whether high 
quality disclosure is useful to the information's users in making financial decisions. High 
quality information improves the ability of investors to evaluate cash flows in future through 
considering better earnings forecasts. Prior empirical studies have investigated the relationship 
between the analysts’ earnings forecasts and disclosure (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Lee, 
2017) and found a statistically significant relationship between the disclosure quality and the 
earnings forecasts accuracy. Since the main task of analysts is to estimate earnings for future 
periods, this study argues that QCSRD is related to the attributes of earnings forecast. As a 
result, when QCSRD is positively correlated with the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(ACCU), the information disclosed is of high quality. Thus, following Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2008), this study tests the validity of the QCSRD framework. The researcher examined the 
relationship between CSR disclosure and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. QCSRD, 
STRQ, SPR and  USEF are used as independent variables whereas ACCU is used as the 
dependent variable. The company characteristics (size, industry type, profitability, leverage 
and variation in accounting earnings) are included as control variables due to their impact on 
QCSRD and ACCU (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Wang et al., 2015; Ferentinou et al., 
2016). The regression5 models are used to examine the relationship between QCSRD and 
                                                          
5 ACCUit = β0 + β1 Disclosure proxies + β2 SIZE + β3 LEV+ β4 ROA + β5 ChROA + eit (3) 
Where disclosure proxies = QCSRD, STRQ, RICH, WID and USFUL. QCSRD = the quality of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure score measured through employing the multidimensional proxy index (see section 4.5). 
STRQ = the quantity dimension of CSRD measured through employing the multidimensional proxy index. SPR = 
the spread is a function of the CSR disclosure coverage and CSR disclosure dispersion. USFUL = the usefulness 
dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing the multidimensional proxy 
index. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. SIZE= company 
size measured through the natural log of the company’s total assets. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-
term debt scaled by total assets. ChROA = the variation in accounting earnings. ACCU = the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. 
148 
 
 
ACCU. To examine the relationship between QCSRD and ACCU, some statistical tests are 
required.6 To check whether there is a multicollinearity problem between independent variables 
(QCSRD and other control variables), the correlation matrix is used. Table 6.5, panels A, B, C 
and D report the correlation coefficients between independent variables. The highest 
correlation (0.113) is between size and ROA, which suggests that there is no multicollinearity 
problem between the independent variables. 
In Table 6.6, the results are presented in four columns: column 1 reports the estimates for the 
the relationship between ACCU and QCSRD (model 1). Column 2 shows the results for the 
relationship between ACCU and STRQ (model 2), column 3 presents findings related to the 
relationship between ACCU and USFUL (model 3),while column 4 presents results related to 
the relationship between ACCU and SPR (model 4). The P-Values of these four models are 
very significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that these models have a good explanatory power 
for QCSRD. Table 6.6 also indicates that the values of overall R2 for the four regression models 
(model 1, model 2, model 3 and model 4) are 21.45 per cent, 14.97per cent, 12.59 per cent, and 
11.20 per cent, respectively. These findings suggest how the combination of the independent 
variables explains the variation in the dependent variable in all models respectively.  
Table 6.6 shows that the QCSRD is statistically significant and positively related to ACCU at 
the 0.01 level (Model1). These results are consistent with findings reported by prior studies 
                                                          
6 The Chow tests are conducted for the 4 regressions used in this chapter in order to test whether the panel or 
pooled model is more suitable. Since the findings of the Chow test revealed that F-value for Chow test was 
significant  at  0.01 level for all four models, the panel data model is more appropriate (see appendix 3). Panel 
data could be categorised by random effect or fixed effect, which helps to mitigate the influences of different 
companies and time series. To choose between the random effect and the fixed effect, the Hausman test is 
conducted for all the regression models. The findings of the Hausman test indicated that P-values were less than 
the 0.05 level for all regression models except  the first model (the relationship between QCSRD and Accuracy), 
which was more than the 0.05 level. Thus, the random effect method is the more suitable method for the first 
model and the fixed effect is more suitable method for the other models (see appendices 4 and 5). 
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(e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Becchetti et al., 2013; Casey and 
Grenier, 2014) indicating that the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is more likely to be 
higher when companies publish a higher quality of CSR report. These findings suggest that the 
identified framework in this study is more likely to help information users to evaluate the 
QCSRD for making their decisions and, therefore, comprises a positive phenomenon for stock 
markets. Given the fact that when disclosure is positively correlated with the accuracy of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts the information disclosed is of high quality, the above results 
provide evidence for the validity of the study framework (QCSRD). Table 6.6 also indicates 
that SPR and USEF as dimensions of QCSRD (Model 3 and Model 4) are statistically 
significant and positively related to ACCU (coef = 3.50, p < 0.01; coef = -1.54, p < 0.05, 
respectively). Although STRQ is insignificantly related to ACCU (Model 2), the relationship 
between them is still positive (coef = 0.334, p < 0.282). Taken together these results also 
provide evidence that the dimensions of CSR disclosure quality index (STRQ, SPR and USFL) 
give a more realistic CSR disclosure picture. Thus, these dimensions can be utilised 
complementarily for evaluating the CSR disclosure. 
The significant and positive relationship between QCSRD and the accuracy of financial 
analysts’ earnings forecast is used by this study as the validity of the quality of CSR disclosure 
framework, which was adopted to measure QCSRD and achieve the second aim of the current 
study. The significant and positive impact of SPR and USEF as dimensions of QCSRD also 
suggests that the characteristics of information disclosed, based on IFRS and the spread of CSR 
information, are more likely to help financial analysts to increase the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts in the Indian context. These results are also consistent with agency theory. Given that 
the error of earnings forecast is high when there is high information asymmetry, the QCSRD 
is assumed by signalling theory to be a means of mitigating the information asymmetry 
between management personnel and financial analysts (Chih et al., 2008). Thus, in line with 
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signalling theory, the study findings suggest that QCSRD could be used to mitigate information 
asymmetries and increase the accuracy of analysts’ forecast. 
 
In respect to other control variables, table 6.7 found evidence that SIZE (column 2) is 
statistically  positively correlated with ACCU (coef = 0.317, p < 0.05), suggesting that the 
accuracy of earnings forecast can be predicted in large companies more easily than small 
companies. It can be also seen that the ACCU is statistically negatively related to industry type 
in column 1 (coef = -0.047, p < 0.10). Finally,  it is interesting to note that variation in ROA 
(column 1 and column 3) is statistically significant and negatively associated with ACCU (coef 
= -0.524, p < 0.01; coef = -0.457, p < 0.01 respectively), suggesting that financial analysts are 
less likely to achieve high accuracy in their  next years’ earnings forecasts for companies that 
provide higher variation value in accounting earnings.  
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Table 6.5: panel A: Correlations metrics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 
 QCSRD    ROA Size   Type Lev Ch-ROA ACCU 
QCSRD 1.000       
ROA 0.018 1.000      
Size 0.101*** -0.113*** 1.000     
Type 0.081*** 0.041* -0.074*** 1.000    
Lev 0.005 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.006 1.000   
ChROA -0.003 -0.049** 0.037 -0.003 -0.022 1.000  
ACCU 
 
0.120***           -0.002                     0.007   0.075***  0.088*** -0.11***   1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Table 6.4 A reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables. QCSRD= the quality of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional framework. ROA=profitability, 
measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. SIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s 
total assets. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. Ch-ROA = the variation in accounting earnings. 
DISE = dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. ACCU = accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** 
Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 6.5: panel B: Correlations metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 STRQ    ROA Size   Type Lev Ch-ROA   DISE ACCU 
STRQ 1.000  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ROA 0.0239 1.000  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Size 0.0531** -0.113*** 1.000      
Type 0.038* 0.041* -0.074*** 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Lev 0.0104* 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.006 1.000    
ChROA -0.042* -0.049** 0.037 -0.003 -0.022 1.000   
ACCU 
 
0.0967***           -0.002                     0.007   0.075***  0.088*** -0.11*** .279***   1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Table 6.4 B reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables. STRQ = the quantity dimension of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. ROA=profitability, measured through 
net income from operations divided by total assets. SIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. LEV= 
leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. Ch-ROA = the variation in accounting earnings. DISE = dispersion 
of analysts' earnings forecasts. ACCU = accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 
level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 6.5: panel C: Correlations metrics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 
 USFUL    ROA Size   Type Lev Ch-ROA   DISE ACCU 
USFUL 1.000   
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ROA 0.031 1.000  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Size 0.079*** -0.113*** 1.000      
Type 0.052** 0.041* -0.074*** 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Lev 0.008 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.006 1.000    
ChROA -0.039* -0.049** 0.037 -0.003 -0.022 1.000   
ACCU 
 
0117***           -0.002                     0.007   0.075***  0.088*** -0.11*** .279***   1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Table 6.4 C reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables. USFUL = the usefulness dimension of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. ROA=profitability, measured through 
net income from operations divided by total assets. SIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. LEV= 
leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. Ch-ROA = the variation in accounting earnings. DISE = dispersion of 
analysts' earnings forecasts. ACCU = accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 
level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6.5: panel D: Correlations metrics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 SPR    ROA Size   Type Lev Ch-ROA   DISE ACCU 
SPR 1.000        
ROA 0.049* 1.000       
Size 0.181*** -0.113*** 1.000      
Type 0.177*** 0.041* -0.074*** 1.000     
Lev 0.022 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.006 1.000    
ChROA -0.038* -0.049** 0.037 -0.003 -0.022 1.000   
ACCU 
 
0.028           -0.002                     0.007   0.075***  0.088*** -0.11*** .279***   1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Table 6.4 D reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables. SPR = the width dimension of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. ROA=profitability, measured through net income 
from operations divided by total assets. SIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. LEV= leverage ratio 
measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. Ch-ROA = the variation in accounting earnings. DISE = dispersion of analysts' 
earnings forecasts. ACCU = accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.  * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** 
Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 6.6: Regression panel analysis of the relationship between ACCU and QCSRD and its 
dimensions  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 ACCU 
 Model 1 
ACCU   
Model 2  
 
 
     ACCU  
Model 3 
          ACCU  
 Model 4  
Coef t Coef       t    Coef   t      Coef    t  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
QCSRD 1.68*** 3.72 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . .   
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
STRQ   .334 1.08     
USFUL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.50*** 5.42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
SPR       1.54** 2.25 
ROA -.036 -0.08 .142 0.29 .012 0.03 .065 0.13 
SIZE .091 0.82 .317** 2.04 .037 .22 .176 1.04 
Type .047* 1.66 .001 -0.01 -011 -0.04 -012 -0.04 
Lev -.330 -1.31 .006  0.02 .039 0.14 .016 0.06 
ChROA -.524*** -3.84 -.455 -3.26 -.457*** -3.30 -.450 -3.23 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  R2 0.2145 .1497 0.2259 0.2120 
P-value 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Table 6.6 reports the relationship between accuracy of earnings analysts’ forecast and the dimensions of CSR disclosure quality. QCSRD = 
the quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional framework. STRQ = the quantity 
dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. SPR = the width 
dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. USFUL = the usefulness 
dimension of corporate social responsibility disclosure measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. ROA= profitability, 
measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. SIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s 
total assets. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. Ch-ROA = the variation in accounting earnings. 
DISE = dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. ACCU = accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** 
Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter measures the QCSRD in order to achieve the second objective of this study. 
Different dimensions were combined to measure the QCSRD: the quantity of the information 
disclosed (how much is disclosed), the spread of the information disclosed (coverage and 
dispersion), and the usefulness of the information disclosed (characteristics of accounting 
information). OLS regression was also performed in this chapter to check the validity of the 
QCSRD index. The empirical results of measuring QCSRD provided in this chapter indicate 
that the highest mean value of QCSRD was reported by metals and mining companies. In 
contrast, service companies reported the lowest mean value. The empirical results also provide 
evidence that the dimensions of the CSR disclosure quality index (STRQ, SPR and USFL) give 
a more realistic CSR disclosure picture. Thus, these dimensions can be utilised 
complementarily for evaluating the CSR disclosure. The current study defined disclosure 
quality through the attributes of disclosure (STRQ, SPR and USFL) that can support the 
procedure of earnings forecast. From this point of view, the information disclosed is of high 
quality when disclosure leads to better inferences in order to reduce the errors in analysts' 
earnings forecasts. However, the importance of quality disclosure for different stakeholders 
raises an issue related to the definition of quality, since different users have different 
perspectives of disclosure quality. Thus, the quality of disclosure needs to be taken into account 
by further studies on this area. 
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Chapter Seven:  The relationship Between the Quality of CSRD and EM 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 As clarified in chapter one, the main aim of this study is to examine the relationship between 
EM and QCSRD among the top 500 Indian listed companies. The following section (7.2) 
presents descriptive statistics for study variables. Next, the correlation matrix is addressed in 
section 7.3. Section 7.4 outlines the main results and discusses the results from examining the 
two main hypotheses of this study. Additional analyses are presented in section 7.5, including 
sign and t-test and suspect companies-year analysis. Finally, the robustness tests section (7.6), 
including the results of the alternative and endogeneity tests and section 7.7, provides a short 
summary of this chapter. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 describes the total observations, mean, standard deviation, 25 percentiles (Q1) and 
75 percentiles (Q3) values and median, for all variables used in this study. The descriptive 
statistics show that QCSRD has an average of 53.3 per cent, which is consistent with previous 
results reported by Martinez et al. (2015). For the dependent variables, the mean value of AEM, 
measured by the modified Jones model, is 4.5 per cent; this is consistent with the average 
reported by Rao & Dandale (2008), Sarkar (2008) and Rudra & Bhattacharjee (2012) in India 
and Zeghal (2012) in 15 European countries. With reference to REM, table 7.1 also shows the 
mean value of REM is 0.1 per cent, which is consistent with the findings found by prior studies 
(e.g. Ferentinou, 2014; Kuo et al., 2014). Table 7.1 also shows that the mean values for the 
three individual proxies of REM (ACFO, APROD and ADISX) are 0.23 per cent, 0.27 per cent 
and 0.29 per cent respectively. These results are consistent with the findings of Ferentinou 
(2016), who found that the mean values of AB_CFO, AB_PROD and AB_DISX are 0.5 per 
cent, 0.2 per cent and 0.3 per cent respectively. 
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Table 7.1 also reports descriptive statistics for various firm-specific variables and shows that 
the mean company log total assets (companiy size) is 7.48. The mean value of ROA is around 
11 per cent  and the mean values of financial leverage and growth are 64 per cent and 25.5 per 
cent respectively. Regarding corporate governance variables, table 7.1 shows that the mean 
value for BEF is 36.7 per cent, which indicates that 36.7 per cent of Indian companies have 
efficient boards. It can be also seen that the mean for ACEF is 62.1 per cent, which indicates 
that 62.1 per cent of Indian companies have efficient audit committees. On average, 28 per cent 
of the study sample are audited by the Big4 international accounting firms and the mean values 
of institutional ownership is 26.4 per cent. Finally, blockholders ownership have a mean value 
of 28.9 per cent. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Sd p25 p50 p75 
QCSRD .533 .104 .359 .508 .62 
AEM 
 
 
 
.045 .106 .007 .021 .049 
REM -.001 .128 -.037 .002 .048 
ACFO -.002 .107 -.037 -.002 .029 
APROD -.002 .102 -.032 -.001 .025 
ADISX -.002 .113 -.043 -.003 .034 
ROA .112 .124 .041 .090 .15 
SIZE 7.48 .663 7.00 7.39 7.8 
GROWTH .255 .325 .088 .189 .32 
LEV .546 .224 .392 .583 .71 
BEF .367 .482 0          0        1 
ACEF  .621 .485 0 1 1  
Block .289 .161 .18 .28 .4 
INSOW .264 .155 .15 .24 .35 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through employing 
modified Jones model. REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury 
model (2006). ACFO= Abnormal cash flows from operations. APROD= Abnormal production cost; ADISX= Abnormal discretionary 
expenses. CSRD= Corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional proxy index. Big4 = 
the highest 4 repetition of audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total 
assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through 
the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership 
measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion 
of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more 
explanation in chapter four. * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
156 
 
 
7.3 Multicollinearity 
Both the correlation matrix and VIF method are used to examine whether there is a high 
correlation between the independent variables. Table 7.2 panel A and panel B report the 
correlation coefficients between independent variables (QCSRD and other control variables). 
The results show that the highest correlation coefficient is between Block and INSOW, which 
is 36 per cent. Thus, the correlation coefficients of all other study variables are less than 
conventional thresholds. Table 7.3 panel A and panel B also report that the highest value of  
VIF test is very low (1.19). The average value is 1.06, which confirms that there is no 
multicollinearity problem between the study independent variables7. 
Table 7.2: Correlation Matrix Analysis. 
Penal A Correlation Matrix Analysis. 
 CSRD AEM Big4 Type ROA Size Growth Lev Block INSOW BEF ACEF 
QCSRD 1.000            
AEM -.092*** 1.000           
Big4 .037 -.066*** 1.000          
Type .0814*** .0182 -.141*** 1.000         
ROA .0182 -.0487** .0256 .045* 1.000        
SIZE .101***  -.0480** -0.61*** -.074*** -.113*** 1.000       
GROWTH .048** -.052** -0.002 -.035 .0127 .0091 1.000      
Lev .005 -.0114 -.070*** .006 .071*** 0.059*** -.0117 1.000     
Block .071*** -.007 .006 .017 .004 .120*** .0135 -0321 1.000    
INSOW .0017 -.0359 .0248 -.117*** -.025 -.060*** .0076 -0.0225 .360*** 1.000   
BEF .022 -.121*** -.018 -.042* .045** -.078*** -.032*** -.0089 .0320 -0.0185 1.000  
ACEF -.017 -.066*** -.014 .001 -.0106 .0183 -.0108 -0.006 .042* -.087*** .098*** 1.000 
Table 7.2 penal A reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables. CSRD = Corporate social 
responsibility disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional proxy index AEM= Discretionary accruals 
measured through employing modified Jones model as a mean proxy of accruals-based EM.  Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee 
firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the 
natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured through 
long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 
0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in 
chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four.   * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 
0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
                                                          
7 Grewal et al. (2004) argue that a multicollinearity problem above 80%  might harm the findings of the regression 
analysis. It is also argued that multicollinearity problem exist among independent variables when the average 
value of VIF is more than 10 (Gujarati, 2003).  
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Table 7.2: penal B correlation matrix. 
Penal B: Correlation Matrix Analysis. 
 CSRD REM Big4 Type ROA Size Growth Lev Block INSOW BEF ACEF 
CSRD 1.000            
REM -.014** 1.000    
Big4 .037 -.015*** 1.000          
Type .0814*** .009 -.141*** 1.000         
ROA .0182 -.092*** .0256 .045* 1.000        
SIZE .101***  .0086 -0.61*** -.074*** -.113*** 1.000       
GROWTH .048** -.0169 -0.002 -.035 .0127 .0091 1.000      
Lev .005 -.005 -.070*** .006 .071*** 0.059*** -.0117 1.000     
Block .071*** -.036* .006 .017 .004 .120*** .0135 -0321 1.000    
INSOW .0017 -.070*** .0248 -.117*** -.025 -.060*** .0076 -0.0225 .360*** 1.000   
BEF .022 .020 -.018 -.042* .045** -.078*** -.032*** -.0089 .0320 -0.0185 1.000  
ACEF -.017 .051** -.014 .001 -.0106 .0183 -.0108 -0.006 .042* -.087*** .098*** 1.000 
Table 7.3 panel B reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables. CSRD = Corporate social 
responsibility disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional proxy index REM=combined proxy of real 
activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006). Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee 
firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the 
natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured through 
long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 
0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in 
chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four.   * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 
0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
Table 7.3: panel A VIF Test Results. 
    Variable   . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        VIF        1/VIF   
         REM        1.02     0.983153 
       INSOW        1.19     0.840585 
       Block        1.18     0.848582 
        Size        1.05     0.952331 
        Type     . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       1.05     0.953708 
         ROA        1.04     0.965053 
        Big4        1.03     0.968839 
        ACEF        1.03     0.975022 
         BEF        1.02     0.976395 
         Lev        1.02     0.981911 
      Growth        1.00     0.996647 
    Mean VIF     . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       1.06   . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Table 6.5 reports results of multicollinearity problem analysis  between the independent variables. CSRD = Corporate social responsibility 
disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional proxy index REM=combined proxy of real activities earnings management 
measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006). Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, 
measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of 
company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-term 
debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. 
INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in 
chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four.   * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at 
the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 7.3: panel B VIF Test' Results 
    Variable     . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        VIF        1/VIF   
         AEM        1.03     0.983153 
       INSOW        1.19     0.840585 
       Block        1.18     0.848582 
        Size        1.05     0.952331 
        Type        1.05     0.953708 
         ROA        1.03    0.965053 
        Big4        1.04     0.968839 
        ACEF        1.03     0.975022 
         BEF        1.04     0.976395 
         Lev        1.02     0.981911 
      Growth        1.01    0.996647 
    Mean VIF        1.06      . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 6.5 reports results of multicollinearity problem analysis between the independent variables. CSRD = Corporate social responsibility 
disclosure score measured through employing multidimensional proxy index AEM= Discretionary accruals measured through employing 
modified Jones model as a mean proxy of accruals-based EM. Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, 
measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of 
company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-term 
debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. 
INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in 
chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four.   * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at 
the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
7.4 Regression Analysis Results 
This chapter examines whether companies with higher QCSRD behave in a different way when 
making accounting and operating decisions by disclosing more transparent financial statements 
to shareholders and other stakeholders, during the period from 2007 to 2015. Table 4 shows 
findings on the relationship between QCSRD (the independent variable), and EM (the 
dependent variable). The company characteristics (size, industry type, profitability, growth and 
leverage) and corporate governance mechanisms (Big4, board effectiveness, audit committee 
effectiveness, institutional and blockholder ownership) were included in the regression model 
as control variables.  
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In order to identify the more appropriate models, this study uses the same steps as were used 
in Chapter five to examine the relationship between QCSRD and EM. To test whether the more 
suitable model is panel or pooled, the Chow test is conducted for all regressions used to 
examine the relationship between QCSRD and EM. Twumasi et al. (2015) indicate that if the 
F-value of the Chow test is less than 0.05,  the preferred model is the panel regression. Since 
the finding of the Chow test reveal that the F-value was significant  at the 0.01 level for all 
models, the panel data model is more appropriate (see appendix 3). Panel data could be 
categorised by random effect or fixed effect. In order to determine the fixed effect or random 
effect, the Hausman test is conducted for all the regression models. Since the result of  Hausman 
test for all regression models used in this chapter were very significant at the 0.01 level (see 
appendix 4),  the fixed effect method is more suitable in examining the relationship between 
QCSRD and EM in all main regressions.  
Table 7.4 shows the results  of fixed-effects regression. The outcomes are reported in five 
columns. In column 1, the regression estimates of AEM, measured by using the modified Jones 
(2005) model, are reported. Column 2 reports the  regression findings of the combined proxy 
(REM),  measured by using the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Columns  3, 4 and 5 show the 
regression outcomes of individual proxies of REM (DISX, CFO and PROD). Table 7.4 
indicates that the the values of overall R2  for the five regression models (AEM, REM, DISX, 
CFO and PROD) are 41.50 per cent, 27.84 per cent, 32.93 per cent, 33.99 per cent and 36.72 
per cent, respectively. These figures show that the combination of the independent variables 
are explained at 41.50 per cent, 27.84 per cent, 32.93 per cent, 33.99 per cent and 36.72 per 
cent of the variation in the dependent variable in all models, respectively. These results are in 
line with previous studies (e.g. Prior et al., 2007; Kao et al., 2014). P-Values in the above five 
regressions are highly significant (0.001), suggesting that these models have a good 
explanatory power for the all models used in the main analysis.  
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Table 7.4 reports the results for the multivariate analysis of the study models using the fixed 
effect of panel regression. In support of the first hypothesis, the results indicate that releasing 
QCSRD is significantly and negatively associated with AEM at a level of 0.01. This finding is 
expected and supports the first hypothesis which proposed that the quality of CSR disclosure 
is negatively related to AEM. Thus, the H1 of this study is accepted. This is also consistent 
with a number of prior studies (e.g. Rezaee and Tuo, 2017; Wang et al., 2015; Yip et al., 2011) 
which find AEM to be negatively related to CSR reporting, suggesting that companies with  
higher CSR disclosure quality report less discretionary accruals compared to those companies 
with a lower quality of CSR disclosure. For the regressions of RAM, ACFO and APROD, the 
estimated coefficient for the QCSRD score is negative and significant at 0.05, 0.10 and 0.10 
level respectively. These findings are also expected and support the second hypothesis, which 
proposed that the QCSRD is negatively related to REM. Thus, the H2 of this study is also 
accepted. These results are in line with results reported by Kim et al. (2012) and Bozzolan et 
al., (2015) who found that REM is negatively associated with CSR. Although there is no 
significant impact of QCSRD on ADISX, the relationship between them is still negative. Taken 
together, this evidence supports the contention that companies, which are considered as high 
QCSRD, are more likely to prepare reliable and transparent financial reporting. This is also 
consistent with the moral perspective, which assumes that companies, which are socially 
responsible and disclose quality information of their CSR, are less likely to manipulate earnings 
(Yip et al., 2011). According to this perspective, firms with a strong commitment to CSR, and 
which report high QCSRD, are more prone to act in a responsible way when reporting their 
financial statements (Choi et al., 2013). The study findings are also in line with signalling and 
agency theories, suggesting that companies, by providing QCSRD, may mitigate information 
asymmetry and the problem of conflicting interests (Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Miller 2002). 
Given that managers are more likely to engage in EM when there is high information 
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asymmetry, CSR reporting is also assumed by signalling theory as a means for mitigating the 
information asymmetry between management personnel and stakeholders. In the same vein, 
Laksmana and Yang, 2009 and Chih et al., (2008) argue that when the transparency of 
information is increased, the expectation of the information asymmetry between the 
management and stakeholders will be reduced. Thus, EM would be reduced. Agency theory 
also suggests that the problem of conflicting interests increases when both the managers and 
shareholders attempt to maximise their wealth. The key factor that leads to this problem of 
conflicting interests is asymmetry information. According to the agency perspective, a 
company is more likely to use several methods, such as a CSR disclosure, to mitigate the 
agency problem between agents and shareholders (Li et al., 2008). Prior research indicates that 
CSR disclosure can reduce opportunistic action since it reduces the asymmetry information. 
Consequently, CSR disclosure is significantly and negatively related to EM practices (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Sun et al. 2010) which is consistent with the main 
results of this study. 
In summary, the above main results support the H1 and H2 which propose that the QCSRD is 
negatively related to both REM and AEM. This confirms that the ninth and tenth hypotheses 
of this study are accepted. 
In regards to control variables, the study’s overall findings suggest that less profitable firms 
(ROA) and company sizes are significantly and negatively related to both AEM and REM. 
These results are consistent with previous studies (Scholtens & Kang, 2013; Kim et al., 2012). 
While growth is insignificantly and positively associated with AEM, it is significantly and 
negatively related to REM. These results are consistent with previous findings by Ipino & 
Parbonetti (2017). International Big 4 auditors are negatively associated with AEM and 
positively related to REM, which is consistent with previous results reported by Zang (2011). 
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These results indicate that large audit firms in India can mitigate the accounting flexibility 
effectively and constrain AEM. Table 7.4 shows that audit committee effectiveness is 
significantly and negatively related to AEM at the 0.05 level, which suggests that companies 
with less effective audit committees have more flexibility to engage in AEM. However, it is 
insignificantly and positively related to REM. Although INSOW is negatively and significantly 
related to REM at a level of 0.05, it is positively and significantly related to AEM. These results 
suggest that a higher ratio of institutional ownership is likely to mitigate REM, therefore 
managers may use AEM activities as a substitution strategy, which is consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017; Ho, L. et al., 2015; Ferentinou et al., 2016). Finally, 
blockholder ownership is negatively related to REM at a level of 0.05. 
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Table 7.4: Results of panel regression of QCSRD on EM 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
         AEM (1)   REM (2)   DISX (3)   CFO (4)   PROD  (5)  
 Coef t Coef   t Coef t Coef t    Coef          t 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CSRD -.055*** -2.77    -.078*** -2.42 -.039 -1.59 -.046*     -1.93 -.052** -2.35 
REM/AEM -.191*** -12.21      -.425***  -11.99 -.398*** -13.38 -.358*** -12.79   -.385*** -14.82 
Big4 -1.65*** -21.08      .133***  10.68 .132*** 12.60 .134* 13.82    .127** 13.42 
ROA -.091*** -5.00      -.090*** -3.43 .004 0.22 -.001 -0.02 -.013 -0.65 
size -.026** -4.46 -.003 -0.16 -.020** -2.61 -.018** -2.53 -.017** -2.61 
Growth     .006 1.35       -.001*** -0.27 -.003 -0.59 .003 0.48 -.001 -0.12 
type     .004 0.41 .010 0.88 -.007 -0.41 -.006 -0.52 -.005 -0.43 
Lev    -.014* -1.40         .006 0.29 .004 0.44 .003 0.30 .002 0.19 
BEF    -.010** -2.43  .008 1.70 -.003 -0.57    -.011 -0.201 -.011 -2.28 
ACEF -.011*** -2.67        .009 1.59 .001 0.20   .003 0.70 .003 0.79 
Block     .018 0.78  -.033 -2.09 -.051* -1.87  -.033 -1.17 -.019 -0.73 
INSOW    .067*** 2.64  -.041**       -2.37 -.109** -3.49       -.122*** -4.02 -.125*** -4.41 
    R2 0,4018 0.2744 0.3300 0.3413 0.3687 
P-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 7.4 reports the findings of the primary analysis examining the relationship between CSRD and EM. AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through employing modified 
Jones model. REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006). ACFO= Abnormal cash flows from 
operations. APROD= Abnormal production cost; ADISX= Abnormal discretionary expenses. QCSRD= Corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured through employing 
multidimensional proxy index. Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. 
FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured 
through long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional 
ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more explanation 
in chapter four. * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.  
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7.5 Additional Analyses 
 
This section conducted a series of tests as additional analyses to support the main results and 
confirm that their evidence represents the relationship between EM and QCSRD. The current 
section starts by using Sign-test and t-test to examine whether EM differs between the high 
QCSRD and low QCSRD companies. The study identifies high quality CSR disclosure 
companies as company-years which fall in the fourth quartile of all samples, whereas low 
quality CSR disclosure companies are identified as company-years which fall in the first 
quartile of all samples. Sign-test and t-test are used in order to obtain more confidence that the 
above main results do represent the relationship between QCSRD and EM. Table 7.5 indicates 
that the mean and median values of AEM (mean = 0.039, median = 0.0165) and REM (mean 
= 0.0007, median = 0.0001) in high QCSRD companies are significantly less than the mean 
and median values of AEM (mean = 0.057, median = 0.0217) and REM (mean = 0.0119, 
median = 0.0184) in low QCSRD companies. Using t-test and sign-test, the mean and median 
differences in AEM and REM between the two groups are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level, indicating that QCSRD firms are less likely to use discretionary accruals and real activity 
to manage earnings, which is also consistent with previous literature (Laksmana and Yang, 
2009; Yip et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012).  
Table 7.5: The differences in EM between CSR and non-CSR companies Results of sign and t-test  
 CSR firms   non-CSR firms                     Difference between 
CSR and non-CSR firms 
 
variables          median               Mean               median                Mean                median               Mean           
 
AEM 0.0165 0.039 0.0217 0.057 -0.052* -0.017*** 
REM 0.0001  .0007 0.0184 .0119 0.0183** 0.0112* 
Notes: the mean values in table 7.5 are estimated by using t-test in order to examine the difference in the mean values and median 
values are estimated by using sign-test to examine the difference in the median values between CSR and non-CSR companies. AEM = 
Discretionary accruals measured through employing modified Jones model. REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings 
management measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006). ***, **, * = The mean and median value are statistically 
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level, respectively.     . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Furthermore, the current study also runs an additional analysis to increase the power of the 
main test and obtain more confidence that the above results do represent the trend in EM 
practice. This study performs a cross-sectional analysis using a sub-sample of firms that are 
likely to have strong incentives to manage earnings. The present research argues that, if 
QCSRD plays a prominent role in determining financial reporting quality and limiting 
management’s opportunistic EM, then a decrease in the EM level should be observed even for 
firms with strong earnings management incentives. The current study constructs a range of 
firm-years sub-samples (four sub-samples) with strong firm-level incentives for earnings 
management. Firstly, it has suggested that meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts is a significant 
benchmark for management; they are likely to manipulate earnings to achieve this benchmark 
(Cohen et al., 2008). Consistent with prior research (Cohen et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012; Zang, 
2011; Ho et al., 2015), this study defines the small analysts’ forecast error (SEAF) as the 
difference between actual earnings per share less the consensus forecast of earnings per share. 
The research focuses on firm-year observations in which the analysts’ forecast error is one cent 
per share or less (Kim et al., 2012). Secondly, the present study creates a sub-sample of firm-
years observations with small positive earnings (SPE) defined as firm-years that report net 
income from operation scaled by lagged total assets higher than or equal to zero but less than 
0.005. Prior research provides evidence that these firms are likely to manipulate their earnings 
to report income marginally above zero (Doukakis, 2014). Thirdly, the current study identifies 
firm-years with changes in net income before extraordinary items (SEC) scaled by total assets 
which lie in the interval (0, 0.005);  it is likely that these firms, during these years, managed 
their earnings in order to meet prior years’ earnings numbers (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et 
al., 2008). Finally, this study focuses on high-debt firms (HDF), defined as firm-years that fall 
above the median value of financial leverage of the sample. This definition is consistent with 
evidence in prior research that highly leveraged firms have strong incentives to engage in both 
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real and accruals-based earnings management (Doukakis, 2014). Previous literature argues that 
the ethical perspective plays a fundamental role in determining financial reporting quality and 
mitigating earnings management practices (e.g. Sun et al., 2010; Yip et al., 2011; Wang et al., 
2015; Belgacem & Omri, 2015). Thus, this study examines whether EM, to meet these 
incentives, differs between companies with high QCSRD and companies with low QCSRD 
among these suspect sub-samples.  Based on the ethical perspective, the current research 
expects that the negative relationship between QCSRD and EM should also be observed on 
companies with strong EM incentives.   
Table 7.6 presents the empirical findings for the suspect company-years analysis. The results 
of the four benchmarks, SEAF, SPE, SPEC and HDF, indicate that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between AEM and QCSRD at the 0.05, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. These results suggest that companies with high QCSRD (with strong EM 
incentives), are less likely to engage in AEM as compared to companies with low QCSRD and 
vice versa. Similarly, QCSRD is negatively and significantly associated to REM in those four 
strong incentives subsamples at 0.01, 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Although the 
suspect companies are assumed to have high potential incentives to manage earnings, generally 
these results indicate that high QCSRD companies are more likely to make less opportunistic 
decisions in their ﬁnancial statements. These results provide more evidence and enhance the 
main results of this study, which is consistent with the ethical respective and signalling theory. 
In respect to the other control variables, the estimates reported in table 7.6 generally support 
the main findings in table 7.4; although some of the control variables show different 
coefficients, they are still in the same directions. 
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Table 7.6: Analysis of suspect firms  
. . . .  
 SPE  SEC  SEAF  HDF  
           AEM(1) REM(2)           AEM(3) REM(4)              AEM(5)   REM(6)       AEM(7) REM(8)  
 Coef   t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef  t Coef t 
CSRD -.396** -3.82 -.118*** -2.16 -.126** -2.03 -.320* -1.84 
-.170*** 0.000 -.099** 
-2.03 
-.178*** 
-3.69 -.221*** -3.85 
REM/AEM -.25*** -2.86 -.96*** -2.86 .127*** 3.74 .990*** 3.74 -.177** 0.013 -.259** -2.53 -.341*** -13.63 -.482*** -13.63 
Big4 -.022 -1.96 -.088* -0.92 -.002 -0.26 .022 1.03 .005 0.655 -.009 -0.68 -.015* -2.25 -.006 -0.74 
ROA .817 0.66 .747 1.21 .033 0.72 -.339*** -2.68 -.018 -0.51 -.021 -0.49 -.033 -1.32 -.106*** -3.55 
Size .029 0.88 .037 1.40 -.008* 1.95 -.007 -0.58 .001 0.945 -.002 -0.22 .003 0.74 .008 1.47 
Growth -.052** -0.38 -.018 -2.29 -.005 -0.58 .015 0.52 .006 0.660 .009 0.51 .010 1.15 .006 0.59 
Type .003 0.80 .007 0.80 .002* 1.82 -.007 -1.56 .001 0.626 .001 0.61 .001 1.48 .002* 1.78 
Lev -.051 0.81 .084 -0.95 .015 0.99 -.024 -0.55 .022 0.300 .012 0.49 .037 1.06 -.071* -1.68 
BEF .013 -0.68 -.033 0.54 -.002 -0.25 .058** 2.12 -.017* 0.092 .008 0.71 -.021** -2.76 .032*** 3.54 
ACEF -.005 0.75 .036 -0.21 -.015** 1.94 -.017 -0.78 -.027** 0.014 .021* 1.57 -.018** -2.98 .017** 2.37 
Block -.128* -2.76 -.350** -1.83 .008 0.39 .016 0.26 .022 0.513 .053 1.30 -.022 -1.14 .035 1.49 
INSOW .090 -0.24 -.033 1.29 -.022 -0.75 -.104 -1.26 -.038 0.343 -.183*** -3.97 .040** 2.01 -.056** -2.34 
R2 0.6786 0.5553 0.2990 0.2972 0.3191 0.3163     0.2423 0.2456 
P-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Table 7.6 reports the findings of the Suspect firms’ analysis to examine the relationship between CSRD and EM. AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through employing 
modified Jones model. REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006). ACFO= Abnormal cash flows from 
operations. APROD= Abnormal production cost; ADISX= Abnormal discretionary expenses. QCSRD= Corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured through employing 
multidimensional proxy index. Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations divided by total assets. 
FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured 
through long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional 
ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, more explanation 
in chapter four. * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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7.6 Robustness Check 
 The current study conducts a series of tests to check the robustness of our results. Firstly, prior 
research suggests that both CSR disclosure and EM are affected by managerial decisions and 
may result in endogeneity problems (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Wang et al., 2016). This would 
require this study to use QCSRD as an endogenous variable. The findings presented in table 
7.4 have to be controlled by endogeneity analysis. Previous literature has pointed out several 
methods to control the endogeneity problem. The common method used in prior studies is the 
instrumental variables (IV) (e.g. Bound et al., 1995; Choi et al. 2013). The main analysis 
reported in table 7.4 is repeated by employing the two-stage least squares method, with lagged 
QCSRD as instrument for QCSRD. Table 7.7 reports a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the lagged QCSRD and the interaction variable (AEM) (Coef = -0.09; p 
< 0.001; y), which is in line with the main results of panel regression in table 7.4. Table 7.7 
also indicates that REM, PROD, DISX and CFO are negatively and significantly related to the 
lagged value of QCSRD (Coef = -0.06; p < 0.05; Coef = -0.043; p < 0.05; Coef = -0.048; p < 
0.05 and Coef = -0.041; p < 0.10 respectively) suggesting that companies with higher QCSRD 
tend to report less EM. Secondly, an alternative measurement of the dependent variables AEM 
and REM are used to check for more robustness of the study results. An alternative measure of 
discretionary accruals is used to test whether the primary findings are robust to various 
measures or not. The main empirical analyses of AEM were repeated by estimating DA 
according to the modified Jones model, adjusted again for operating performance using Kothari 
et al.’s (2005) model.  Moreover, an alternative measure of REM is used to provide reasonable 
assurance for whether the primary findings are robust to various measures or not. Although 
previous literature (Zang, 2011; Zhao et al., 2012) combines the individual proxies for REM 
(i.e. ACFO, APROD and ADISX) to compute the measure of REM, Doukakis (2014) argues 
that excluding the abnormal DISX variable has the advantage of making clear the net impact 
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on abnormal cash flows from operations. Thus, this research estimated REM through 
combining only the other two individual proxies, abnormal CFO and abnormal PROD. Table 
7.8 shows the results of fixed-effects regression in column 1, measured by using Kothari et 
al.’s (2005) model. The findings indicate that the QCSRD is negatively and significantly 
associated to AEM at the 0.05 level. These results are consistent with the above main findings 
in Table 7.4, column 1, suggesting that companies with higher QCSRD behave ethically and 
report less AEM compared to those companies with a lower QCSRD. Table 7.8 also shows the 
results  of fixed-effects regression in column 2, measured by using the Doukakis (2014) model. 
The results report a negative and statistically significant relationship between the QCSRD and 
the alternative proxy of REM at the 0.05 level. Overall, the results of these robustness tests 
show that the same main results in table 7.4 are unchanged. 
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Table 7.7: Instrumental variables two-stage (IV 2SLS) model 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  AEM 
(1) 
  REM 
(2) 
  CFO 
 (3) 
  DISX 
(4) 
  PROD 
(5) 
 
 Coef t Coef T Coef t Coef t Coef t 
Lag CSRDD -.094*** -3.71 -.063** -2.22 -.039* -1.53 -.046** -1.72 -.042** -1.71 
Big4 -.016*** -3.07 -.010* -1.76 .006 1.21 .008 1.41 .005 1.11 
ROA -.042** -2.17 -.116*** -5.29 .043** 2.20 .059*** 2.81 .026 1.42 
Size -.006* -1.73 -.002 -0.69 .007* 1.92 .008** 2.25 .007** 2.15 
Growth .014** 1.99 .001 0.12 .002 0.39 -.003 -0.38 .001 0.11 
Leverage -.003 -0.34 -.001 -0.14 .003 0.30 -.002 -0.24 .002 0.27 
BEF -.018*** -2.86 .001 0.27 -.001 -0.06       .001 0.02 -.001 -0.19 
ACEF -.014*** -2.87 .005 0.92 .003 0.77 .003 0.70 .004 0.94 
Block .017 0.97 -.032* -1.61 .035* 1.90 .033* 1.73 .027* 1.57 
INSOW .023 1.27 -.067*** -3.29 .001 0.09 -.010 -0.54 -.001 -0.04 
PROM .019 1.03 -.063*** -2.96 .043** 2.23 .059*** 2.88 .037** 2.04 
R2 0.4944 0.4990 .5029 0.4939 0.4998 
P-value 0.043 0.005 0.025  0.015 0.029 
Table 7.7 reports the findings of the endogeneity analysis to examine the relationship between CSRD and EM. AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through employing modified 
Jones model. REM = combined proxy of real activities earnings management measured through employing Roychowdhury model (2006) . ACFO= Abnormal cash flows from 
operations. APROD= Abnormal production cost; ADISX= Abnormal discretionary expenses. Lag QCSRD= Corporate social responsibility disclosure score in previous year measured 
through employing multidimensional proxy index. Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income from operations 
divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= 
leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. 
INSOW = institutional ownership measured through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF= audit committee 
effectiveness, more explanation in chapter four. * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 7.8: Results of panel regression of Alternative test 
     Kothari model      
           AEM  
  Doukakis Model 
REM2 
  
        Coef    Z     Coef  z    
QD  -.036** -1.91 -.110** -2.29 
AEM/REM  -.191*** -12.70 -.745*** -13.67 
Big4  -.164*** -21.86   .269*** 13.64 
ROA -.090*** -5.14 -.018 -0.46 
Size -.0283*** -4.97 -.0368*** -2.66 
Growth .006 1.42 .006 0.56 
type  .007 0.46 -.019 -0.49 
Lev  -.007 -0.77 .001 0.04 
BEF -.006 -1.18 -.012 -1.02 
ACEF -.007* -1.79 .007 0.73 
Block  .036 1.50 -.050 -0.87 
INSOW  .060** 2.40 -.245*** -4.01 
PROM  .046* 1.65 .003 0.06 
R2             0.4148                0.3555   . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
P-value             0.01                0.01    . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 7.8 reports the findings of the alternative analysis examining the relationship between QCSRD and EM. REM = combined proxy of real 
activities earnings management measured through employing Doukakis model (2014). AEM = Discretionary accruals measured through 
employing Kothari model as a mean proxy of AEM.. QCSRD= Corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured through employing 
multidimensional proxy index. Big4 = the highest 4 repetition of audit committee firms. ROA= profitability, measured through net income 
from operations divided by total assets. FSIZE= company size measured through the natural log of company’s total assets. GROWTH= 
Growth ratio measured through the change of sale. LEV= leverage ratio measured through long-term debt scaled by total assets. BLOCK= 
block holder ownership measured through the proportion of ownership more than or equal 0.05. INSOW = institutional ownership measured 
through proportion of shares held by institutions, BEF = board effectiveness explained in chapter four. ACEF= audit committee effectiveness, 
more explanation in chapter four. * Signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level, ** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level, *** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
7.7 Conclusion  
To achieve the main aim of this study, this chapter examines the effect of QCSRD on EM using 
a sample of the top 500 Indian listed companies. Following Cohen et al., (2008) and Kim et al., 
(2012), this study classifies EM into AEM and REM. It also combines different dimensions to 
measure the QCSRD: the quantity of the information disclosed (how much is disclosed), the 
spread of the information disclosed (coverage and dispersion), and the usefulness of the 
information disclosed (characteristics of information).  OLS regression is performed in this 
chapter and finds that QCSRD practices are associated with EM. Additional analysis on t-test 
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and sign-test provide more confidence that the main results do represent the relationship 
between QCSRD and EM. Moreover, a range of suspect firm-years observations with relatively 
strong earnings management incentives confirms the significant impact on AEM and REM and 
points to the important role that firm-level incentives play in shaping EM practice. In line with 
the ethical perspective, agency theory and signalling theory, these findings support the premise 
that firms which reveal QCSRD are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings management 
through discretionary accruals and/or real activities manipulation. Consistent with a number of 
prior studies (such as Yip et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2015) this study interprets the evidence that 
QCSRD practices are substantive, rather than symbolic. This study provides insights for 
practitioners, policy makers and academics. Firstly, practitioners may understand the function 
and importance of the QCSRD roles in constraining both AEM and REM and improving 
financial reporting quality. Managers may refer to this result when they purpose to persuade 
investors and perform CSR activities to reduce EM and increase investors’ wealth. Secondly, 
our study has policy implications for standard setters and regulators to continue improving the 
guidance and framework to assist firms to provide high-quality CSR reports. Finally, to the 
academics, the empirical evidence on the effect of QCSRD on REM may present a stepping-
stone for future research so that future studies can consider the role of voluntary disclosure in 
reducing REM to protect investors. 
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Chapter Eight: Summary and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
The current chapter provides a summary and conclusions of the present thesis, which begins 
by clarifying its overview in section 8.2. Section 8.3 discusses the summary of study results, 
and s ection 8.4 discusses the study implications. The limitations of this study are explained 
in section 8.5, and section 8.6 shows the suggestions for future research. 
8.2 Overview 
This thesis purposes to achieve three objectives: 1) To measure EM practices among the top 
500 Indian listed companies; 2) To measure QCSRD among the top 500 Indian listed 
companies; and 3) the main aim of this study is to examine the relationship between EM and 
QCSRD. In this respect, prior studies have attempted to investigate whether EM and CSR 
disclosure are related (e.g. Chih et al., 2008; Laksmana and Yang, 2009; Grougiou et al., 2014; 
Muttakin & Azim, 2015). Their findings substantiated an association between CSR and EM. 
Empirical results, however, remain inconclusive as to whether CSR  has a negative or positive 
effect on EM and vice versa (for example, Sun et al, 2010; Yip et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2015; 
Muttakin & Azim, 2015; Belgacem & Omri 2015; Rezaee et al., 2017). Prior literature has 
provided two different approaches with respect to the link between QCSRD and EM. 
According to the opportunistic perspective, Sun et al. (2010) argued that, when agency conflicts 
exist, managers manipulate earnings opportunistically in their favour. Companies with poor 
quality financial reporting are more likely to use CSR disclosure to mask their opportunistic 
behaviour (Martínez-Ferrero, et al, 2015). Based on this perspective, prior studies found a 
positive relationship between CSR disclosure and EM (for example, Muttakin & Azim, 2015; 
Belgacem & Omri 2015; Khan & Azim, 2015). On the other hand, the moral perspective 
assumes that companies which are socially responsible and disclose quality information of their 
CSR are less likely to manipulate earnings (Yip et al., 2011). According to this perspective, 
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previous studies found that CSR disclosure is negatively related to EM (for example, Wang et 
al., 2015; Rezaee et al., 2017). 
 The above two theoretical perspectives pose an important research question. A closer look at 
the arguments behind these two perspectives, however, reveals that they can be reconciled if 
one can evaluate the informational content (i.e. quality) of CSR. Chih et al., (2008) suggest that 
managers are less likely to engage in EM in companies that provide high quality disclosure of 
their social activities which targets all stakeholders because, when the transparency of 
information is increased, the expectation of the information asymmetry among the management 
and stakeholders will be reduced. Since the reduction in information asymmetry tends to 
constrain EM (Wang et al, 2015), this study expects a negative association between QCSRD 
and EM. 
8.3 The Summary of Study Results 
To achieve the purpose of this study, the empirical research objectives were addressed in 
chapters five, six, and seven. The next sections present the key results of these three empirical 
chapters. 
8.3.1 Earnings Management Practices in Indian Listed Companies 
To achieve the first aim of this study, Chapter five provides results related to the level of AEM 
and REM practices. The findings in Chapter five indicate that, in general, there are differences 
in the tendencies of REM and AEM. For instance, while AEM shows an overall decrease during 
the period of study, REM increases in the same period. The results also indicate that there is a 
significant and negative relationship between AEM and REM. This result supports the 
predictions based on prior research, indicating that managers can use a mixture of EM methods 
(i.e. AEM and REM) to meet their target (e.g. Zang, 2012; Sellami, 2016). These results also 
suggest that the mangers’ decision to engage in any EM strategy will be influenced by how 
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constrained and costly this strategy is. Managers will face different levels of constraints for 
each strategy, which will influence their decision. When the constraints of using one EM 
method are high, managers are more likely to substitute the less costly alternative to manipulate 
earnings. Thus the relative degree of AEM vis-a-vis REM relies on the relative costs of each 
strategy (see. e.g. Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2012; Cohen et al., 2008). The results show that 
all of the costs associated with AEM have significant coefficients with the predicted signs. In 
fact, the study results suggest that, when firms are constrained by the relative costs associated 
with AEM, they substitute it with REM. The results also show that all of the costs associated 
with REM have significant coefficients with the predicted signs. In fact, the study evidence 
suggests that, when firms are constrained by the relative costs associated with REM, they 
substitute it with AEM. Taken together, the above results suggest a substitute relationship 
between AEM and REM. These results provide evidence that managers change their EM 
strategies from AEM to REM and vice-versa based on relative costs related to the EM strategy, 
which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017; Zang, 2012;  
Abernathy et al.,2014; Ho, L. et al., 2015; Ferentinou et al., 2016). Additional analysis of firms 
with relatively strong EM incentives confirms the trade-off between AEM and REM. The study 
findings are also robust to the alternative measure of earnings management. 
8.3.2 QCSRD in Indian Listed Companies 
To achieve the second objective of this study, chapter six provides results related to the level 
of QCSRD. The findings suggest that Indian companies recently paid more attention to the 
quality of CSR disclosure than before 2010. This could be attributed to the increase of 
investment trends from foreign companies in India after 2010 (Srivastava & Bhutani, 2012), 
which demanded that the financial reporting system should bring harmonisation in the financial 
reports in order to make them internationally acceptable. The results in Chapter six also show 
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that the QCSRD is statistically significant and positively related to the accuracy of financial 
forecasts. These results are consistent with previous results reported by prior studies and 
indicate that accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is more likely to be higher when 
companies publish a higher quality of CSR report (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan 2008; Dhaliwal 
et al., 2012; Becchetti et al., 2013; Casey and Grenier, 2014). They also suggest that the 
identified framework in this study is more likely to help information users to evaluate the 
QCSRD.  The findings  also indicate that SPR and USEF, as dimensions of QCSRD, are 
statistically significant and positively related to the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Although STRQ is insignificantly related to ACCU (column 2), the relationship between them 
is still positive. Taken together, these results also provide evidence that the dimensions of CSR 
disclosure quality framework (STRQ, SPR and USFL) give a more realistic CSR disclosure 
picture. Thus, these dimensions can be utilised complementarily for evaluating the CSR 
disclosure. 
8.3.3 The Relationship between QCSRD and EM 
To achieve the main aim of this study, Chapter seven provides results related to whether 
QCSRD is linked to AEM and REM. In support of the study hypothesis (H1), the results 
indicate that QCSRD is significantly and negatively associated with AEM. This is consistent 
with a number of prior studies which find AEM to be negatively related to CSR reporting (e.g. 
Rezaee and Tuo, 2017; Wang et al., 2015; Yip et al., 2011). The relationship between 
COM_RAM, and ACFO, APROD and QCSRD is negative and significant. Although there is 
no significant impact of QCSRD on ADISX, the relationship between them is still negative. 
Taken together, this evidence supports the second hypothesis in this study (H2) and the 
contention that companies that are socially responsible are more likely to prepare reliable and 
transparent financial reporting. These findings are in line with signalling and agency theories, 
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suggesting that companies, by providing QCSRD, may mitigate information asymmetry and a 
problem of conflicting interests (Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Miller 2002). Agency theory also 
suggests that the problem of conflicting interests increases when both the managers and 
shareholders attempt to maximise their wealth. The key factor that leads to this problem of 
conflicting interests is asymmetry of information. According to the agency perspective, a 
company is more likely to use several methods, such as a CSR disclosure, to mitigate the 
agency problem between agents and shareholders (Li et al., 2008). Prior research indicates that 
CSR disclosure can reduce opportunistic action since it reduces the asymmetry information. 
Consequently, CSR disclosure is significantly and negatively related to EM practices (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Sun et al. 2010). Given that managers are more likely 
to engage in EM when there is high information asymmetry, CSR reporting is also assumed by 
signalling theory as a means for mitigating the information asymmetry between management 
personnel and stakeholders. In the same vein, Laksmana and Yang, 2009 and Chih et al., (2008) 
argue that when the transparency of information is increased, the expectation of the information 
asymmetry between the management and stakeholders will be reduced. Thus, EM would be 
reduced.  
This chapter also examines whether EM differs between the high QCSRD and low QCSRD 
companies. The results indicate that high QCSRD companies are less likely to use discretionary 
accruals and real activity to manage earnings, which is also consistent with the main results. 
Additional analysis of firms with relatively strong EM incentives was carried out to confirm 
the impact of QCSRD on EM. The results of the four benchmarks indicate that there is a 
negative and significant relationship between AEM and QCSRD. The study findings are also 
robust to the alternative measure of EM.  
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The study findings support the premise that firms which reveal QCSRD are less likely to 
engage in aggressive earnings management through discretionary accruals and/or real activities 
manipulation. Consistent with a number of prior studies (e.g. Yip et al., 2011; Wang et al., 
2015) the research interprets the study evidence that QCSRD practices are substantive, rather 
than symbolic. 
8.4 The Study Implications 
This study provides insights for practitioners, policy makers and academics. Firstly, 
practitioners may understand the roles and importance of QCSRD in constraining both AEM 
and REM and improving financial reporting quality. This result may be useful for managers 
when performing CSR activities that reduce EM and increase investors’ wealth and confidence. 
Since QCSRD is publicly noticeable, the results of the current research might have practical 
implications for managers in assessing their accountability and transparency. The results are 
likely to be used by the boards of companies to evaluate the financial reporting quality based 
on QCSRD. By examining the trade-off between AEM and REM, based on their costs and 
constraints, practitioners also may understand the function and importance of corporate 
governance roles in constraining EM and improving financial reporting quality. Managers may 
refer to this result when they purpose to persuade investors of the quality of financial reporting.  
Moreover, the results may offer further empirical evidence that supports the decisions of 
market participants and shareholders in India when assessing the quality and reliability of 
financial reports.  Financial analysts are more likely to use the results of this study to enhance 
their earnings forecast. High quality information improves the ability of investors to evaluate 
future financial performance through considering more accurate earnings forecasts. They may 
also use it to assess how the QCSRD impacts the decisions of the capital market. When the 
capital market perceives the high financial reporting quality of companies with QCSRD, the 
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disclosed financial statement might be received by decision-makers as more reliable 
information for credit assessment and investment decisions in general.  
Secondly, this study has policy implications for standard setters and regulators to continue 
improving the guidance and frameworks to assist firms to provide high-quality financial 
reporting and CSR disclosure. In addition, enhancing the understanding of the impact of 
QCSRD on EM may help regulators and authorities, particularly in India, to improve their 
regulations on QCSRD. It can be also used to support the authorities of stock markets in 
assessing the present QCSRD requirements and how it develops the quality of financial reports.  
Thirdly, besides the above implications, this study provides insights for some theoretical 
implications. For the quality of CSR disclosure matters, the findings of this study support the 
agency and signalling theories which focus on the quality of CSR reporting to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders. Furthermore, while the quality of 
CSR reporting is becoming increasingly important in the business environment, CSR 
disclosure decisions are seemingly driven by more traditional concerns, such as avoiding 
political scrutiny and the costs which may arise from that scrutiny.  
8.5 Limitations of the Study 
This study has made a considerable effort to ensure that it meets its aim and examines the 
research hypotheses. However, the current research suffers from some limitations. Firstly, the 
study sample is limited to the non-financial listed companies. Therefore, the results of the 
current thesis might not be applicable for the financial companies because of the unique 
characteristics of their ﬁnancial statements. Secondly, the perspective of EM suggested in the 
current research is associated with opportunistic behaviour of EM. Nevertheless, managers are 
likely to use EM in providing private disclosure for the stakeholders about future returns to 
maximise the company’s value. Therefore, the study results are restricted to the opportunistic 
  
 
180 
 
 
EM supposition. Thirdly, the data used in the current research was collected from annual 
reports that are available on companies’ websites and from other available databases. Thus, 
any issues which affect QCSRD may have a negative influence on the research results’ 
validity. Fourthly, the data used for the current research is limited to the period 2007 to 2015; 
given that 2008 is considered by scholars as the first year of the global financial crisis, the 
results might be influenced by the effect of the financial crisis. Fifthly, limitations might be 
associated with scoring procedures of the CSR disclosure index. This study followed the 
procedures that were widely used in prior literature. As clarified in Chapter four (see section 
4.5), this study used a scoring process that is considered to be subjective. Nevertheless, effort 
is made by the current study to minimise subjectivity which may affect the results. Sixthly, 
the models which are used to examine the study hypotheses are likely to suffer from the 
omission of particular variables, leading to a factor bias related to both EM and QCSRD. 
Nevertheless, this study has taken several steps to reduce the occurrence probability of this 
issue, including tests for the fixed or random effects models, controlling endogeneity 
problems and using alternative measurements and robustness tests. 
8.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
As an avenue for future research, the study analysis could be extended by examining whether 
agency/contracting costs, which are related to compensation and debt contracts, impact ethical 
considerations in financial reporting decisions. The empirical evidence on the effect of QCSRD 
on REM may present a stepping-stone for future research to: consider: i)  the role of voluntary 
disclosure, in general, and ii) CSR disclosure, in particular, in order to reduce AEM and REM 
to protect investors. Furthermore, the importance of disclosure quality for different 
stakeholders raises an issue related to the definition of disclosure quality, since different users 
have different perspectives of disclosure quality. Thus, the quality of disclosure needs to be 
taken into account by further studies. The findings of the current research are based on the 
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opportunistic behaviour of EM perspective rather than the informative perspective. Thus, 
additional research should be conducted to examine the link between QCSRD and EM from 
the informative perspective. Furthermore, while the study has examined the impact of QCSRD 
on AEM and REM using a sample of non-financial firms, it is useful to examine the link 
between QCSRD and both EM strategies (AEM and REM) among financial firms, to achieve 
a thorough understanding of the determinants of EM activities among these firms. Moreover, 
this research focused on only one country: India. The present research designs can be conducted 
in other countries. Since prior research has argued that several factors such as culture, religion 
and other societal norms may influence CSR disclosure and EM (e.g. Gautam & Singh, 2010; 
Hastings, 2000), the current research could be an interesting topic for future research. This 
could also encourage academic researchers to investigate the effect of countries’ 
characteristics. India has different environmental contexts, religions and different cultures as 
one of the developing countries. Thus, future research could expand the current study designs 
by using samples from different countries in the analysis. Cross-country analysis might offer 
broader evidence in terms of managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings and disclose CSR 
information. Finally, the impact of BEEF and ACEF on the relation between REM and AEM 
has not been examined by previous research. This is the first study to examine this relationship 
based on Indian data. Corporate ownership in India is predominantly concentrated in the hands 
of domestic individuals and promoter groups, multinational parents, or the state 
(Balasubramanian & Anand, 2013).Thus, further research can re-examine this research 
question using data other than Indian data. 
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The Appendixes 
Appendix 1: CSR disclosure checklist items  
 
1- Community development 
1- Education, 
2- Contribution to national economy 
3- Charity and donation,  
4- Social activities support 
5- Other Community investment 
 
2- Human resources 
1-  Safety and health,  
2-  Employee equal opportunities 
3- Employee  training and development 
4- Retirement benefits. 
5- Other employee Data 
 
3- 
 
Products and services 
1- Products/ Services quality  
2- Products safety. 
3- Product or service development, 
4- ISO or other awards received by company. 
 5 - Other products data 
4- Customer 
1- Customer service information. 
2- customer feedback 
3- Others customer data 
 
5-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environment 
1- Pollution 
2- Recycling 
3- Waste management 
4- Water usage 
5- Emission of carbon and harmful gases 
6- Energy policy statement 
7- ISO or other awards received by company 
8- Other environmental policy statement 
 
6- 
 
Others CSR Information 
1-  General CSR Information 
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Appendix 2: USFUL dimension Checklist Items 
  Question Likert’s Literature 
Relevance CSR disclosure is estimated to be 
relevant if it has an influence on 
the users’ decisions (IASB, 
2010, p. 17). IFRS suggests that 
financial information impacts the 
decision-making by users to 
make it different. 
0 =  no CSRD 
1= disclose descriptive information on 
CSR is disclosed, 
 2 = descriptive and financial information 
of CSRD is included,  
3 = descriptive disclosure including 
financial and forward-looking 
information is reported. 
e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000; McDaniel et al., 
2002; Chakroun et al. 
2013, Hussainey, K., & 
Alotaibi, K., 2016. 
Faithful 
representation 
CSR disclosure to be faithfully 
representative, it should be 
natural, complete and free of the 
bias (IASB, 2010). 
0 = no negative and positive CSR 
activities are disclosed. 
1 = few positive events are disclosed 
(one paragraph). 
2 = more positive events are disclosed 
(more than one paragraph). 
3 = more positive events with negative 
events are disclosed. 
e.g. Razaee, 2003; Cohen 
et al., 2004; Chakroun et 
al. 2013, Hussainey, K., 
& Alotaibi, K., 2016. 
 
Understandability Understandability is defined as 
understanding of disclosure 
regarding the information quality 
which help users to understand 
the disclosure meaning. (IASB, 
2010), when information is 
classified concisely and 
presented clearly, 
understandability will be 
enhanced. 
 0 = no disclosure on CSR. 
 1 = poor presentation (nonfinancial 
information only, without any table, 
pictures or graphs). 
 2 = financial and nonfinancial 
information without any table, pictures 
or graphs are provided. 
 3 = a good presentation (text, financial 
information plus graphs, tables or 
pictures)  
e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000; Chakroun et al. 
2013, Hussainey, K., & 
Alotaibi, K., 2016. 
Comparability The Comparability is defined as 
the quality of disclosure that 
enables users for identifying the 
performance trends of the 
company over time and help 
users to compare between two 
sets of economic activities 
(IASB, 2010). 
0 = no ratios is found in annual report. 
 1 = few ratios are found (less than 5). 
2 = some ratios are found (from 5 to 10). 
3 = enough ratios are found (more than 
10).  
e.g. Cleary, 1999; 
Hussainey, K., & 
Alotaibi, K., 2016. 
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Appendix 3: The result Chow Test 
1- The relationship between REM and AEM  
 
AEM is dependent variable 
 
REM is dependent variable 
 
 
 
2- The relationship between Accuracy and QCSRD 
 
 
 
 
3-      The relationship between Accuracy and STRQ 
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4- The relationship between Accuracy and USFUL 
 
5- The relationship between Accuracy and SPR 
 
 
6- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
 
 
 
7- The relationship between REM and QCSRD 
 
 
 
8- The relationship between ACFO and QCSRD 
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9- The relationship between APROD and QCSRD 
 
 
 
10- The relationship between ADISX and QCSRD 
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Appendix 4: Hausman Test 
1- The relationship between REM and AEM 
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2- The relationship between Accuracy and QCSRD 
 
 
 
 
3- The relationship between Accuracy and STRQ 
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2- The relationship between Accuracy and USFUL 
 
 
 
 
3- The relationship between Accuracy and SPR 
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4- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
 
 
 
5- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
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6- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
 
 
7- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
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8- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
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Appendix 5: LM test 
1- The relationship between Accuracy and QCSRD 
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Appendix 6: The result of normality test 
1- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
 
2-  
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3- The relationship between REM and QCSRD 
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Appendix 7 Heterogeneity plot test 
 
1- The relationship between AEM and QCSRD 
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2- The relationship between REM and QCSRD 
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